Fieseler Fi 156 Storch on offer at Eagles11.com

 

reproduced with the permission of warbird brokers Eagles11.com

"..Fieseler Storch Fi 156 C3 is now exclusively for sale with Eagles Eleven. Owned by “Historiske fly AS Ltd” this rare and very special aircraft spent ten years and over 9000 hours undergoing a meticulous full nut and bolt restoration. Currently on the Norwegian register... 

.... as LN-WNS, and with just 90 hours flown, this much loved Argus-powered Storch is now looking for a new owner with an appreciation for detail and craftsmanship..." 

 A slideshow of 'walkaround' images is available on the Eagles11 web site here

Fw 190 Schlachtflieger an der Ostfront - SG 77, April 1945

 

A chapter in Jens Bechler's book 'Aufschlagbrand' (Volume I) kindly sent to me by Davy McKee focuses on some of the events of April 1945 around Dresden when the 'close-support' Schlachtflieger of SG 77 sustained heavy loses as its Fw 190 F-8s - some toting Panzerblitz anti-tank rockets - and Ju 87 Gs were heavily engaged in ground-attack missions against Soviet forces while USAF P-51s were overhead almost constantly. 

Fw 190 F-8 of I./SG 77 in Alteno, February 1945

Although the month of April 1945 opened with a period of poor weather that largely grounded Allied air forces, the end of the war was fast approaching. Luftwaffe pilot and aircraft losses were increasing from day to day. This was especially true of those ground-attack units flying almost constant operations against Soviet ground forces. One of these units was SG 77- in a four-day period in mid-April 1945 SG 77 lost a 'one hundred-kill' ace and three Ritterkreuz holders. 

Through early February SG 77 was based at Kamenz and Cottbus. From mid-February to early March I. Gruppe of SG 77 shifted to Alteno, while II. Gruppe moved to Gahro on 18 February. Takeoffs were among the most tricky of operations for these Gruppen operating so close to the front with 'swarms' of Allied fighters overhead almost continually. There was literally nowhere to hide.

One pilot Fw Ernst Kelle recalled;

" ..according to my notes, we were in Cottbus from 10 February to 10 April. We were in constant action along the Bóbr (river flowing through the north of the Czech Republic and the south-west of Poland) and around Kustrin. I remember that on the morning of 2 April my room mate Horst Görtler (RK 30 March  1945) was feeling unwell with stomach problems (Magenbeschwerden) and asked me to stand in for him at cockpit readiness. Just the day before his machine  - Kennzeichen 'E' - had taken some flak hits (Flakbeschuss) but the holes had been riveted up overnight. Almost as soon as I had strapped into the Fw red and green flares were fired off  - the signal for 'Alarmstart' (scramble!). Two of us got airborne immediately - as I selected gear up and flaps in we were directed over the radio towards two La-5s south of Cottbus. I was in my third curving turn to the right when I suddenly realised that the rudder was not responding to the stick. I recall that I bailed out with the machine already on its back  - which was not easy. Hanging under the chute I came under ground fire - probably Volkssturm. The next morning I discovered bruises on my neck and thigh - I had opened the chute rather too early. In addition I was in uniform and in the rush had not put on my leather flying suit (Lederkombi). Once on the ground I made my way to the crash site of my machine..."

The Fw 190 had come down in a field close to the airfield narrowly missing a house whose occupants had been sitting down to breakfast.  On 6 April the Panzerjägerstaffel of SG 77 moved to Kamenz under their new RKträger Lt. Max Diepold. Diepold's Stukas now entered the fighting on the Oder. 

Horst Görtler and Max Diepold were the last two RK recipients in SG 77, awarded 30 March 1945, at Cottbus by Gen. d. Flieger Seidemann. Diepold's 10.(Pz.)/SG 77 was heavily committed around Bautzen. Görtler was a Soviet POW until the spring of 1947 when he was released due to illness. He was killed in a flying accident in October 1956.

The front moved ever closer. On 11 April Russian tank spearheads reached Forst despite the efforts of SG 77. It was on this date that SG 77 lost their Austrian RK-holder Hptm. Anton Andorfer. As he is still MIA it is presumed that he was downed by Soviet anti-aircraft fire somewhere along the Autobahn between Liegnitz and Forst. Of the nine Fw 190s airborne only one returned to Alteno.  Returning to Kamenz from a combat sortie on 13 April Uffz. Heinz Kroll crash-landed his machine on the airfield and sustained serious injuries. He was extricated from the wreckage before the machine exploded. With spinal injuries and a broken nose the young pilot was evacuated to a hospital in Karlsbad. His war was over.

