Monday, 16 November 2026
Death notice Fw. Reinhold Höger 9./JG 54 - archive photo scan #57
Monday, 9 November 2026
5./ZG 76 - summer 1941, De Kooy, Holland by Peter Kassak
Previously on this blog, I was able to post a video of a Viermot-kill (Abschuss) achieved by Ofw. Walter Karbstein (2./ZG 76) from 2 April 1944.
(https://falkeeins.blogspot.com/2025/05/ofw-walter-karbstein-2zg-76.html)
The exact date these images were captured is not known. However as there is a cake it may well be that they captured a celebration of the birthday of one of the pilots. The biographical data indicates then that Wilhelm Herget, whose birthday was on 30 June (born 1910) is a possible candidate.
1/ above, a picture from August 1941, taken in the environment of II./ZG 76 at the Dutch airfield. The men‘s faces radiate a relaxed atmosphere. From the left, Oblt. Adolf Borchers and Lt. Hans-Heinrich König. A few of the leading pilots of II. Gruppe are strolling to the right of the picture. Oblt. Wilhelm Herget - easily recognisable from his small stature - walks in the summer sun without shoes, which appears to emphasize his small height. Oblt. Hans-Joachim Jabs, wearing sunglasses, shows off his Knight‘s Cross, which he received for his achievements the previous summer. On the far right is Hptm. Heinz Nacke, who, after the death of Erich Groth on 15 August 1941, took command of II. Gruppe.
2/ below, a picture taken in the same location and time frame. A convivial meeting and chat under the summer sun in August 1941, members of II./ZG 76 are seen here engaged in friendly conversation. Hans-Joachim Jabs is sitting in the middle of the picture facing the photographer, with Borchers next to him. Nacke sits in an armchair to the left of Jabs.(Marek Žatkovič collection)
3/ below; an image of a larger group of II./ZG 76 men. To the left can be recognized the blonde-haired Lt. Hans-Heinrich König, to the right of him is Hptm. Heinz Nacke, in the far middle sits Oblt. Hans-Joachim Jabs and next to him on the right Oblt. Adolf Borchers and two unknown pilots. (Marek Žatkovič collection)
More details about the "Haifischgeschwader" may be found in Peter Kassak's recommended book covering the history of this unit throughout WWII, recently reviewed in glowing terms by Robert Forsyth in Axis Wings volume 4. See also the link below..
Friday, 6 November 2026
Steinhoff - Kommodore JG 77, last months in Italy - archive photo scan #56
Another previously unpublished image in the Luftwaffe blog 'archive photo scan' series. Kommodore Steinhoff salutes the gathering in front of the Hakenkreuz at a festive occasion for the Stab JG 77 in Poggio Renatico (north of Bologna) during the latter months of the unit's stay in Italy. Perhaps a celebration to mark the award of the Schwerter for the Kommodore which occurred in late July 1944 just days after the assassination attempt on the Führer. Did Steinhoff still believe in the 'Endsieg' - 'final victory'- even now? Less than 10 years after this image the Americans had retrained him to fly their new jet fighters ahead of the 'official' establishment of the new Bundesluftwaffe. Flights for Steinhoff in USAF T-33s - which were not made public at the time- took place in Germany as early as November 1952, well before he went out to the US for jet 'refresher' training. (see Kropf - 'Jet Geschwader im Aufbruch') The new Bundesluftwaffe was not officially established until late 1955... (Kühne via Brouez)
Below, Steinhoff (right) with the Kommandeur of I./JG 77 Hptm. Theo Lindemann during March 1944 in Görz/Gorizia (30 km south of Udine) where the unit was briefly based during March 1944. Note in the background a Gustav of the Gruppenstab under camouflage netting/mats.
Thursday, 5 November 2026
Abschußmeldung Oblt. Heinz Gottlob, 1./JG 26
Wednesday, 4 November 2026
Labour shortages in the aviation industry, June 1943
A memo from the Milch papers in the RL 3 files
1.) The labour situation in the aviation industry is becoming critical. The drafting of essential German personnel into military service can no longer be offset. The total percentage of foreign workers has reached a level that cannot be exceeded without compromising both the quality and the volume of production. More than half of all productive workers are already foreign nationals. At the Junkers aircraft plants, work on the Ju 52 is currently overseen by only six German foremen and inspectors; everyone else is Russian. The BMW 801 is being manufactured by a workforce that is 75% Russian, and the Ju 87 by one that is 90% Russian.
