In the skies of France, MS 406 in combat - 3 Me 109s downed in 15 seconds, 8 June 1940 - "la journée la plus glorieuse.."

 

To paraphrase David Méchin in 'Le Fana..' the Morane-Saulnier 406 is an aircraft that symbolises the French defeat of 1940. It was old, it was slow (only 400 km/h, rate of climb 12m/sec) and it was poorly armed (two machine guns and a cannon) - its magazines held just enough ammunition for a very short 10-second burst of fire. On 10 May 1940 some 400 of the 900-front line fighter strength of the Armée de l’Air were Morane 406s. It was the first 'modern' French fighter -a low-wing monoplane with retractable landing gear and an enclosed cockpit - to enter service. Designed in 1934 and making its maiden flight in August 1935, it was a contemporary of the fighters being developed by the other belligerents – the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and the Hawker Hurricane – whose prototypes, designed to very similar specifications, were flying at around the same time, give or take three months. Their performance was comparable, and the Morane 405 prototype was not entirely undeserving of the title ‘world’s best fighter’ bestowed upon it by the French press at the time. However, between the prototype’s maiden flight and the delivery of production aircraft, a race against time would unfold – one that France would lose amidst the turbulent economic and political climate of the 1930s: a production aircraft that was already obsolete, an industrial concern lacking the cash flow to modernise production lines, administrative delays within the ministry, procrastination by the air force’s technical departments, social unrest, and delays in deliveries from equipment suppliers. The Luftwaffe had already been using the Bf 109 for over a year before production models of the Ms 406 came into service, whilst production of the ‘Jumo’-engined Bf 109 was coming to an end just as large-scale production of the Morane was getting underway! Worse still for the French, production of the re-engined version of the Me 109 - the 'Emil' - which was technically far superior to the MS.406 was moving ahead more or less seamlessly. The French, however, proved incapable of producing the successor to the Ms 406 - the MS.450 - just as they proved incapable of producing even a simply improved version, the MS.410. By the time of the German attack, the French Air Force’s main aircraft was technically far inferior to its opponents and was one of the causes of the debacle that ensued… Just one cause, amongst many other failings on the part of the French Air Force.

By 10 May 1940 the Moranes were being replaced as fast as was possible by Bloch 152s (armed with two HS 404 20m cannon and two machine guns) and of course the D.520s which were then starting to roll out of the factory. GC III/2’s Moranes were replaced by Curtiss H-75s at the beginning of June. On 24 June only five Morane-equipped Groupes de Chasse were left among a total of some 24 Groupes de Chasse (about 17 % of the fighter aircraft, as re-equipped units mostly received 30-36 new aircraft instead of 24-28) and these, too, would have been re-equipped, mainly with D.520s, had not the campaign concluded as rapidly as it did. Although slated to convert to the new Arsenal VG. 33, GC I/2 started and finished the campaign on the MS 406.

The Morane’s low speed was in some instances not always an obstacle to catching up with formations of Luftwaffe bombers and even to carrying out several firing passes; but in unfavourable circumstances, the French fighter was not up to much. Cne (Captain) Robert Williame describes an attack led by GC I/2 on 1 June 1940 in his 1945 account 'L'escadrille des Cigognes' (or 'Stork squadron');

"..As soon as the bombers spotted us, they closed ranks. We were faced with a veritable fortress of 30 large aircraft. We were still 800 metres away when some sixty machine guns opened fire on us, leaving an impressive trail of white smoke behind the formation. Our slow closing speed and the distance at which the bombers had opened fire left us exposed to their fire for a long time. Unwisely influenced, we fired long bursts from too far away instead of delivering short bursts at close range, manoeuvring into sectors that were difficult for our opponents to hit. It was a failure.

The very next day, a similar mission brought us into contact with another German formation. There were six of us: the Coubé 'flight' with its three aircraft, Puybusque, Chalupa, and myself. We were waiting in the Pontarlier area, when Puybusque spotted a Junkers 88. Having dropped its bombs, it was returning to Germany heading north. Mechanical trouble must have forced it to break away from its formation and we could easily catch up with it - or so I thought. A brief pursuit showed us the futility of this, and we turned back to head for Pontarlier. Then almost immediately, seven Heinkel 111s appeared, coming from the south. I launched the attack; then I noticed some hesitation in my escort 'flight'. At that moment, 300 metres above the formation I was attacking, and 500 metres behind it, I saw four more Heinkels whose machine guns were firing at us. Coubé had mistaken them for twin-engined Messerschmitt 110 heavy fighters and had moved in against them with his patrol to protect us. During this manoeuvre, in the course of which he had had to gain altitude rapidly, he lost speed and consequently fell slightly behind the bombers. He was never able to catch up with them, despite a 100-kilometre pursuit at full throttle. I broke away from the formation of seven [Heinkel 111s] and started a firing run against the formation of four. The difference in speed between the Heinkels and the Moranes must have been around 10 km/h in our favour. From Pontarlier to Montbéliard, a distance of around a hundred kilometres, with the throttle wide open throughout and under almost constant machine-gun fire between passes, we were only able to make three attacks. Each of them ended within 100 metres of our targets. We could see our bullets and shells hitting them every time. Pieces of metal were being torn away. But not a single aircraft went down. And we had run out of ammunition. On his second attack Puybusque's machine caught fire. The hapless pilot struggled to jettison the canopy, frozen fast in the cold atmosphere but by standing on the seat and bent double he managed to push it away with his back. He jumped clear and came down some 10 km from the Swiss border.[...] On landing back in Damblain my 'Juliette III' was in a sad state..[..] That evening, CO Captain Daru told me that the commander of the eastern theatre of operations (France) was surprised that, following these last two days of 1 and 2 June, we had not shot down a single enemy aircraft. With tears in my eyes, I replied that we could not have done any better: of the three aircraft that had attacked, one had been set ablaze and a second seriously damaged by enemy fire. It was not our fault that our outdated aircraft prevented us from leading combat...”

Above; Cne Robert Williame (right) in early June 1940 in front of his MS 406 (No. 966) of the 'Stork squadron'. The words of Sgt Pierre Boillot, a pilot with GC II/7, sum up in a sentence what an MS.406 pilot might have felt; “..with the Dewoitine 520, you could engage in a dogfight, whereas with the Morane 406, you simply had to endure it.” On 8 June 1940 Williame thought he had made 'ace in a day' in an MS 406, downing Me 109s of JG 26 and Ju 87s of St.G 2- but some of his 'kills' were 'shared'. The 'best' day for the French fighter forces was 5 June with over 50 claims. The Moranes scored more victories than other types due mostly to their superior numbers and competent pilots.  However, between September 1939 and the end of June 1940 the Luftwaffe aces shot down around 300-350 MS 406s, possibly more, approximately one third of total production..(Philippe via 'Avions')

On 8 June - five days after the launch of Unternehmen 'Paula', the large scale Luftwaffe assault on airfields around Paris intended to finish off the French air force - a three-aircraft patrol from GC I/2 led by Williame joined GC III/7 (equipped with D.520s) at Coulommiers airfield - crews from both units were soon scrambled on a 'destruction' mission over the sector Beauvais-Gisors-Persan-Beaumont, at an altitude of 4,500 metres, accompanied by Curtiss Hawks from II/4 providing top cover. Williame recalled:

“..Below us, the area south of Beauvais was ablaze, sending columns of smoke all the way to Paris that obscured the ground. Gisors was also on fire. There were fires everywhere – smaller in scale but numerous. It was a harrowing sight to behold. Suddenly, in the direction of Soissons, bursts of anti-aircraft fire caught my attention. I soon spotted a formation of some fifteen to twenty German bomber aircraft. Above and to the sides, numerous Messerschmitt 110s and 109s were accompanying them north-westwards. I headed towards them. Our escort was struggling to keep up. We had the sun behind us. I managed to position us behind a flight of three Messerschmitt 109s, which were part of a formation of nine aircraft flanking the southern quarter of the enemy force. I was able to get in closer and opened up at roughly the same time as Chalupa and Audebert. Both of us hit the Me 109 on the left, and then, on my own, I got the one in the centre from barely twenty metres. Both enemy fighters went into a spin and burst into flames. Pichon and Meunier saw the first one crash five kilometres north-west of Beauvais airfield, whilst, witnessed by Pichon and Audebert, the second suffered the same fate, at roughly the same spot. Seeing his leader and the other member of his patrol go up in flames, the third pilot made a slight turn to the right and spotted me twenty metres away from him. He fed in some rudder - two or three jerks - looking like a man who really didn’t know what he was going to do. I fired a burst at him. He went into a steep dive towards his own lines, spewing out a huge plume of smoke. Chalupa, Pichon and Meunier saw him just as I did, but no-one was able to witness his crash as more Messerschmitts were already trying to outmanoeuvre us. I glanced behind and above me. Our escort was no longer there. Perhaps they’d thrown themselves into the fray too and had done a good job? I never got to find out. I’d run out of ammunition. It was now a matter of getting us out of that hornet’s nest. We managed it without coming under attack and landed at Coulommiers...”