On 16 April the Red Army launched the final battle of WWII on German soil - the assault on Berlin from the Oder and Neisse rivers. A dull rumbling disturbed the peace and quiet on SG 77's airfields. The Tagesmeldung from Heeresgruppe Mitte on 16 April reported the massive Soviet artillery bombardment targeting German defensive positions, particularly on the Seelow Heights, the last major defensive line east of Berlin. Thousands of guns, rockets, and Katyusha launchers fired simultaneously, creating one of the most intense barrages of the war.

(Map by Lonio17 / Orionist  under Creative Commons. Note Dresden/Kamenz/Bautzen at bottom centre with Cottbus/Forst/Gubin further north)

On 17 April, at Kamenz, Gruppenkommandeur III./SG 77 Studemann gave his orders to the individual Staffelkapitäne - all Staffeln were to get airborne. Pilots were already strapped in at cockpit readiness - for many it would be their last flight..A formation of 55th Fighter Group P-51s spotted the Fw 190s of 7. and 8. Staffeln getting airborne from the grass field - and the killing began. The Americans claimed ten Fw 190s downed and a further five damaged.At the controls of his Fw 190 F-8 'Black 9 +' Staffelkapitän 8./SG 77 August Lambert jettisoned his ordnance but in a running dogfight failed to evade his attackers. He was shot down near Hoyerswerda (north of Bautzen). He had achieved his 100th (aerial) victory earlier in the month. Lost with him was another leading SG 77 RK-bearer and Schlachtflieger - Lt. Gerd Bauer. He along with several others were killed in the dogfight 1 km north-west of Kukau near Kamenz. The crash site of Fw. Wolfram Szymanski (7. Staffel) was excavated near Kamenz-Thonberg in 2007 - the force of the 'Aufschlagbrand' was such that wreckage was found scattered over a 300-metre wide area. 9. Staffel pilot Ortwin Pech recalled;

" .. I flew three sorties on 17 April. The 'circus' started in the early hours. I was assigned to the Alarmschwarm and was scrambled when the first American fighter formation was reported on approach - 18 Thunderbolts. Wild dog-fighting was soon underway. I chased a P-47 to the east of Dresden before my effective fire forced the pilot to bail out. I returned to Kamenz bathed in sweat. But there was little respite. We were in the air again just before mid-day to strafe Russian tanks near Tschiwitz. then P-51s attacked the field. We looked on helplessly as the 'Scheiben Schiessen' (lit.'turkey shoot') ran its course. Among the comrades brought down were the two RK-holders Lambert and Bauer. We were ordered up again that evening to attack Russian road columns near Trebendorf. By the time I later fell into my 'cot' I was exhausted.. Not a day that I would easily forget.."

Franz Kugler, Gruppenadjutant in I./SG 77 later wrote to Lambert's widow; 

" ..shortly before the last Russian offensive the Geschwader moved to Kamenz north-east of Dresden. We were under threat from our enemies both in the East and the West. 17 April was a 'black day'.  The Americans were overhead from the early hours. Your husband - having already shot down over one hundred enemy aircraft - was leading the 'Alarmschwarm' and was again keenly awaiting the signal to takeoff. Heavy fighting was soon underway both over and around the airfield and your husband met a 'heroes death' ('Heldentod') - he had suffered a fatal head injury, which we assume occurred during these combats. We had lost an adored comrade and brave Staffelkapitän..."

On the following day, 18 April, SG 77 lost another Ritterkreuzträger. Hptm. Hans-Joachim Brand was Kommandeur I./SG 77. His Fw 190 was hit by Soviet flak in a dive and crashed at low altitude between Cottbus and Guben, in the Niederlausitz. Brand was a Battle of Britain Stuka veteran and had flown over 950 sorties including about 150 in the Fw 190. 

According to one eye-witness account Brand was shot and killed while hanging under his chute. Uffz. Ewald Bauer remembered;

".. In the period we were at Alteno on 18 April the Kommandeur was shot down. I remember it well as we were all horrified and furious when those pilots that landed back reported that they had seen Brand jump clear of his machine only to then come under Russian ground fire as he hung under his chute.."