Friday, 30 October 2026
Fw 190s of 5./JG 26 - archive photo scan #55
To complement the images posted elsewhere here are few more from DAZ 40, an ECPA-D file featuring the activities of 5./JG 26 somewhere on the Channel front in late 1941. The aircraft are among some of the first Fw 190 A-1s into service - note the absence of cooling slots behind the engine. Staffelkapitän was Oblt. Wolfgang Kosse - with cap and neck scarf below - who flew 'black 10' with the WNr. 100 as seen in the photo. Kosse is pictured discussing signal cartridges with Lt. Horst Sternberg, who regularly flew 'black 13'. Click to view large...
Wednesday, 28 October 2026
Nachtschlachtgruppe 8 on the Eastern Front, March 1945
A summary of the activities of NSGr.8 for the month of March 1945, dated 31.03.45, and written up by Major and Gruppenkommandeur Johann Trnka for his 'parent-command' 4 Fliegerdivision (BA RL 7-6/21)
2.) Own operational activity:
Over the course of the month, 178 Ju 87s, 6 Ju 188s, 4 Ju 88s, and 2 Go 145s were deployed across 7 operational days. The following ordnance was dropped: 61 AB 500s, 143 AB 250 SD 16s, 262 AB 250 SD 16s, 1 "Mark-rot 500," 5 "Mark-grün 500s," 4 "Mark-grün 250s," (target markers), 250 SD 70s, 19 SD 250s, 6 SC 500s, and 37 LC 50s.
The attacks targeted troop concentrations, artillery positions, and vehicle concentrations in the areas of Gorgast, Manschnow, Neu-Manschnow, Reithwein, Göritz, and Lebus, as well as routes leading up to the Oder crossings near Rathstock and Göritz.
Given the favorable weather conditions, the operations were carried out with the targets illuminated and marked by Ju 88 aircraft. As the targets were clearly identified by the aircrews and subsequent bombing patterns were observed, it can be assumed with certainty that the enemy suffered significant losses in both personnel and materiel.
3.) Notable successes
Following the attack on Lebus on 25 March 1945 (blog note : a small town in eastern Germany located approximately 80 to 90 kilometres east of Berlin, sitting on the west bank of the Oder River) the 712th Infantry [Division] reported:
"Enemy staging areas disrupted by bombs and artillery fire. Caused by bombs: Large fires in the centre of Lebus—likely fuel—and an ammunition depot destroyed. Casualties not yet determined.
The intended attack (detected via radio intelligence at 06:15) was thwarted. The bombs landed accurately— primarily on the eastern and northern parts of Lebus, but also across the rest of the area. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was minimal. Furthermore, it was reported via radio transmission: Enemy staging areas were shattered by bombs and artillery, preventing them from launching their attack. Fires and explosions—flames visible in Lebus.
The enemy is constructing trenches and field fortifications opposite our own main battle line (HKL). Enemy troops are regrouping throughout the entire sector. There is renewed artillery activity in and around Lebus.
Enemy artillery is ranging in on the main battle line and the area near the front. Constant enemy aerial reconnaissance. On 27 March, 1945, the Küstrin Fortress command reported: Our own ground-attack aircraft sorties were on target and provided significant relief.
4.) Specific operational findings:
a)
Coordinated attacks in Staffel strength (approximately 15 aircraft), led by a Ju 88 acting as a pathfinder (Beleuchter) have proven highly effective. By illuminating the target and marking it with target-marker bombs, crews can orient themselves precisely within the operational area, allowing them to execute attacks under optimal conditions. The accuracy of these strikes was excellent in every instance. Because the crews attack in rapid succession, the formations are generally able to verify their own strike results.
b)
With visibility less than 5 km/cloud base below 500 m, operations are rarely worthwhile, as the resulting flight difficulties and poor target-identification capabilities preclude effective dive-bombing attacks.
c)
During attacks in the immediate vicinity of the front line, it is crucial for our own troops to signal their positions—for instance, by using white flares —to indicate their location relative to the enemy.

