The Moranes flew a second sortie taking off in the evening for Soissons-Attichy, escorted by the D.520s of GC II/3. At around 19:45 two formations of gull-winged single-engine machines were intercepted over the sector - Stukas of St.G. 2. One of the Morane pilots (Sgt Jacques de Puybusque, seven victories) noted that the Ju 87s could manoeuvre well - both when defending themselves and they could 'attack' like fighters. But no fewer than six were claimed by GC I/2 shot down during this mission: Williame claimed two and a third shared and would subsequently be recommended for the cross of the Légion d'honneur for his leadership of the unit on this date. His 'score' on 8 June was the highest individual 'score' of a French fighter pilot during one day for the period May-June 1940 (aside from Le Gloan's exploit against the Italians). Two of the Morane pilots from the 'patrouille simple' of the second escadrille (Spa 103) were shot down: Adjt Streiff, the sole survivor, lost sight of his comrades during the dogfight. One of them, Lt Monty, was seen attacking enemy aircraft on his own: according to farmers’ accounts, he shot down two enemy aircraft before being shot down himself; the villagers of Longpont (Aisne) buried him in their village......

  ( In “L’escadrille des Cigognes” Cne Williame. Edition Arthaud, 1945)

More on the MS 406 and it's pilots - around 13 of them achieved 5 or more victories against the Luftwaffe during May-June 1940. The Lela Presse MS 406 title has recently been revised, expanded and reissued. See avions-bateaux.com

Dewoitine D.520 in the air war over France May-June 1940.

 

By the end of WWI the French were the largest producers of combat aircraft and their air force one of the biggest in the world. But during the interwar years, French aviation suffered under systemic political instability, and catastrophic nationalisation policies - the Front Populaire government nationalized the aircraft industry into regional conglomerates, the so-called Sociétés Nationales de Constructions Aéronautiques or SNCAs. This forced factories to merge based on geography rather than economic logic -aircraft procurement was based on a policy of 'prototypes'- small numbers of individual types being financed per factory to keep them in production. Émile Dewoitine had been named 'directeur délégué' of the SNCA du 'Midi' (SNCAM) but it was the State who decided which aircraft were to be developed. Work on what would become the D.520 was more or less shelved for a year as the Air Ministry placed large orders for the fighter that had won the 1934 C1 fighter competition, the MS 405 (which evolved into the MS 406) - the MS 405 C1 first flew a couple of months after the Me 109 and three months before the Hawker Hurricane. The SNCAM spent most of 1937 supplying spares to keep France's fleet of ancient D.510s in the air. 

By the time of the German invasion, these factors—combined with outdated tactical doctrines and a lack of integrated strategic command—left the Armée de l'Air struggling against the highly coordinated Luftwaffe which had spent its brief existence flying (highly coordinated) 'manoeuvres' with the army. As James S. Corum points out in his recent title 'France, 1940' the Allies were perfectly capable in May 1940 of deploying large numbers of bombers and fighters in support of Allied counter-attacks and armoured thrusts ...but failed to do so.  Similarly the French never developed a 'workable' strategic air power doctrine - at no time was there any attempt to deploy French bombers aggressively against German strategic targets even once war had been declared! This reluctance to 'offend' the Germans did not extend to the Italians -  port installations in Venice were bombed with ancient Blochs during June 1940...

 The French (and others..) continue to argue about the effectiveness of the Armée de l'Air.  The 'reputation' of the Air Force was deliberately 'undermined' by the Vichy government who sought scapegoats after the armistice. Some French authors maintain that in May 1940 the Armée de l'Air had the most modern types, the best aircraft armament etc anywhere...although most of it was obviously too little and too late. The four leading French fighter 'Groupes de Chasse' flew American H-75 Hawks - huge orders had been placed with the Americans in 1937-38 when the French realised that they could not actually mass-manufacture fighter aircraft. French pilots however were well-trained and experienced. French fighter pilots flew lots of aerobatics and although they did not practise gunnery there were already a number of French fighter aces by May 1940. From September 1939 they had deployed to satellite fields near the German borders - although infrastructure and communications were rudimentary. In one notable Phoney War battle during November 1939 nine Hawks from II/GC 5 took on 27 Bf 109s and shot down 12 of them including the leading German ace at the time. Unfortunately for the French the Germans were flying the older 'D' model and not the newer Emil. According to James Slaughter in his 'Air Power over the Rhine' ;

" The Bf 109, which entered the conflict dominant, gained speed and firepower as a direct result of action in Spain as the war continued. Compare this with the French who worried that making the M.S.406 faster would unnecessarily increase tensions with Germany and lead to an arms race they apparently did not know they were already in. By 1940, the latest Bf 109s were far superior to virtually any fighter the French had, again largely due to the “Spanish laboratory.”

The Hawks were pretty capable machines if poorly armed. Leading Hawk unit I/GC 5 under Jean-Mary Accart achieved around 125 victories in the French campaign - the highest scoring French fighter unit. The Dewoitine D.520 struggled into service principally with GC I/3 during May 1940 - although this Groupe had been flying the new fighter since January 1940 serviceability as with any 'new' aircraft was pretty poor and teething issues were notable. Communist trade unions in 'red' Toulouse did much to hamper production and even in the spring of 1940 aircraft factories were still only working a five-day week -  French communists took their orders from Moscow and the Soviets had a non-aggression pact with the Germans until Barbarossa. 

Groupe de Chasse I/3 was only the third highest scoring Armée de l'Air fighter unit during the Battle of France with 75 victories. Some French authors like to stress that the Armée de l'Air had more than just a handful of modern fighters - other types such as the LeO 451, Amiot 351-354, Br 693, the Bloch 174 were all state-of-the-art aircraft, often the best in the world in their category.. and although the Me 109 E was obviously better than the MS 406 which constituted around 45% of French front-line fighter strength the Ms 406 was a more maneuverable fighter and it carried heavier armament - only around eighty of these were actually shot down by 109s in combat.  In reality the Ms 406 was slow and 'difficult' to mass produce - it taking twice as long to build an Ms 406 as it did an Me 109. Despite this some 600 Ms 406s had been delivered within 18 months of the type's first flight in 1935. On the German side somewhere between 150-160 Me 109s were lost in France at a time when monthly production of the Luftwaffe fighter was comparatively very low - around 25 machines. Ultimately the French 'problem' was not the Air Force nor their fighters. You could argue of course that France had not managed by May 1940 to effectively re-equip itself with a substantial force of its best fighters, nor had France developed the integrated command, radar and reporting networks that might have contributed to a much more effective air defence organisation. An effective force for the tactical support of French armies in the field was also lacking. 