Uffz. Robert Mewis later wrote to Brand's widow;

".. we had been ordered to wipe out a Soviet motorised column with our bombs. A heavy curtain of fire attempted to keep us at some distance from our target. Your husband was leading our formation and launched into a long diving attack heading from East to West. I was some 200m behind him in the Rotte. As we pulled out of our dives we were in the zone covered by the light flak and your husband's Fw 190 received several hits at around 400m altitude and a heavy plume of smoke soon developed. He jettisoned his canopy. At that moment his machine started to break up, the fuselage splitting apart behind the cockpit. The Fw 190 instantly rolled onto its back and went into a spin before plummeting earthwards in flames. Your husband managed to fall away at about 300 metres. Because of the heavy ground fire I was unable to pinpoint where he came down. But I did see the chute open correctly - and it was undamaged. It was heading for some woods about 4 km from our target.."

Author and crash-archaeologist Bechler spend twelve months searching for a possible crash site without result. Brand is still listed as missing on German soil. 

Uffz. Ortwin Pech almost met a similar fate. Attacking Soviet armour around Horlitza his Fw 190 took hits from anti-aircraft fire. His engine stopped with Kamenz in sight, forcing to take to his chute. He landed safely while the Fw 190 went down on the edge of the airfield. Not so fortunate were Lt. Reinhard Berbig and Uffz. Richard Linders whose machines collided and crashed, killing both pilots. Despite their high losses SG 77 claimed some 20 Soviet tanks destroyed on 18 April and other vehicles damaged. Just a day or so later tank spearheads had reached the outskirts of Kamenz. Bernhard Ellwanger recalled;

" during the night of 19-20 April the Russians had almost reached the airfield. Some time between 02:00 and 03:00 their first shells came down amongst our barrack buildings. We cleared out in a hurry and ran to our dispersals. Enemy fire continued. Three small reconnaissance patrols were sent out to scout the enemy's position and strength. Only two of them returned. Our ground crews slipped away under cover of darkness, while the pilots remained close to their machines. However heavy ground mist put paid to any early takeoffs. Only a small strip of marshland separated us from the enemy and we could clearly hear the engine noise of their vehicles. At around 06:00 our first machines managed to get airborne and immediately ran into the enemy. Other Fw 190s followed suit. Our maintenance hangars were already ablaze and we started to fear for our aircraft. When at around 09:00 our Stabsschwarm was finally ordered to get airborne the airfield was undergoing almost constant shelling. We set off straight across the field, so to speak, right through exploding shells, yet all four machines made it out unscathed. We could even see Russian tanks maneuvering around the burning hangars. At nearby Grossenhain we landed to refuel but as this base was under almost constant American Jabo attack we did not hang around and were soon airborne again. We flew past the destroyed city of Dresden into the Czech lands, where we landed in Pardubice.."

'Struck through' swastika on late-war Fw 190s by Peter Kassak

 

by Peter Kassak -  images via Peter Kassak and the Crow Collection

In the Axis Wings Vol.4 we have published an article covering the history of a 'new' III./JG 54 which later became part of IV./JG 51. The feature was illustrated with photographs of four Fw 190s belonging to the Gruppe, “black 15”, “black 17”, “white 15” and “blue 7”.  Aside from the 'elongated' Wellenlinie III. Gruppe wavy line on the rear fuselage, one markings 'feature' of all four of these machines was the swastika 'struck through' with a diagonal white stripe. The purpose of this marking has not been explained fully or satisfactorily. As the unit was mostly deployed on the 'Oder front' flying constant harassing and ground-attack sorties against the Russians in the last months of the war ( "...the target was yet again the bridges across the Oder built beneath the surface of the water during the night by the Russians..", Heinz Schmidt, 10./JG 54) it is usually suggested that the 'struck through' Hakenkreuz was some sort of  Oder front 'tactical' marking, perhaps to increase visibility for ground troops. Not that that makes much sense really as the swastika itself was highly visible!  The four aircraft mentioned above though were not an exception. This small post shows additional photos of these and  other machines on the strength of either III./JG 54 or IV./JG 51 (most probably taken on charge from III./JG 54 without repainting) and with similarly modified tail markings displayed. These images were, however, not of sufficiently good enough quality to be published alongside the Axis Wings article text so had to be omitted. 

