In July 1944 two Gruppen of Oblt. Johann Kogler's ZG 26 converted from the Me 410 to the Fw 190 and a new Jagdgeschwader 6 was established. Kogler retained his position as Kommodore. Hptm. Willi Elstermann was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 6. Elstermann was a pre-war pilot, born in December 1917, and a decorated career officer -awarded the EK I and the combat clasp in Gold - and rated as 'above average'. Having flown in ZG 52 - and been shot down by French H-75 Hawks during September 1939 - he flew combat in NJG 3 prior to being appointed Kdr. of II./ZG 26. His 'Einsatzfreudigkeit' was especially noted - his 'enthusiasm and commitment to combat'. By mid-January 1945 he had flown some 150 combat sorties and returned seven victories. Although he had been 'sanctioned' after the disastrous performance of his Gruppe in France during late August 1944 (some 50 machines lost in around two weeks combat) he had been re-appointed to command later in the year, taking over as Kommandeur of I./JG 6.
In late January 1945 Elstermann and elements of his Gruppe had the misfortune to find themselves directly in the advance of the so-called Soviet 'Vistula-Oder' operation - the 'steamroller' that brought the Red Army in a matter of weeks to within striking distance of Berlin. I./JG 6 was on the airfield of Schroda-Ost. Schroda (now Środa Wielkopolska) was a German town and administrative district (Kreis) within the Prussian province of Posen (Poznań region), located some 30 km south-east of the city of Posen (Poznań). Posen lies on the river Warta (Werte in German or Werthe in English), one of Poland's longest rivers. It meets the Oder at Kostrzyn on the Polish-German border - the then German 'fortress' of Küstrin. Alongside Elstermann and I./JG 6 in Schroda were elements of I./JG 301 under Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Friedrich-Karl Wodtke and III./SG 77 under the Staffelkapitän of 7./SG 77 Hptm Günther Ludigkeit. Wodtke was another pre-war pilot (born 1916 in Ansbach) transferring from the Aufkl.Kette AS/88 to 3./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406, prior to retraining as a bomber pilot. As Stafü in III./KG 1 he attended the Verbandsführerschule/KG 101 and during September 1943 held the rank of Hptm. and was StaKa in 3./KG 30. Ludigkeit was a decorated Stuka pilot in St.G 77 with the DKiG. He had subsequently been awarded the Ritterkreuz in March 1944 having then flown some 765 combat sorties. All three of the Gruppen led by these officers were assigned to 3. Flieger-Division.
I./JG 301 had barely arrived in Schroda, transferring on 21 January 1945 as part of the wholesale shift of Western fighter Gruppen to the Eastern Front. Unfortunately for the hapless fighter pilots Schroda was so close to the front lines that pilots were among some of the men immediately deployed to the ground forces attempting to hold up the Russians. At least two pilots were killed in theses clashes.
But crucially for what happened next, all three Gruppen were then 'socked-in' by bad weather with little chance of getting airborne...
On Monday 22 January takeoffs were impossible at Schroda Ost due to weather conditions. I./JG 6 had twelve operational and four non-operational Focke-Wulf aircraft at Schroda; also present were elements of I./JG 301—with two operational and two non-operational Fw 190s each—and III./SG 77 with eight aircraft. Other units had parked their aircraft at the airfield and handed them over to the airfield commandant. All told, the Schroda-Ost airfield held approximately 65 aircraft. Over the course of the day and the following night, the situation there became critical, as the capture of the airfield by Soviet troops became ever more likely. In light of this, the Kommandeur I./JG 6 was placed in command of I./JG 301 and III./SG 77 present on site, by order of the 3. FL. Div. (3rd Air Division). Furthermore, it was ordered that only the minimum number of aircrew and technical personnel required to ready the aircraft for takeoff and ferry them away were to remain at the airfield. All other personnel were to withdraw immediately to Posen, travelling by road as a unified group. The mission assigned to the Gruppenkommandeur I./JG 6 was to order and oversee the transfer of the aircraft to Posen, subject to weather conditions. As a precaution, the aircraft were to be concentrated together in a tight formation and at the same time prepared for demolition—an action the Gruppenkommandeur was to order should the airfield come under direct fire and takeoffs become impossible. Subsequently, the detachment remaining at the airfield was to be deployed for the airfield's continued defense or begin the march back to Posen, in accordance with the instructions of the Horstkommandant (Airfield Commander). As the situation grew increasingly critical and repeated telephone appeals to the 3rd Air Division failed to yield an evacuation order, the Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 6—acting in concert with the commanders of I./JG 301 and III./SG 77—decided to load the available vehicles and ready all personnel (with the exception of the I./JG 6 Gruppenkommandeur himself and a small demolition squad) for departure outside the airfield perimeter. That evening, when the column could see from a distance that the Schroda-West airfield was being destroyed and demolitions were also taking place at Schroda Ost, it began its withdrawal. In reality, however, only the permanent structures at the East airfield were demolished at that stage, while the remaining detachment continued to hold its position. It was not until 05:30 on the morning of January 23—prompted by the approach of enemy forces—that the aircraft assembled at the airfield were actually destroyed - some 60-odd aircraft. As a result of these events, court-martial proceedings were initiated against the three Kommandeure involved; following an oral hearing on January 27, all three were sentenced to several weeks of aggravated barracks arrest ( geschärfter Stubenarrest) for negligent breach of duty..
The events at Schroda-Ost as recounted above are based on the field court-martial verdict issued by the Special Court of the Commander-in-Chief of *Luftflotte* 6 on 27 January 1945 (BA/MA RL 7/529).
. To quote from JfV 16/I (Prien/Balke)
".. The verdict leaves a decidedly ambivalent impression; while formally correct, the presiding judge appears to have been torn between the higher command's implicit demand for harsh penalties and a discernible desire to ensure justice for the highly decorated officers on trial—particularly given that they were neither responsible for the desperate situation that arose at Schroda nor had their actions resulted in damage that could have been avoided through proper conduct... "
In other words - and as understood by this blog - Elstermann would likely have been court-martialed and punished regardless of whether he had blown up 60 perfectly good aircraft or let them fall into Russian hands - all of this through no fault of his own....
".. The accused are convicted of negligent breach of duty— Hptm. Wodtke also of negligent disobedience—as follows:
Hptm. Elstermann is sentenced to 6 (six) weeks of strict room arrest,
Hptm. Wodtke to (four) weeks of strict room arrest,
Hptm. Ludigkeit to 3 (three) weeks of strict room arrest.
Hptm. Ludigkeit is acquitted of the charge of cowardice on the grounds of lack of culpability.."