Some of the points above are made by David Méchin in the latest 'Le Fana de l'Aviation' 'Hors Serie' (No. 77) currently on French news stands. Entitled " D.520 - les batailles d'un redoutable chasseur" ('D.520, the battles of a formidable fighter') Méchin's 'book-a-zine' is available from publisher Larivière's site here  (10€ euros for 130 pages).  Just getting built and into service was  one of the machine's 'battles' - see the image on pages 18-19 which according to the caption shows ".. the SNCAM Toulouse factory at maximum output in early 1940 "  - four 'workers' standing around, hands on hips or in pockets, staring at three partially completed D.520s!

By mid-June 1940 there were nearly 2000 D.520s on the SNCAM's order books. Some 467 D.520s were constructed - less than half this number saw any service. Only 34 D.520s took part in the fighting from May 14 onwards (GC I/3), 68 from May 15 on (GC I/3 and II/3), about 102 on June 1 (add GC II/7) and so forth.

An account from générale de brigade aérienne Duval ;

 ".. The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

( **see Danel/Cuny P.66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520s produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre' (not serviceable). By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..)

A young GC III/6 pilot officer Jean Menneglier recounted his first contact with the D.520;

 "... In mid-June GC III/6, which had been at Le Luc since the beginning of the month, finally exchanged its Morane Saulnier MS 406 for the long-awaited Dewoitine D.520. As soon as the first detachment, including Jacobi, chef d'escadrille (squadron leader) of the 5th, and Le Gloan, had returned, we left for Toulouse. We landed on June 15 at Francazal where we abandoned our old Moranes without regret. We were taken by bus to Blagnac where we made contact with the Dewoitine 520. The one they gave me was number 358. It was a splendid machine, entirely of metal, equipped with a Hispano-Suiza 12-cylinder V engine with a power rating greater than that of the Morane, of the order of 920 HP. To compensate for the torque the engine was offset by 1°30' and the vertical stabilizer had a wing profile providing some compensation according to the speed. It was armed with a 20 mm Hispano gun firing through the prop axis, like the 406, but with a magazine of 80 explosive shells instead of 60, and 4 machine guns, 2 in each wing, with a belt magazine of 700 cartridges per gun instead of 350. These were heated. This gave 6 seconds of continuous fire with the gun (800 rounds/min) and 35 seconds with the machine guns, which was much better than the 406. The landing gear was mechanically locked in the "retracted" position, so there was no problem in case of a bullet lodged in the hydraulic system. It was a fast plane, credited with a speed of 550 km/h at the recovery altitude, very fine to fly, which started quite easily, which turned well and which had very sound reactions. It was almost the equivalent of the Me 109. If we had had it at the beginning of the war, things would certainly have been different. There was one amusing detail about the machine. The D.520 was equipped with a 'trunk' (baggage compartment) that sat in the fuselage behind the pilot. It was of decent size and it proved to be very handy when we were on the move, allowing us to take a lot of personal belongings with us. When I took control of my new aircraft, I was surprised by the sensitivity of the rudder and I was snaking a little at takeoff, but I got used to it very quickly. After a few minutes of flight I returned to land at Francazal which we left on patrol the next day to join Le Luc. As soon as we landed, we were told what had happened the day before during our absence and how Le Gloan and Assollant had been able to shoot down 5 Italian machines in less than 45 minutes... " 

For the Luftwaffe the campaign in the West was of course far from the 'walk-over' perhaps imagined. Every Gruppe regularly lost men and machines and certainly not the most inexperienced. On May 21, the Gruppenkommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Erich Mix was shot down by Sous-Lieutenant Hubert de Salaberry in his GC I/3 Dewoitine D.520. Mix had just downed the D.520 flown by Sous-Lieutenant Jean Parisse (although he identified it as an Ms 406). De Salaberry wrote the following account in his unpublished memoir (via Persyn) ;

“ ..up ahead of me I caught sight of a D.520 on its back with its gear extended, a rather unusual sight at this altitude. It was wreathed in a huge sheet of bright orange flame, blazing from the engine cowl to the tail fin like a huge torch. The cockpit seemed to have disappeared. It was a haunting sight in the bright blue sky. Less than one hundred metres behind it a Bf 109 continued to squirt out burst after burst of fire as if at a fairground shooting range, sporadic flashes of flame dancing along its wing leading edges. I was filled with an overwhelming desire to deal this 109 some of its own medicine. After a quick glance behind to check my rear, I dropped down in behind the ‘Fritz’. He had seen me and understood straight away that the hunter was now the prey. He did what all German fighters do when they are caught napping – he rolled onto his back and dropped like a stone, counting on being able to build up enough speed to put some distance between us. I was not about to let him go. I rolled with him and headed down vertically, my engine screaming with the throttle against the stop. I had full confidence in my aircraft, the Dewoitine was very stable and the engine & prop behaved themselves impeccably... Reeling the 109 slowly in during our headlong dive I unleashed several brief bursts from directly astern. The German pilot did not react and continued on down. Suddenly I noticed the sky becoming darker, realised that the ground was rushing up toward us. Crushed by the deceleration as I eased out the dive I lost sight of the German. I orbited the area but could see nothing. Below me the countryside was peaceful and unremarkable...”

Below; Kommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Mix at the controls of his Emil, May 1940. On May 21, he nursed down his shot-up machine for a belly-landing near Roye after combat with GC I/3 D.520s. Sustaining only minor injuries he was able to depart the scene, before being recovered two days later by German troops. He was awarded the EK I (Iron Cross First Class).

Below; GC I/3 D.520 of the unit's 2e escadrille probably assigned to S/Lt Parisse, shot down on 21 May 1940 in the vicinity of Fonches-Fonchette (Somme) after combat with Bf 109s. The pilot was seriously wounded, taking a round in the chest and although he managed to carry out a successful belly-landing in a field and climb out of the cockpit he collapsed and died a short while later. As the local villagers had all fled his body was not properly buried until after they returned in late June ....note the SPA 69 emblem has been cut out of the fuselage side by 'souvenir' hunters...(source "GC I/3 Les rois du Dewoitine 520" published by Lela Presse Avions). 



G.C I/3 D.520s flew their last sorties in the battle for France on the afternoon of June 16, 1940 - ordered to strafe German motorised columns en-route for Nevers. Sous-lieutenant  Pierre Salva recalled;

" ..suddenly they appeared ahead of us - some thirty motorcycle outriders and an unending column of vehicles displaying black crosses. They had not heard us arrive such was the noise of their tracks and engines which covered the roar of ours. I doubt very much that they thought there were any French fighters left in the skies to interrupt their 'marche triomphale' . Their anti-aircraft batteries did not react at all. The first tank in the column was neatly centred in my sight - a miss was impossible. I was about to fire - and then, there in the gun-sight, women and children, and a horse pulling a cart loaded with more refugees. If I unleashed a burst now I might damage the tank but I would inflict carnage on women and children. Despite my orders I did not open fire. Nor did Salaberry...."


Below; Dewoitine D 520 prototype no. 3 seen after capture by the Germans, probably Cazaux. This aircraft was written off in a takeoff accident on March 11, 1940. The hard-edged camouflage distinguishes this from D.520 no. 2.

Below; an early series aircraft as indicated by the location of the radio access hatch. Only 54 D.520s were lost as a direct result of enemy action during May-June 1940. A further 22 were abandoned/lost/destroyed by the French themselves.

Below; Dewoitines stocked at Francazal, post armistice, 28 June 1940.  The D.520 production line was located at Saint-Martin-du-Touch, production site of more recent ATR turboprop aircraft.

How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose in May-June 1940? French claims for May-June can range from 300-1000  victories. Mombeek in his history of JG 2 quoted the following figures for Luftwaffe losses for this period; 460 fighters, 635 twin engine bombers and 150 Stukas for total losses amounting to 25% of Luftwaffe front-line strength. The current 'official' score for the French fighter squadrons as quoted by the SHD (Service Historique de la Défense) is 650-675 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. According to Peter Cornwell (page 529  'The Battle of France' ) the Luftwaffe lost no less than 3,278 aircrew killed (!) from Sept. ’39 through to the end of June 1940, as compared to the RAF’s 1,127 and the Armée de l’Air’s 923. Taking the period of the invasion on its own gives the German's a loss-rate during the campaign in France that was twice that of its BoB loss rate. Whatever the exact German losses for the French campaign they were pretty heavy. This obviously had an impact on the conduct of operations over England subsequently. In fact the 'myth' of French AF ineptitude during the Battle of France is probably closely related to the 'myth' of 'The Few' during the BoB.