Below; belly-landed Fw 190 of 10./JG 54 flown by Ofw. Willi Schlecht being put back on its 'feet', 11 March 1945, following a Jabo mission against the Oder bridges flown from a field strip at Müncheberg outside Berlin. The swastika in the image has been 'censored' although the white diagonal stripe has already had a similar effect on the actual machine...

Below; there exists in the Crow Collection (curated by Del Davis) a series of images showing the end of Focke Wulf Fw 190 A-8 W.Nr. 350859 “blue 7+~”. Flown by III./JG 54, “blue 7+~” fell into US hands at Mϋnster Handorf when the airfield was occupied by personnel of the 390th Service Squadron, 79th Service Group, responsible for the P-47s of the 406th Fighter Group.  Two other Fw 190s belly landed about 15 miles from airbase Y-94 at Mϋnster Handorf in late April 1945 so that their pilots could surrender to the Americans. Fw 190 “blue 7+~” was later repaired as seen in the second image below - the 'original' torn rudder has presumably been replaced as the diagonal stripe is limited to the tail fin only.

A 'wide' view (below, left) and a close-up of Focke Wulf Fw 190 A-8 W.Nr.350859 “white 11+~” at the wreck yard of the Luftwaffe at the end of WWII in Flensburg. The diagonal stripe through the swastika suggests that this was another late-war machine belonging to III./JG 54.

Below;  another view of the Flensburg dump - Fw 190 A “white 9+~” with blown canopy was a late-war machine assigned to IV./JG 51 and most likely saw service previously with III./JG 54  as it displays the diagonal white stripe through the swastika.

 Below; a well-known photo of Focke Wulf Fw 190 D-9 W.Nr.213097 “White 11+~” from 13./JG 51 photographed at Flensburg in May 1945. However, in the background to the left of the “Dora-9” is Fw 190 “white 5+~” with the 'amended' swastika. It was almost certainly an ex III./JG 54 plane that ended up in the hands of IV./JG 51. 

 Below; photos of Fw 190 A-8 “white 13+~” of 9./JG 54 at Eggersdorf were recently published in Prien JfV Teil 16/I. (pages 370-371)  The swastika is not visible, but this Focke Wulf belonged to the Gruppe and almost certainly featured the 'struck through' Hakenkreuz. Note the relatively 'dark' finish and the stencilled figure '3'. The somewhat 'elongated' Wellenlinie (wavy line) was  the Gruppe marking of the 'new' III./JG 54. The Gruppe moved to Eggersdorf from Grossenhain on 9 February 1945 and “white 13+~” is seen here carrying an AB 250 Abwurfbehälter on the belly rack.

In the skies of France, MS 406 in combat - 3 Me 109s downed in 15 seconds, 8 June 1940 - "la journée la plus glorieuse.."

 

To paraphrase David Méchin in 'Le Fana..' the Morane-Saulnier 406 is an aircraft that symbolises the French defeat of 1940. It was old, it was slow (only 400 km/h, rate of climb 12m/sec) and it was poorly armed (two machine guns and a cannon) - its magazines held just enough ammunition for a very short 10-second burst of fire. On 10 May 1940 some 400 of the 900-front line fighter strength of the Armée de l’Air were Morane 406s. It was the first 'modern' French fighter -a low-wing monoplane with retractable landing gear and an enclosed cockpit - to enter service. Designed in 1934 and making its maiden flight in August 1935, it was a contemporary of the fighters being developed by the other belligerents – the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and the Hawker Hurricane – whose prototypes, designed to very similar specifications, were flying at around the same time, give or take three months. Their performance was comparable, and the Morane 405 prototype was not entirely undeserving of the title ‘world’s best fighter’ bestowed upon it by the French press at the time. However, between the prototype’s maiden flight and the delivery of production aircraft, a race against time would unfold – one that France would lose amidst the turbulent economic and political climate of the 1930s: a production aircraft that was already obsolete, an industrial concern lacking the cash flow to modernise production lines, administrative delays within the ministry, procrastination by the air force’s technical departments, social unrest, and delays in deliveries from equipment suppliers. The Luftwaffe had already been using the Bf 109 for over a year before production models of the Ms 406 came into service, whilst production of the ‘Jumo’-engined Bf 109 was coming to an end just as large-scale production of the Morane was getting underway! Worse still for the French, production of the re-engined version of the Me 109 - the 'Emil' - which was technically far superior to the MS.406 was moving ahead more or less seamlessly. The French, however, proved incapable of producing the successor to the Ms 406 - the MS.450 - just as they proved incapable of producing even a simply improved version, the MS.410. By the time of the German attack, the French Air Force’s main aircraft was technically far inferior to its opponents and was one of the causes of the debacle that ensued… Just one cause, amongst many other failings on the part of the French Air Force.

