To paraphrase David Méchin in 'Le Fana..' the Morane-Saulnier 406 is an aircraft that symbolises the French defeat of 1940. It was old, it was slow (only 400 km/h, rate of climb 12m/sec) and it was poorly armed (two machine guns and a cannon) - its magazines held just enough ammunition for a very short 10-second burst of fire. On 10 May 1940 some 400 of the 900-front line fighter strength of the Armée de l’Air were Morane 406s. It was the first 'modern' French fighter -a low-wing monoplane with retractable landing gear and an enclosed cockpit - to enter service. Designed in 1934 and making its maiden flight in August 1935, it was a contemporary of the fighters being developed by the other belligerents – the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and the Hawker Hurricane – whose prototypes, designed to very similar specifications, were flying at around the same time, give or take three months. Their performance was comparable, and the Morane 405 prototype was not entirely undeserving of the title ‘world’s best fighter’ bestowed upon it by the French press at the time. However, between the prototype’s maiden flight and the delivery of production aircraft, a race against time would unfold – one that France would lose amidst the turbulent economic and political climate of the 1930s: a production aircraft that was already obsolete, an industrial concern lacking the cash flow to modernise production lines, administrative delays within the ministry, procrastination by the air force’s technical departments, social unrest, and delays in deliveries from equipment suppliers. The Luftwaffe had already been using the Bf 109 for over a year before production models of the Ms 406 came into service, whilst production of the ‘Jumo’-engined Bf 109 was coming to an end just as large-scale production of the Morane was getting underway! Worse still for the French, production of the re-engined version of the Me 109 - the 'Emil' - which was technically far superior to the MS.406 was moving ahead more or less seamlessly. The French, however, proved incapable of producing the successor to the Ms 406 - the MS.450 - just as they proved incapable of producing even a simply improved version, the MS.410. By the time of the German attack, the French Air Force’s main aircraft was technically far inferior to its opponents and was one of the causes of the debacle that ensued… Just one cause, amongst many other failings on the part of the French Air Force.
By 10 May 1940 the Moranes were being replaced as fast as was possible by Bloch 152s (armed with two HS 404 20m cannon and two machine guns) and of course the D.520s which were then starting to roll out of the factory. GC III/2’s Moranes were replaced by Curtiss H-75s at the beginning of June. On 24 June only five Morane-equipped Groupes de Chasse were left among a total of some 24 Groupes de Chasse (about 17 % of the fighter aircraft, as re-equipped units mostly received 30-36 new aircraft instead of 24-28) and these, too, would have been re-equipped, mainly with D.520s, had not the campaign concluded as rapidly as it did. Although slated to convert to the new Arsenal VG. 33, GC I/2 started and finished the campaign on the MS 406.
The Morane’s low speed was in some instances not always an obstacle to catching up with formations of Luftwaffe bombers and even to carrying out several firing passes; but in unfavourable circumstances, the French fighter was not up to much. Cne (Captain) Robert Williame describes an attack led by GC I/2 on 1 June 1940 in his 1945 account 'L'escadrille des Cigognes' (or 'Stork squadron');
"..As soon as the bombers spotted us, they closed ranks. We were faced with a veritable fortress of 30 large aircraft. We were still 800 metres away when some sixty machine guns opened fire on us, leaving an impressive trail of white smoke behind the formation. Our slow closing speed and the distance at which the bombers had opened fire left us exposed to their fire for a long time. Unwisely influenced, we fired long bursts from too far away instead of delivering short bursts at close range, manoeuvring into sectors that were difficult for our opponents to hit. It was a failure.
The very next day, a similar mission brought us into contact with another German formation. There were six of us: the Coubé 'flight' with its three aircraft, Puybusque, Chalupa, and myself. We were waiting in the Pontarlier area, when Puybusque spotted a Junkers 88. Having dropped its bombs, it was returning to Germany heading north. Mechanical trouble must have forced it to break away from its formation and we could easily catch up with it - or so I thought. A brief pursuit showed us the futility of this, and we turned back to head for Pontarlier. Then almost immediately, seven Heinkel 111s appeared, coming from the south. I launched the attack; then I noticed some hesitation in my escort 'flight'. At that moment, 300 metres above the formation I was attacking, and 500 metres behind it, I saw four more Heinkels whose machine guns were firing at us. Coubé had mistaken them for twin-engined Messerschmitt 110 heavy fighters and had moved in against them with his patrol to protect us. During this manoeuvre, in the course of which he had had to gain altitude rapidly, he lost speed and consequently fell slightly behind the bombers. He was never able to catch up with them, despite a 100-kilometre pursuit at full throttle. I broke away from the formation of seven [Heinkel 111s] and started a firing run against the formation of four. The difference in speed between the Heinkels and the Moranes must have been around 10 km/h in our favour. From Pontarlier to Montbéliard, a distance of around a hundred kilometres, with the throttle wide open throughout and under almost constant machine-gun fire between passes, we were only able to make three attacks. Each of them ended within 100 metres of our targets. We could see our bullets and shells hitting them every time. Pieces of metal were being torn away. But not a single aircraft went down. And we had run out of ammunition. On his second attack Puybusque's machine caught fire. The hapless pilot struggled to jettison the canopy, frozen fast in the cold atmosphere but by standing on the seat and bent double he managed to push it away with his back. He jumped clear and came down some 10 km from the Swiss border.[...] On landing back in Damblain my 'Juliette III' was in a sad state..[..] That evening, CO Captain Daru told me that the commander of the eastern theatre of operations (France) was surprised that, following these last two days of 1 and 2 June, we had not shot down a single enemy aircraft. With tears in my eyes, I replied that we could not have done any better: of the three aircraft that had attacked, one had been set ablaze and a second seriously damaged by enemy fire. It was not our fault that our outdated aircraft prevented us from leading combat...”