D. 520 on display at the Le Bourget Air and Space museum. One of the last production examples, no. 862 was constructed for the Luftwaffe but is here repainted in the colours of GC III/6 ace Pierre Le Gloan..

Also on this blog;

Dewoitine D.520 in JG 105  -  archive photo scans

Ju 87 Stukas in the Blitzkrieg

 

On 10 May, 1940, the Wehrmacht launched the Westfeldzug, code-named 'Fall Gelb', the campaign in the West. All Ju 87 units (except I./St.G. 1) were committed over France, Belgium and the Netherlands, i.e. around 350 machines. The Ju 87s were quickly feared by their adversaries as they pursued their Blitzkrieg (lightning war) in close collaboration with German ground and Panzer forces. Flying up to four sorties per day, the Stuka units suffered about 30% losses. With barely any rest period they were then dispatched on missions over England. This dusty, slightly battle-worn Ju 87 of III./St.G. 51 was photographed at the end of the campaign. This Gruppe would soon be incorporated in St.G. 1.

Probably unsurprisingly the Junkers Ju 87, the Luftwaffe’s 'Sturzkampfflugzeug' (dive-bombing aircraft) or 'Stuka' has inspired myth and urban legend.. As Spanish Civil War historian Gerald Howson  described, a veteran of the International Brigades who was at Dunkirk related how the Stukas operating over the Low countries and France during May 1940 had not been a novelty for him since he had already encountered them in Spain... Unlikely since the Germans sent only a handful of Stukas to Spain and, in all probability what had been seen in Spain was another type entirely. Similarly, Italian Ju 87s flew from Belgian bases in May 1940 to bomb columns of refugees in the south of France. The Italians though did not receive Stukas until much later, and the Stuka's endurance hardly allowed it to operate at those sorts of ranges. But then Ju 87s were 'omnipresent' during the Second World War. Popular TV 'historical' documentaries - including episode 1 of a brand-new WW II history series- generally feature footage of panicked columns of refugees fleeing in May/June 1940 interspersed with clips showing the 'shrill screams of the Stuka's sirens' as they dive-bombed these same columns. Horrific stories accompanied by 'blood-curdling' sound effects are related over background scenes of the ever-present Ju 87s swooping down accompanied by film of entire buildings collapsing like a house of cards. Even 'serious' authors are not immune;

"..with its distinctive cranked wing and vulture-like looks, the blood-curdling shriek of a Stuka in a near-vertical power-dive was certain to strike fear and panic into the most battle-hardened soldiers as well as defenceless civilians.." (Falconer, Haynes Workshop Manual, 2018)

Of course, by the time French, Belgian and Dutch refugees had started to flee southwards during May 1940, the 'Jehrico trumpet' sirens had been removed from the aircraft. And Ju 87 pilots had more than enough on their hands than setting out to massacre unfortunate civilians. As for flattening towns and cities, the Stukas' usual payload could at best barely penetrate a single building, far less collapse an entire block of flats/apartments. But worth noting perhaps -  as per Marc Hazard in his 'Stuka in the Blitzkrieg' (Lela Presse, 2023) - that somewhere between 80-100 Stuka pilots who took part in the campaign of May/June 1940 went on to receive the RK, ie some 25% of all Stuka pilots who took part in the Westfeldzug. And that the defeated Allies (Britain and France) did much to 'demonise' the Ju 87 and its crews - the "Teutonic harbinger of destruction [... and] stylised figureheads of the invincible German war machine " (Falconer)  - as part of the explanation for their rapid collapse and defeat in May/June 1940..

Below; a newspaper account published in a March 1942 issue of the NS Leipziger Tageszeitung newspaper written by Schlachtflieger ace Oblt. Dieter Pekrun relating his shooting-down (by Spitfires of course) on his second sortie of the day while piloting a Stab I./StG 2 Stuka on the third day of the Westfeldzug, 12 May 1940 - Pekrun managed to bail out and came down in a field of 'irate' cows at Geetbets, Belgium - behind  the lines. With his BS dead, Pekrun evaded the various search efforts mounted to locate him and returned home some 24 hours after being presumed MIA. Pekrun was awarded the RK in June 1941.

Also on this blog

Stuka crew of LG 1 relaxes ahead of the attack in the West

'Stukas in the Blitzkrieg', Marc Hazard, Stukageschwader 77, summer 1940

Caudron CR. 714 in the Battle for France - GC 1/145 ('Les Polonais de Varsovie')

..the following is based on Grzegorz Slizewski's book  "The Lost Hopes - Polish fighters over France " with some important corrections and additional material from Comas/Ledet 'The Caudron Fighters' published by Lela Presse and the highly recommended book "Les aviateurs polonais en France" (B. Belcarz, Artipresse).

On 17 February 1940 French Air Minister Guy La Chambre signed an agreement with Polish General Sikorsky to establish a Polish fighter Group comprising two escadrilles in the Armee de l'Air. This would naturally be established from the DIAP (Depot d'instruction de l'Aviation Polonaise - Polish air training centre) then based in Lyon. On the opening day of the German offensive in the West, 10 May, the Poles of CG 1/145 were in Lyon with just a handful of Ms 406s and CR. 714s.  'Defence flights' for the city were quickly formed and the aircraft relocated to Mions outside Lyons - from where the air raid warnings sounded from the city could just about be heard (radios were defective). Eager to fight with whatever types the French could supply, the Poles had been accumulating training time on the CR. 714 even before the 'official' establishment of the first 'French' Polish fighter squadron. The first Caudrons arrived at Lyon-Bron during March 1940. But it was not originally envisaged that they would be deployed in combat. The French knew full well that the light-weight Caudron powered by its small Renault engine would be severely outclassed by Luftwaffe types, so had used the type as a cheap 'training' machine. But in the end there were no other types available in numbers. By 21 May some 16 machines had been taken on strength and the Groupe had relocated to Villacoublay, south of Paris (part of the 23rd Groupement de chassse) and close to the Caudron factory at Guyancourt for further deliveries. The French Minister of Air, Guy La Chambre, inspected GC 1/145 ('Les Polonais de Varsovie') on 25 May. The aircraft were being delivered straight from the production line and presented a litany of defects forcing the minister to  suspend all flying on the "Cyclone". He was told about the aircraft's poor climb rate, a weak landing gear and its faulty lowering mechanism, as well as an imperfect propeller pitch-changing device, engine cowling 'ballooning' during dives and unreliable dashboard instruments. While the Minister's reaction was perhaps the proper one, it served to deprive the Polish pilots in France of the only aircraft available to them. The French Air Ministry had originally ordered the Armee de l'Air to equip the Poles with the Bloch 152, aircraft which were not available. Despite Polish pilots having more hours on the Ms 406 they were not offered these aircraft either far less the D.520 - types for which they were probably not considered 'suitable'. The very next day, they elected to continue flying the defective Caudrons. On 2 June the squadron moved to the airfield at Dreux, some 30 km west of Paris. There were no facilities on the field and it was not until the ground echelon arrived that the aircraft could be dispersed and carefully camouflaged around the airfield. Two days later, the Poles finally received the long-awaited radios. Up to that point, they scrambled at the signal of an automobile horn. To beef up GC II/10, on 5 June the squadron was ordered to patrol in the Rouen area. This was done by Flight "B". Half an hour later, Flight "A" was moved to Bretingy-sur-Orge, south of Paris, with the task of defending the French capitol. The next day, the squadron was charged with the same duties.