By 10 May 1940 the Moranes were being replaced as fast as was possible by Bloch 152s (armed with two HS 404 20m cannon and two machine guns) and of course the D.520s which were then starting to roll out of the factory. GC III/2’s Moranes were replaced by Curtiss H-75s at the beginning of June. On 24 June only five Morane-equipped Groupes de Chasse were left among a total of some 24 Groupes de Chasse (about 17 % of the fighter aircraft, as re-equipped units mostly received 30-36 new aircraft instead of 24-28) and these, too, would have been re-equipped, mainly with D.520s, had not the campaign concluded as rapidly as it did. Although slated to convert to the new Arsenal VG. 33, GC I/2 started and finished the campaign on the MS 406.

The Morane’s low speed was in some instances not always an obstacle to catching up with formations of Luftwaffe bombers and even to carrying out several firing passes; but in unfavourable circumstances, the French fighter was not up to much. Cne (Captain) Robert Williame describes an attack led by GC I/2 on 1 June 1940 in his 1945 account 'L'escadrille des Cigognes' (or 'Stork squadron');

"..As soon as the bombers spotted us, they closed ranks. We were faced with a veritable fortress of 30 large aircraft. We were still 800 metres away when some sixty machine guns opened fire on us, leaving an impressive trail of white smoke behind the formation. Our slow closing speed and the distance at which the bombers had opened fire left us exposed to their fire for a long time. Unwisely influenced, we fired long bursts from too far away instead of delivering short bursts at close range, manoeuvring into sectors that were difficult for our opponents to hit. It was a failure.

The very next day, a similar mission brought us into contact with another German formation. There were six of us: the Coubé 'flight' with its three aircraft, Puybusque, Chalupa, and myself. We were waiting in the Pontarlier area, when Puybusque spotted a Junkers 88. Having dropped its bombs, it was returning to Germany heading north. Mechanical trouble must have forced it to break away from its formation and we could easily catch up with it - or so I thought. A brief pursuit showed us the futility of this, and we turned back to head for Pontarlier. Then almost immediately, seven Heinkel 111s appeared, coming from the south. I launched the attack; then I noticed some hesitation in my escort 'flight'. At that moment, 300 metres above the formation I was attacking, and 500 metres behind it, I saw four more Heinkels whose machine guns were firing at us. Coubé had mistaken them for twin-engined Messerschmitt 110 heavy fighters and had moved in against them with his patrol to protect us. During this manoeuvre, in the course of which he had had to gain altitude rapidly, he lost speed and consequently fell slightly behind the bombers. He was never able to catch up with them, despite a 100-kilometre pursuit at full throttle. I broke away from the formation of seven [Heinkel 111s] and started a firing run against the formation of four. The difference in speed between the Heinkels and the Moranes must have been around 10 km/h in our favour. From Pontarlier to Montbéliard, a distance of around a hundred kilometres, with the throttle wide open throughout and under almost constant machine-gun fire between passes, we were only able to make three attacks. Each of them ended within 100 metres of our targets. We could see our bullets and shells hitting them every time. Pieces of metal were being torn away. But not a single aircraft went down. And we had run out of ammunition. On his second attack Puybusque's machine caught fire. The hapless pilot struggled to jettison the canopy, frozen fast in the cold atmosphere but by standing on the seat and bent double he managed to push it away with his back. He jumped clear and came down some 10 km from the Swiss border.[...] On landing back in Damblain my 'Juliette III' was in a sad state..[..] That evening, CO Captain Daru told me that the commander of the eastern theatre of operations (France) was surprised that, following these last two days of 1 and 2 June, we had not shot down a single enemy aircraft. With tears in my eyes, I replied that we could not have done any better: of the three aircraft that had attacked, one had been set ablaze and a second seriously damaged by enemy fire. It was not our fault that our outdated aircraft prevented us from leading combat...”