Above; Cne Robert Williame (right) in early June 1940 in front of his MS 406 (No. 966) of the 'Stork squadron'. The words of Sgt Pierre Boillot, a pilot with GC II/7, sum up in a sentence what an MS.406 pilot might have felt; “..with the Dewoitine 520, you could engage in a dogfight, whereas with the Morane 406, you simply had to endure it.” On 8 June 1940 Williame thought he had made 'ace in a day' in an MS 406, downing Me 109s of JG 26 and Ju 87s of St.G 2- but some of his 'kills' were 'shared'. The 'best' day for the French fighter forces was 5 June with over 50 claims. The Moranes scored more victories than other types due mostly to their superior numbers and competent pilots. However, between September 1939 and the end of June 1940 the Luftwaffe aces shot down around 300-350 MS 406s, possibly more, approximately one third of total production..(Philippe via 'Avions')
On 8 June - five days after the launch of Unternehmen 'Paula', the large scale Luftwaffe assault on airfields around Paris intended to finish off the French air force - a three-aircraft patrol from GC I/2 led by Williame joined GC III/7 (equipped with D.520s) at Coulommiers airfield - crews from both units were soon scrambled on a 'destruction' mission over the sector Beauvais-Gisors-Persan-Beaumont, at an altitude of 4,500 metres, accompanied by Curtiss Hawks from II/4 providing top cover. Williame recalled:
“..Below us, the area south of Beauvais was ablaze, sending columns of smoke all the way to Paris that obscured the ground. Gisors was also on fire. There were fires everywhere – smaller in scale but numerous. It was a harrowing sight to behold. Suddenly, in the direction of Soissons, bursts of anti-aircraft fire caught my attention. I soon spotted a formation of some fifteen to twenty German bomber aircraft. Above and to the sides, numerous Messerschmitt 110s and 109s were accompanying them north-westwards. I headed towards them. Our escort was struggling to keep up. We had the sun behind us. I managed to position us behind a flight of three Messerschmitt 109s, which were part of a formation of nine aircraft flanking the southern quarter of the enemy force. I was able to get in closer and opened up at roughly the same time as Chalupa and Audebert. Both of us hit the Me 109 on the left, and then, on my own, I got the one in the centre from barely twenty metres. Both enemy fighters went into a spin and burst into flames. Pichon and Meunier saw the first one crash five kilometres north-west of Beauvais airfield, whilst, witnessed by Pichon and Audebert, the second suffered the same fate, at roughly the same spot. Seeing his leader and the other member of his patrol go up in flames, the third pilot made a slight turn to the right and spotted me twenty metres away from him. He fed in some rudder - two or three jerks - looking like a man who really didn’t know what he was going to do. I fired a burst at him. He went into a steep dive towards his own lines, spewing out a huge plume of smoke. Chalupa, Pichon and Meunier saw him just as I did, but no-one was able to witness his crash as more Messerschmitts were already trying to outmanoeuvre us. I glanced behind and above me. Our escort was no longer there. Perhaps they’d thrown themselves into the fray too and had done a good job? I never got to find out. I’d run out of ammunition. It was now a matter of getting us out of that hornet’s nest. We managed it without coming under attack and landed at Coulommiers...”
The Moranes flew a second sortie taking off in the evening for Soissons-Attichy, escorted by the D.520s of GC II/3. At around 19:45 two formations of gull-winged single-engine machines were intercepted over the sector - Stukas of St.G. 2. One of the Morane pilots (Sgt Jacques de Puybusque, seven victories) noted that the Ju 87s could manoeuvre well - both when defending themselves and they could 'attack' like fighters. But no fewer than six were claimed by GC I/2 shot down during this mission: Williame claimed two and a third shared and would subsequently be recommended for the cross of the Légion d'honneur for his leadership of the unit on this date. His 'score' on 8 June was the highest individual 'score' of a French fighter pilot during one day for the period May-June 1940 (aside from Le Gloan's exploit against the Italians). Two of the Morane pilots from the 'patrouille simple' of the second escadrille (Spa 103) were shot down: Adjt Streiff, the sole survivor, lost sight of his comrades during the dogfight. One of them, Lt Monty, was seen attacking enemy aircraft on his own: according to farmers’ accounts, he shot down two enemy aircraft before being shot down himself; the villagers of Longpont (Aisne) buried him in their village......
( In “L’escadrille des Cigognes” Cne Williame. Edition Arthaud, 1945)