In the evening of June 6, the squadron was attached to the 42eme Groupement de Chasse, defending a sector of the Seine Valley between Vernon and Meulan.

Two three-aircraft reconnaissance flights on the route Meulan-Magny-en-Vexin-Fleury-sur-Andelle-Vernon and along the Seine were the squadron's only activity on 7 June. The next day found the squadron with twenty-one serviceable aircraft. The remaining thirteen required much attention from the ground crews. Some were being generally checked after forced landings, while multiple tasks were performed on others; changing a stabilizer or rudder, replacing Plexiglas in a cockpit, a carburettor, parts of an electrical installation, and so on. That day "A" Flight was assigned to GC II/10. At 15:54 a section of five aircraft, led by kpt. Wczelik, took off to patrol over the Vernon-Meulan area. South of Rouen, the Poles attacked a group of about twenty Messerschmit 110 Cs of III./ ZG 26 escorting a group of Stukas. After several months of inaction the Poles were spoiling for a fight. They landed at 17:10. Officers Wczelik and Czerwinski claimed victories, but none of the other pilots saw the enemy aircraft crash. Commander Kepinski recognized only one of them as probable but soon after, around the area of that clash, the wreck of a single Me-110 was found, all five Polish pilots receiving a victory share as was usual French practise.

 por. Tadeusz Czerwinski  kpt. Wczelik, ppor. Aleksy Zukowski, ppor. Jerzy Godlewski and kpr. Piotr Zaniewski were credited with one Bf 110 each - for one aircraft shot down.  Belcarz points out that the only Bf 110 losses were over the German-Swiss border zone while in Comas/Ledet one notable French historian argues that the German loss does not appear in most recognised sources (including Vasco and Cornwell) since it was not reported until later in the year. The squadron suffered no losses, but most of the aircraft were shot-up and temporarily unserviceable.

At Bernay, on 9 June the squadron joined up with Flight "B", to fly a sweep at full strength over the front-line area. Eighteen aircraft took off at 2:30 p.m. Led by maj. Kepinski were Commandant de Marmier, kpt. Laguna, kpt. Wczelik,por. Zdzislaw Zadrozinski, por. Jan Obuchowski, por. Julian Kowalski, ppor. Czeslaw Glowczynski, ppor. Jerzy Czerniak, ppor. Lech Lachowicki-Czechowicz,ppor. Jerzy Godlewski, ppor. Bronislaw Skibinski, sierz. Jan Palak, plut. Andrzej Niewiara, plut. Mieczyslaw Parafinski and kpr. Edward Uchto. Over Vernon, the squadron attacked an enemy formation of about 50 Dornier Do 17s escorted by about 20 Bf 109s. Due to  radio malfunction the attack was poorly coordinated.

 Czeslaw Glowczynski recalled;

 ".. My radio didn't work so I wasn't aware of any warnings. I soon noticed a group of about 30 Bf 109s, some 3,000 feet below. Since our leader didn't react. I come close to him and waggled my wings. I pointed down; he nodded to indicate that he had seen them and continued straight and level. I gave him a sign that I would attack. I thought that at least a part of our group would follow me in this attack, but I found myself alone, with the exception of my wingman, ppr. Czerniak. Our position was advantageous since we attacked from above, with the sun behind us. At top speed, I swept down on the rearmost Bf 109. The swiftness of my attack caused the whole German formation to break up. One of them went down steeply, smoking heavily. Immediately, I went after another one, which, after few bursts, crashed in a forest south of Rouen. I was then shot at from behind. Several bullets came near my head and shattered my instrument panel. I managed to force land on a front-line strip at Evreux. Czerniak got one Bf 109 as well, and he landed with me. It took the whole evening to fix my machine and I returned to the unit the next day.."

 Jerzy Czerniak recalled;

 "... The weather was beautiful and flying in the direction of our assigned zone of operation, we were climbing slowly. At 12 or 15 thousand, we started to look for game. For over thirty minutes, the flight was uneventful, and looking at Czeslaw, I could tell that he was greatly disappointed that there were no Huns around. That's when I saw aluminium flashes  glinting below us. I gave Czeslaw a sign, and we altered our course a little to put the sun directly behind us. Next, Czeslaw dived and I followed him, releasing the safety catch on my armament in case there was a scrap. And there was  one. We closed on the Messerschmitts and Czeslaw coolly positioned himself right behind one of them and opened fire. Others maneuvered themselves behind Czeslaw who continued spraying his wiggling victim. All this time, I flew behind my colleague, observing the scene. One Messerschmitt started to shoot at him and that's when I intervened. I jumped at the German and gave him a burst right in the cockpit. He must have got it since he flipped over, going down. I served him another portion and stayed with him till he crashed into a French farmer's yard.."

(p55 Comas/Ledet - The Caudron fighters)

 Ppor. Glowczynski was credited with one Bf 109 destroyed and one damaged, while ppor. Czerniak got one Bf 109 destroyed. Plut. Parafinski also scored, destroying a Bf 109, while kpt. Wczelik and sierz. Markiewicz shared one Dornier 17 destroyed. Two planes crashed south of Andelys and others near Louviers. This time, the squadron suffered a loss of three pilots. Killed in action were por. Obuchowski, ppor. Lachowicki-Czechowicz and kpr. Uchto. por. Kowalski was slighty wounded, while ppor. Godlewski force landed at Villacoblay. The rest of the pilots landed at 3:50 p.m. A few aircraft were unserviceable. Godlewski tried to join his unit on a new plane but nose-dived during the takeoff. He come out of the accident unscathed, but couldn't catch up with the squadron. The Poles clashed with the Emils of II./JG 27 (some sources state III./JG 26). The pilots from this unit claimed three Moranes shot down. Credited with victories were: Gruppenkomandeur Hauptmann Werner Andres, Feldwebel Karl Witzel and Feldwebel Karl-Heinz Bendert. In reality, the Luftwaffe lost three Bf 109s. Leutnant Hans Bosch ( Hptm. Andres wingman ) and Feldwebel Karl-Heinz Kranich become POWs. Leutnant Hermann Kugler went missing. Slightly wounded, Hptm. Andres force landed near Creil...

Below;  when CG 1/145 evacuated the airfield at Dreux they left behind some fifteen Caudrons. The reverse of the image below - an expired Ebay.de auction - is captioned, 'Dreux 22 July 1940'. Compare with the image on page 180 of  "Les aviateurs polonais en France" (B. Belcarz, Artipresse). First machine visible "1" is the aircraft assigned to plut. Markiewicz.

Above; reproduced on p55 of the Comas/Ledet title and p181 of the Belcarz ' Les aviateurs polonais en France', three 2e escadrille machines at Dreux on 22 June 'white 10 and 'white 13' with 'white 7' in the background. 'White 13' was flown by the future 56th FG ace Boleslaw Gladych. 

1/145 pilots had 12 victories 'officially' confirmed (Bf 110s, Do 17s and four Bf 109s) for the loss of 3 Caudron pilots KIA. Ppor. Jerzy Godlewski -officially MIA- reached England and joined 72 Sqd

"The Caudron fighters - the Cr. 714 and variants" authored by Matthieu Comas and Michel Ledet 

"Les aviateurs polonais en France" (B. Belcarz, Artipresse).

And a rare page-view look into the huge Belcarz book on the Cr. 714 "Cyclone" - details of the cockpit/instrument panel

Dr Belcarz founder of Stratus and Mushroom recently succumbed to cancer RIP

Stuka crews of 10.(St)/LG 1 relax ahead of the attack in the West

A Stuka crew from 10.(St)/LG 1 relaxing by their machine just prior to the Westfeldzug, the campaign in the West. The Ju 87s of IV./LG 1 departed their field near Cologne on 19 May 1940 and headed for Belgium. Their new base was a field strip near Hargimont (Marche). This 10. Staffel machine was Ju 87 B-1 'L1+CU'.