Above; Cne Robert Williame (right) in early June 1940 in front of his MS 406 (No. 966) of the 'Stork squadron'. The words of Sgt Pierre Boillot, a pilot with GC II/7, sum up in a sentence what an MS.406 pilot might have felt; “..with the Dewoitine 520, you could engage in a dogfight, whereas with the Morane 406, you simply had to endure it.” On 8 June 1940 Williame thought he had made 'ace in a day' in an MS 406, downing Me 109s of JG 26 and Ju 87s of St.G 2- but some of his 'kills' were 'shared'. The 'best' day for the French fighter forces was 5 June with over 50 claims. The Moranes scored more victories than other types due mostly to their superior numbers and competent pilots.  However, between September 1939 and the end of June 1940 the Luftwaffe aces shot down around 300-350 MS 406s, possibly more, approximately one third of total production..(Philippe via 'Avions')

On 8 June - five days after the launch of Unternehmen 'Paula', the large scale Luftwaffe assault on airfields around Paris intended to finish off the French air force - a three-aircraft patrol from GC I/2 led by Williame joined GC III/7 (equipped with D.520s) at Coulommiers airfield - crews from both units were soon scrambled on a 'destruction' mission over the sector Beauvais-Gisors-Persan-Beaumont, at an altitude of 4,500 metres, accompanied by Curtiss Hawks from II/4 providing top cover. Williame recalled:

“..Below us, the area south of Beauvais was ablaze, sending columns of smoke all the way to Paris that obscured the ground. Gisors was also on fire. There were fires everywhere – smaller in scale but numerous. It was a harrowing sight to behold. Suddenly, in the direction of Soissons, bursts of anti-aircraft fire caught my attention. I soon spotted a formation of some fifteen to twenty German bomber aircraft. Above and to the sides, numerous Messerschmitt 110s and 109s were accompanying them north-westwards. I headed towards them. Our escort was struggling to keep up. We had the sun behind us. I managed to position us behind a flight of three Messerschmitt 109s, which were part of a formation of nine aircraft flanking the southern quarter of the enemy force. I was able to get in closer and opened up at roughly the same time as Chalupa and Audebert. Both of us hit the Me 109 on the left, and then, on my own, I got the one in the centre from barely twenty metres. Both enemy fighters went into a spin and burst into flames. Pichon and Meunier saw the first one crash five kilometres north-west of Beauvais airfield, whilst, witnessed by Pichon and Audebert, the second suffered the same fate, at roughly the same spot. Seeing his leader and the other member of his patrol go up in flames, the third pilot made a slight turn to the right and spotted me twenty metres away from him. He fed in some rudder - two or three jerks - looking like a man who really didn’t know what he was going to do. I fired a burst at him. He went into a steep dive towards his own lines, spewing out a huge plume of smoke. Chalupa, Pichon and Meunier saw him just as I did, but no-one was able to witness his crash as more Messerschmitts were already trying to outmanoeuvre us. I glanced behind and above me. Our escort was no longer there. Perhaps they’d thrown themselves into the fray too and had done a good job? I never got to find out. I’d run out of ammunition. It was now a matter of getting us out of that hornet’s nest. We managed it without coming under attack and landed at Coulommiers...”

The Moranes flew a second sortie taking off in the evening for Soissons-Attichy, escorted by the D.520s of GC II/3. At around 19:45 two formations of gull-winged single-engine machines were intercepted over the sector - Stukas of St.G. 2. One of the Morane pilots (Sgt Jacques de Puybusque, seven victories) noted that the Ju 87s could manoeuvre well - both when defending themselves and they could 'attack' like fighters. But no fewer than six were claimed by GC I/2 shot down during this mission: Williame claimed two and a third shared and would subsequently be recommended for the cross of the Légion d'honneur for his leadership of the unit on this date. His 'score' on 8 June was the highest individual 'score' of a French fighter pilot during one day for the period May-June 1940 (aside from Le Gloan's exploit against the Italians). Two of the Morane pilots from the 'patrouille simple' of the second escadrille (Spa 103) were shot down: Adjt Streiff, the sole survivor, lost sight of his comrades during the dogfight. One of them, Lt Monty, was seen attacking enemy aircraft on his own: according to farmers’ accounts, he shot down two enemy aircraft before being shot down himself; the villagers of Longpont (Aisne) buried him in their village......