Just one of the many excellent photos published in the latest BA (issue 104) from Lela Presse " Stuka dans la Blitzkrieg " Part II (the  attack in the West. Part I covered Poland and Scandinavia..). BATAILLES AÉRIENNES is the leading French-language quarterly from Lela Presse, in continuous publication since 1997. Features rare first person accounts, rarely seen photos and superlative artwork from Eric Schwartz, still only 13 euros (100 pages, 200 illustrations, 10-15 artworks). Available here

" Here is the second part of our study dedicated to the terrifying weapon -in its day- that was the Stuka. After a successful trial in Poland, the Ju 87 was to prove its worth on the battlefield in the West. As we know, it was a great success. And the Allied anti-aircraft defences of the time were not the equivalent of the German Flak; not to mention the Allied fighters who, although overwhelmed by the scale of the Luftwaffe attacks, were able to score a few successes against the Stuka, successes which already revealed the vulnerability of the dive-bomber. So, no, the Stuka was not a miracle weapon; it was simply a question of making good use of a weapon in a rather favorable context. Mention is often made of the Stuka's siren, which terrorized the population and Allied troops. Certainly, this was the case during certain attacks, and this is essentially what was remembered and, above all, peddled. Nevertheless, numerous photographs show that personnel were happy to get rid of this equipment... whose effectiveness could not have been as radical as later reported...

To this day, the Stuka remains a legendary weapon, inseparable from the 'Blitzkrieg' waged by the 3rd Reich. The author's account shows us that the reality needs to be nuanced, as the losses suffered by Stuka units were not negligible; nor were those suffered by other Luftwaffe units, even in a context of near-total victory..."

No 1 Squadron Hurricanes in France 1939-40 - Sqn Leader 'Bull' Halahan and 'blue 109s'

 

 

During late 1939 No. 1 Squadron was commanded by Squadron Leader Patrick J. H. ‘Bull’ Halahan. While airmen from all over the Empire served in 1 Sqd,  the Irish squadron leader earned a certain notoriety. Patrick Halahan, a Dubliner, nicknamed ‘Bull’ - apparently because of his sturdy broad-shouldered physique - had what might then have been referred to as a 'strong character'. He spoke with a thick Irish accent and according to one account, " his language was colorful and down-to-earth. " As part of 67 Wing, 1 Squadron was sent to France during October 1939 along with No. 73 squadron as part of the air component of the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) assigned to escort and protect the BEF's Fairey Battle bomber and recce machines. No. 1 Squadron was to settle in at the airfield at Vassincourt (Champagne-Ardennes region), while No. 73 Squadron under Squadron Leader Brian W. ‘Red’ Knox was stationed at Rouvres. The field at Vassincourt was perched above the small village of Neuville where No 1 squadron’s pilots were quartered in private lodgings. It was, according to the pilots, a ‘real hole’. Squadron Leader Halahan soon had good cause to call upon the services of the new French interpreter assigned to the unit - a certain Jean Demozay. With Jean’s help the pilots were able to establish their ‘mess’ in the local town hall, rather than utilize the ancient and run down buildings on the airfield. This was the first real contact between the two men and their paths would subsequently cross on several more occasions.

'Bull' was soon embroiled in struggles with RAF command. This became evident when he insisted on back armour being installed in the Hurricane. The authorities believed this would disrupt the aircraft's centre of gravity, but Halahan took the armour from a Fairey Battle bomber and had it installed. It was soon apparent that it did not affect the Hurricane’s handling. He demanded – against regulations – that the convergence distance for the eight machine guns be reduced to short range, which increased the effectiveness of the Hurricanes. 

Pilots of No 1 Squadron at Vassincourt show off one of their Hurricanes to Mr Mahmoud Abu Fath, a member of the Egyptian Parliament, January 1940. Looking at the camera is Flying Officer Billy Drake, who became a 20-kill ace and survived the war.

Below; Thierry Dekker artwork of No. 1 Sqd Hurricane Mk 1. s/n L1679 'JX-G' of F/O Paul Richey, Vassincourt, May 1940. Note the French-style rudder stripes. Note the aircraft is fitted with a reflector gun sight. The photo also appears to show aluminium or blue lower surfaces (rear fuselage) - as Richey put it in his account ; " all German aircraft were difficult for us to see from below as they were painted duck-egg blue. Our  [..aircraft ] stood out like chequer-boards. Not without a struggle 'Bull' had our machines painted blue underneath, a colour subsequently adopted for all RAF fighters..."

As noted by Richey in his memoir 'Fighter Pilot' 'Bull' also filed a report regarding the lower surface colours of RAF fighters which was forwarded to AASF HQ and dated May 7, 1940 and had originated from test flying a captured Bf 109 against Hurricanes on May 2, 1940 at Orleans. S/Ldr Halahan wrote:

" ..during these tests one point became abundantly clear, namely that the 109, due to its better under camouflage, was very much more difficult to spot from underneath than was the Hurricane. This gives the 109 a definite tactical advantage, namely when they are below us they can spot us at long distance, which we when below them find most difficult. As in all our combats initial surprise is the ideal at which we aim, I strongly recommend the undersides of Hurricanes be painted a duck egg blue, the roundels remaining the same, as it is the contrast between the black and the white only which is noticeable from below.."

Above, Bull Halahan (CO) and Johnny Walker in front of 'L', still apparently with black/white undersides

Below; P/O Peter 'Boy' Mould of 1 Sqd is often credited with scoring the first RAF victory over France on Oct 30, 1939 in Hurricane L1842 coded 'T'. In fact he did not - a JGr. 152 Bf 109 D flown by Gfr. Joseph Scherm was shot down by return fire when attacking a Battle of No. 103 Sqd on September 27. Three weeks later a Hurricane coded 'T' was lost after a mid-air collision with a French H-75A. The Hurricane was flown by Sgt A.V. Clowes (of JX-B with wasp fame) and the photo shows Clowes alongside the machine - note the 'T'  - the serial 'JX' appears to have been overpainted, as was common practice at the time. While codes change in service of course this may well have been Mould's aircraft.

Loss report for P/O Mould, flying a replacement Hurri, coded "T" on May 10, 1940
Type: Hurricane Mk 1
Serial number: P2649, JX-T
Operation: Patrol
Damaged: 10/05/1940
P/O W.O. Mould - unhurt
Took off from Vassincourt. Hit by return fire from Do 17 engaged east of Rouvres 05.00 hrs. Returned with slight damage and punctured tyre. Aircraft damaged but repairable.

Another Irish pilot to benefit from Halahan’s leadership in 1 Sqd was John Ignatius Kilmartin from Dundalk, County Louth. ‘Killy’ claimed several aircraft destroyed during the Battle of France, including a Messerschmitt Bf 109 on 12 May 1940.  (claimed as a Heinkel He 112). On that same day, his leader, ‘Bull’ Halahan shot down a ‘real’ Bf 109 before being brought down himself. Luckily, he was unhurt and managed to return to his unit. He continued to lead them to numerous victories in the air until the exhausted Squadron was granted a return to Britain on 24 May. Both pilots became instructors at No. 5 Operational Training Unit at RAF Aston Down. Halahan became its commander, but Kilmartin was sent to RAF Tangmere to participate in the Battle of Britain, shooting down two aircraft in the first three days. 

Surprisingly the experienced Halahan was not involved in the Battle of Britain. In April 1941 he led a formation of 24 Hurricanes, taking off from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and flying to the besieged Malta, enabling the island to hold off Italian-German air attacks. However, in June 1941, he took responsibility for a riotous drinking spree of some of his men and was transferred to the Middle East. With his career stalled, he retired from the RAF in 1943. This, together with his absence from the Battle of Britain, may be the reason why he is largely forgotten. 

The memoirs of Richey and Drake, two direct witnesses suggest other reasons. For example, Halahan is described as  having a certain contempt for the French ally and made no secret of it according to the Francophile Richey. Drake describes him as an unwelcoming fellow who did not wish to have any ongoing contact with his men. He lived in a chateau or, although married, indulged in adultery with local girls (his Francophobia was therefore 'two-speed'). It is perhaps for his 'harsh' temperament ('Bull') and his various misdemeanours that led to his eclipse rather than for his 'non-participation' in the Battle of Britain.... 