  ( In “L’escadrille des Cigognes” Cne Williame. Edition Arthaud, 1945)

More on the MS 406 and it's pilots - around 13 of them achieved 5 or more victories against the Luftwaffe during May-June 1940. The Lela Presse MS 406 title has recently been revised, expanded and reissued. See avions-bateaux.com

Dewoitine D.520 in the air war over France May-June 1940.

 

By the end of WWI the French were the largest producers of combat aircraft and their air force one of the biggest in the world. But during the interwar years, French aviation suffered under systemic political instability, and catastrophic nationalisation policies - the Front Populaire government nationalized the aircraft industry into regional conglomerates, the so-called Sociétés Nationales de Constructions Aéronautiques or SNCAs. This forced factories to merge based on geography rather than economic logic -aircraft procurement was based on a policy of 'prototypes'- small numbers of individual types being financed per factory to keep them in production. Émile Dewoitine had been named 'directeur délégué' of the SNCA du 'Midi' (SNCAM) but it was the State who decided which aircraft were to be developed. Work on what would become the D.520 was more or less shelved for a year as the Air Ministry placed large orders for the fighter that had won the 1934 C1 fighter competition, the MS 405 (which evolved into the MS 406) - the MS 405 C1 first flew a couple of months after the Me 109 and three months before the Hawker Hurricane. The SNCAM spent most of 1937 supplying spares to keep France's fleet of ancient D.510s in the air. 

By the time of the German invasion, these factors—combined with outdated tactical doctrines and a lack of integrated strategic command—left the Armée de l'Air struggling against the highly coordinated Luftwaffe which had spent its brief existence flying (highly coordinated) 'manoeuvres' with the army. As James S. Corum points out in his recent title 'France, 1940' the Allies were perfectly capable in May 1940 of deploying large numbers of bombers and fighters in support of Allied counter-attacks and armoured thrusts ...but failed to do so.  Similarly the French never developed a 'workable' strategic air power doctrine - at no time was there any attempt to deploy French bombers aggressively against German strategic targets even once war had been declared! This reluctance to 'offend' the Germans did not extend to the Italians -  port installations in Venice were bombed with ancient Blochs during June 1940...

 The French (and others..) continue to argue about the effectiveness of the Armée de l'Air.  The 'reputation' of the Air Force was deliberately 'undermined' by the Vichy government who sought scapegoats after the armistice. Some French authors maintain that in May 1940 the Armée de l'Air had the most modern types, the best aircraft armament etc anywhere...although most of it was obviously too little and too late. The four leading French fighter 'Groupes de Chasse' flew American H-75 Hawks - huge orders had been placed with the Americans in 1937-38 when the French realised that they could not actually mass-manufacture fighter aircraft. French pilots however were well-trained and experienced. French fighter pilots flew lots of aerobatics and although they did not practise gunnery there were already a number of French fighter aces by May 1940. From September 1939 they had deployed to satellite fields near the German borders - although infrastructure and communications were rudimentary. In one notable Phoney War battle during November 1939 nine Hawks from II/GC 5 took on 27 Bf 109s and shot down 12 of them including the leading German ace at the time. Unfortunately for the French the Germans were flying the older 'D' model and not the newer Emil. According to James Slaughter in his 'Air Power over the Rhine' ;

" The Bf 109, which entered the conflict dominant, gained speed and firepower as a direct result of action in Spain as the war continued. Compare this with the French who worried that making the M.S.406 faster would unnecessarily increase tensions with Germany and lead to an arms race they apparently did not know they were already in. By 1940, the latest Bf 109s were far superior to virtually any fighter the French had, again largely due to the “Spanish laboratory.”

The Hawks were pretty capable machines if poorly armed. Leading Hawk unit I/GC 5 under Jean-Mary Accart achieved around 125 victories in the French campaign - the highest scoring French fighter unit. The Dewoitine D.520 struggled into service principally with GC I/3 during May 1940 - although this Groupe had been flying the new fighter since January 1940 serviceability as with any 'new' aircraft was pretty poor and teething issues were notable. Communist trade unions in 'red' Toulouse did much to hamper production and even in the spring of 1940 aircraft factories were still only working a five-day week -  French communists took their orders from Moscow and the Soviets had a non-aggression pact with the Germans until Barbarossa. 