Kilmartin had a much longer career, flying Typhoons and Thunderbolts and taking command of several units from Scotland to Sierra Leone and from Middle Wallop to Sumatra. After the war, Kilmartin stayed in the RAF and held several positions in NATO until 8th July 1958, when he retired as a Wing Commander.

Irish volunteers in the RAF during the Battle of France - essay by Joseph Quinn

Also on this blog;

Two controversial French aces; Clostermann and Demozay

'Chamberlain' emblem on Knullenkopf Do 17 P - ebay photo find #332

another 'Chamberlain' emblem on this Knullenkopf 1.(F)/123 Dornier Do 17 coded "4U+CH". With the Adjutant of the Aufklärungsgruppe, Oblt Goebel, on board, the crew of this particular machine flew a sortie over the Dunkirk 'pocket' on June 3, 1940. See page 56 of Rabader's "Knullenkopfstaffel". Note the Knullenkopf emblem on the engine cowl.

More 'Churchill and Chamberlain ' emblem on Knullenkopfstaffel Dornier also on this blog here

A brief history of the French 'Stuka' - Loire Nieuport LN 401/411 of the Aéronautique Navale - French naval air arm dive bomber

Above; a freshly-built 'pre-series' LN 411 dive bomber - the so-called French Stuka - seen in St Raphael after its first flight. The Germans gave authorisation to the French to complete assembly of 24 LN 411 bombers which were on the construction line in Issy-les-Moulineaux in June 1940.

A contemporary of the Blackburn Skua, the "French Stuka" was a small gull-winged, single-engine 'strike' dive bomber conceived for the French naval air arm as the Loire-Nieuport 40;  the navalised variant was the LN 401 intended for service on the French carrier Béarn and fitted with a landing hook, buoyancy 'cells' inflated with CO2 and foldable wings, while the LN 411 was a land-based variant planned to equip regular Armée de l'Air bomber units. In the end the Armée de l'Air rejected the type - its 600hp Hispano-Suiza engine meant that the aircraft was slow and underpowered. The 411 were thus also taken on strength by the Marine. Both versions served in the dive bomber squadrons of the Navy, AB 2 and AB 4. L'Aéronautique Navale -the air arm of the French navy - la Marine Française - had four escadrilles or squadrons of "strike bombers" - each of twelve aircraft; escadrilles AB 1 and AB 3 were equipped with the Chance Vought 156 F while escadrilles AB 2 and AB 4 thus flew the Loire Nieuport 401 and 411.

As the French carrier, the Béarn, was engaged in the task of transporting warplanes purchased in the USA back to France, the LN 401s were never involved in shipboard operations, being shore-based throughout their career. Escadrille AB 4 converted from the LN 401 to the LN 411 in April 1940, its LN 401s being distributed among Escadrille AB 2, the conversion unit at Lanvéoc-Poulmic, and the war reserve at Cherbourg. By 10 May 1940, AB 2 and AB 4 each had its full complement of 12 aircraft, the former being based at Berck and the latter still completing its operational training, at Cherbourg-Querqueville. AB 2 had undertaken its first sorties when the LN 411s of AB 4 joined it at Berck on 17 May. Two days later, ten aircraft were lost to flak during an attack by 20 aircraft from both escadrilles on the crossroads at Berlaimont against German tank columns driving on northern French ports. The 10 that survived the sortie to reach Berck were all so badly damaged that on the following day only three aircraft could be mustered for an attack on the Origny Bridge over the Oise, one of these being lost. On 21 May another aircraft was shot down to leave the two escadrilles with one airworthy machine.

Two views of the LN 401 flown by Lieutenant Vilbert of AB 2 and downed by flak when attacking German armoured columns advancing on Cambrai on the evening of 19 May. This was one of a number of these machines brought down by anti-aircraft fire in the particularly ill-fated action against German armour at the Berlaimont road junction

Personal accounts of LN 411 pilots in action are rare; Admiral Francis Lainé, then fighter pilot and squadron leader in the Aéronavale, related an account of flying the LN 411 in action in the Battle of France in the review Icare # 60, "L'Aéronavale - les marins pilotes témoignent".

 In November 1939, as first lieutenant and experienced fighter pilot, Lainé was appointed to command AB 4. But, at Lanvéoc-Poulmic, the airbase theoretically dedicated to the AB 4, only 2 pilots were appointed to his squadron without any aircraft: Some "experts", at the Ministère de la Marine, expected seriously the impossible - that this unit be operational before mid-June 1940. As Prudhomme in his history of the type explains the dive bombing sight was never fitted in these machines. Nevertheless, Lainé managed to fly 14.5 hours in January 1940, "among them, a magnificent gift of my excellent friend Jean Lorenzi, squadron leader of the AB 2, who allowed me to fly 0 hours 25 and two landings with his own Loire-Nieuport 401." Succeeding also to transferring the AB 4 to Orly airbase, very close to the Nieuport plant of Issy-les-Moulineaux where the LN 411 were manufactured, aircraft and pilots were operationally ready in April 1940. The training was done at Cherbourg-Querqueville. It consisted of vertical dives from 4 000 m to 800 m, also in dives at 60° or 45° from 1 200 m to 300 m with concrete bombs then with operational bombs. Another training sortie type flown were fighter missions, firing live munitions. During the final training sorties flown on May 17 there was a fatal crash, the pilot unable to pull up his LN 411 from the dive. The full squadron went to Berck, to join the AB 2.

On May 19, both units (AB 2 and AB 4, some 20 Loire-Nieuports) received the order to attack German armored columns seen close to Berlaimont and were airborne at 18:30. The route chosen to reach the target was straight from Berck to Berlaimont, flying over the town of Arras. Rommel's VIIth Panzer Division had already started crossing the crossroads and the Vth were to follow..

 Admiral Lainé recalled: "I was very proud to lead these 20 well armed fighter-bombers into combat. This was probably the most 'interesting' command I had in the forty three years I was in the French Navy." The two squadrons flew at low altitude in seven sections, with 100 m between them. The "low altitude" of between 300 m and 600 metres saw the top speed of the LN 401 and 411 down to just 320 kph and their cruise speed to 250 kph. During the 20 last kilometers, the Loire-Nieuport dive-bombers were 'shadowed' by a "Henschel 126".  At 10 km from the target the French formation climbed to 1200 m. At 19:30, CO Lainé dove first, followed by the rest of the wing, exactly over the Berlaimont crossroads. He was "warmly welcomed" by  intense AA fire. Defensive fire was so dense he believed that two of his comrades were brought down straight away. Lainé’s Loire-Nieuport was also hit by a shell which destroyed his radio-transmitter. In fact, Petty officer Téoulet had been killed instantly by a German shell, his LN 411 flew some 20 kilometers further on before crashing with his yellow painted bomb still intact. Petty officer Goasguen was downed and killed, apparently not by enemy fire at all, but by French anti-aircraft fire  as he was preparing to land on his own airfield. Lainé, looking backward, saw the other sections diving tidily and, suddenly, a huge black cloud caused by the smoke of multiple bomb explosions, anti-aircraft fire and by the fire of those tanks and buildings hit by the bombs. The black cloud quickly shrouded the whole town. Lainé: "I saw a large tank park, the perfect target for some bombs, which could have caused tremendous damage, but now, I had no means to report this to any of my pilots." Thirty two years latter, remembering his actual mood as he flew northward at very low altitude, he was filled with anger: "To see my comrades brought down like that made me mad!". So he proceeded to shoot up anything that moved: "The gunners of a dreadful Flak 88 mm cannon, and a German motorcyclist rolling around like a shot rabbit." Captain Vuilliez stated elsewhere that all the LN 401 and 411 of this mission escaped from the dive bombing of the Berlaimont crossroad, but that that the flak took its toll on the return flight so the losses increased gradually. At 20:30, four LN 411 of  escadrille AB 4 landed at Berck, "all more or less damaged by the Flak fire, but, also, I’m afraid, riddled by fragments issued from the explosions of their own bombs released too late…"  Among the five other LN 411 bombers of this squadron, one was destroyed by French anti-aircraft fire, one by German Flak close to the attacked crossroad, the three others had belly landed with their pilots alive (2 POW). In escadrille AB 2  the petty officer Pascal was killed in flight and crashed close to his target. Three LN 401 belly landed, their pilots becoming POWs. Only one machine from the two squadrons, the LN 401 of ensign Faivre was attacked by four Bf 109 Emils. Evading most of their passes, the French pilot succeeded in putting down in a rough field south of Cambrai and exited his aircraft unharmed. From the 11 Loire-Nieuport 401s of  AB 2, six had returned home. According to author Arnaud Prudhomme in his history of the type, six bombs had come down squarely on the crossroads which was engulfed in a huge traffic jam.  German casualties at the crossroads may have amounted to as many as 400 KIA and WIA. Two full days were needed for reorganizing and repairing this division brought to a standstill.

 The following day, May 20, all the available dive-bombers of the three naval attack squadrons AB 1 (equipped with 11 Chance-Vought 156 Vindicators), AB 2 and AB 4 (with only 3 Loire-Nieuports serviceable, the others being repaired), were sent out on a new mission - the destruction of a bridge at Origny-Sainte-Benoîte (about 40 km south of Berlaimont). The Vindicators of AB 1 took off from a distant airfield (Alprecht), so they had to rendezvous above Berck where the Loire-Nieuports were based.

Having reached Berck airfield, the aircraft of AB 1 flew directly to the bridge at Origny, without waiting for three Loire-Nieuports which were still climbing. It is reported that the engines of these aircraft began to overheat in an attempt to catch up with the Vindicators forcing their pilots to slow down.  (French aviation blogger Drix states on his page that the American and the French dive-bombers shared the same empty weight of 2135 kg so while the engine of the Vindicator delivered 825 hp, given factors such as a twin-bladed prop, larger wing area and less streamlined fuselage and cowl it is doubtful whether the Vindicator was indeed faster than the Loire-Nieuport.) The Vindicators, now alone, were attacked by twelve Bf 109 Emils. Caught by surprise and their poor weak armament insufficient protection, five of the French machines were instantly downed, including the 3 section leaders. Two Vindicators, having evaded the Messerschmitt attack, flew to the target and unsuccessfully bombed the bridge.  The AB 1 squadron leader Mesny returned safely at home but his comrade was downed inside the French lines, his gunner being KIA.

 The Loire-Nieuport garnered a mixed reputation. Positive assessments were expressed by her pilots who relied on their fighter-bombers: Admiral Louis Cassé emphasised that dive-bombing required good pilot training. He also highlighted production difficulties with the bomb sight.

Criticisms of the LN fighter-bomber family came mainly from the French themselves unsurprisingly. Among them was Jacques Mordal, a Navy medical officer, on the staff of Admiral Auphan in late 1942 in Vichy. Thirty-two years later, he wrote the introduction for the Icare magazine  review of the Aéronavale en 1940. He was of the opinion that the LN 401 /411 was 100 kph slower than the Vindicator and the high loss rate demonstrated that the Loire-Nieuport dive-bomber was not suitable  for attacking terrestrial targets…which of course it was not. A negative assessment was also expressed by CC Corfmat, who was one of the first French pilots to fly the Vindicator. In his report on the Battle of France, given to Vichy authorities at the end of 1940, he expressed "the requirement to replace the obsolete Loire-Nieuport with American machines". He said also the Loire-Nieuport was too frail and worn out.

Admiral Lainé, who conducted the 'successful' attack on Berlaimont was a supporter of the LN 411,  underlining the good visibility offered to the pilots, allowing good bombing accuracy. After the war, for a parliamentary commission, he was less inclined to praise the machine. He repeated the criticisms of Captain Corfmat about the too light construction of the Loire-Nieuport.  On May 21 petty officer Moulinier flew a solo fighter sortie: he succeeded in inflicting heavy damage on a Dornier 17 bomber, setting one engine on fire, but was hit by the German rear gunner. Moulinier made a successful emergency landing. Nevertheless, during the afternoon of the same day, he was able to fly his repaired Loire-Nieuport and to land in safety at Cherbourg-Querqueville at 19:15... This action, as also the CAP managed by the AB2 to protect the Calais-Marck airbase, demonstrated the self-confidence of the pilots flying this fighter-bomber. Captain Vuilliez, in his book, after having gathered the testimonies of a number of LN 40, 401 and 411 pilots, were laudatory about them. The operational results were better than those of the Vindicator: In the Netherlands, the Loire-Nieuport and the Vindicator flew respectively 27 and 21 sorties. In totally similar conditions, for a apparently similar bombing efficiency, none of the LN was missing, one of them even destroying a He 111 bomber...

The last delivery of Vindicators was transferred  to the British government a few hours before De Gaulle flew to London, there to broadcast his 'famous' call to continue the fight.  After training and some trials, the British refused to use the Vindicator, preferring to assign the crews to Fairey Swordfish. The only combat operation flown by the Vindicator in U.S. Navy service was the Battle of Midway during the Pacific War. Again, these aircraft suffered high losses while failing to achieve strikes on the Japanese ships. Maybe, the nicknames found by the USMC crews, "Vibrator" and "Wind indicator", suggest how these aircraft was unfitted to the dive-bombing role. France had also ordered  the completely obsolete Curtiss Helldiver XSBC-3 and, by pure chance, the Douglas Dauntless which was an excellent aircraft but, unfortunately, this machine was not delivered in time for the battle...

Below ; from left to right, wrecks of pre-series LN.40s, the first variant of the type, which was used to train new crews on the type; n°5 "AB 2.12", n°4 "AB 2.11" and n°3 "AB 2.9". The LN.40 n°3 and n°4 were involved in accidents on 7 April 1940. Both were cannibalised to repair other Loire Nieuport dive-bombers. The three were abandoned at Berck on 21 May 1940 when AB 2 departed this field

Above;  LN 401 the navalised variant - note the arrestor hook

Subsequently, in anticipation of Italy's entry into the war, the survivors of these two units were shifted to airfields in southern France, most notably at Hyères-Palyvestre on 4 June 1940. Some sources confirm only eight of 36 LN 411 dive bombers arrived in southern France after their heavy losses. A strength report of the French naval air arm dive bomber squadrons cites the following

AB 2 at Hyères with 8 LN 401/411 of which six were serviceable
AB 3 at Cuers Pierrefeu with 12 Chance-Vought 156 F, all serviceable
AB 4 at Hyères with 8 LN 401/411 on strength of which six were serviceable

From 4 June to 25 June AB 2 and AB 4 carried out reconnaissance and bombing sorties over Italy as well as maritime convoy escort missions. Note that on 15 June 1940 following a strafing attack by 27 Fiat CR 42  biplane fighters of the 150th (or 151) gruppo, six CV 156 F bombers were destroyed on the ground. In addition during the night of 18-19 June, following a raid on Novi-Ligure, 2 LN 411 of AB 4 failed to return to base (pilots M. Billien and SM. Riquier).Towards the end of June the remaining LN 411 bombers crossed the Mediterranean with the intention of reaching Algeria. En route three aircraft were forced through engine problems to crash land en route - LN 401, n° 2, flown by SM. Le Moal and LN 411, n° 20, piloted by le M. Meheut, both from AB 2, crash-landed near the locality of Portixeddu on Sardinia (see below) due to loss of oil pressure while two days later on 27 June,  LN 411, n° 8, piloted by le SM. Mehault of AB 4, also force-landed with oil pressure problems, this time on the small island of Asinara, north-west of Sardinia.

See here for more pics

http://fandavion.free.fr/LoireNieuportLN411.htm