Groupe de Chasse I/3 was only the third highest scoring Armée de l'Air fighter unit during the Battle of France with 75 victories. Some French authors like to stress that the Armée de l'Air had more than just a handful of modern fighters - other types such as the LeO 451, Amiot 351-354, Br 693, the Bloch 174 were all state-of-the-art aircraft, often the best in the world in their category.. and although the Me 109 E was obviously better than the MS 406 which constituted around 45% of French front-line fighter strength the Ms 406 was a more maneuverable fighter and it carried heavier armament - only around eighty of these were actually shot down by 109s in combat.  In reality the Ms 406 was slow and 'difficult' to mass produce - it taking twice as long to build an Ms 406 as it did an Me 109. Despite this some 600 Ms 406s had been delivered within 18 months of the type's first flight in 1935. On the German side somewhere between 150-160 Me 109s were lost in France at a time when monthly production of the Luftwaffe fighter was comparatively very low - around 25 machines. Ultimately the French 'problem' was not the Air Force nor their fighters. You could argue of course that France had not managed by May 1940 to effectively re-equip itself with a substantial force of its best fighters, nor had France developed the integrated command, radar and reporting networks that might have contributed to a much more effective air defence organisation. An effective force for the tactical support of French armies in the field was also lacking. 

Some of the points above are made by David Méchin in the latest 'Le Fana de l'Aviation' 'Hors Serie' (No. 77) currently on French news stands. Entitled " D.520 - les batailles d'un redoutable chasseur" ('D.520, the battles of a formidable fighter') Méchin's 'book-a-zine' is available from publisher Larivière's site here  (10€ euros for 130 pages).  Just getting built and into service was  one of the machine's 'battles' - see the image on pages 18-19 which according to the caption shows ".. the SNCAM Toulouse factory at maximum output in early 1940 "  - four 'workers' standing around, hands on hips or in pockets, staring at three partially completed D.520s!

By mid-June 1940 there were nearly 2000 D.520s on the SNCAM's order books. Some 467 D.520s were constructed - less than half this number saw any service. Only 34 D.520s took part in the fighting from May 14 onwards (GC I/3), 68 from May 15 on (GC I/3 and II/3), about 102 on June 1 (add GC II/7) and so forth.

An account from générale de brigade aérienne Duval ;

 ".. The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

( **see Danel/Cuny P.66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520s produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre' (not serviceable). By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..)

A young GC III/6 pilot officer Jean Menneglier recounted his first contact with the D.520;

 "... In mid-June GC III/6, which had been at Le Luc since the beginning of the month, finally exchanged its Morane Saulnier MS 406 for the long-awaited Dewoitine D.520. As soon as the first detachment, including Jacobi, chef d'escadrille (squadron leader) of the 5th, and Le Gloan, had returned, we left for Toulouse. We landed on June 15 at Francazal where we abandoned our old Moranes without regret. We were taken by bus to Blagnac where we made contact with the Dewoitine 520. The one they gave me was number 358. It was a splendid machine, entirely of metal, equipped with a Hispano-Suiza 12-cylinder V engine with a power rating greater than that of the Morane, of the order of 920 HP. To compensate for the torque the engine was offset by 1°30' and the vertical stabilizer had a wing profile providing some compensation according to the speed. It was armed with a 20 mm Hispano gun firing through the prop axis, like the 406, but with a magazine of 80 explosive shells instead of 60, and 4 machine guns, 2 in each wing, with a belt magazine of 700 cartridges per gun instead of 350. These were heated. This gave 6 seconds of continuous fire with the gun (800 rounds/min) and 35 seconds with the machine guns, which was much better than the 406. The landing gear was mechanically locked in the "retracted" position, so there was no problem in case of a bullet lodged in the hydraulic system. It was a fast plane, credited with a speed of 550 km/h at the recovery altitude, very fine to fly, which started quite easily, which turned well and which had very sound reactions. It was almost the equivalent of the Me 109. If we had had it at the beginning of the war, things would certainly have been different. There was one amusing detail about the machine. The D.520 was equipped with a 'trunk' (baggage compartment) that sat in the fuselage behind the pilot. It was of decent size and it proved to be very handy when we were on the move, allowing us to take a lot of personal belongings with us. When I took control of my new aircraft, I was surprised by the sensitivity of the rudder and I was snaking a little at takeoff, but I got used to it very quickly. After a few minutes of flight I returned to land at Francazal which we left on patrol the next day to join Le Luc. As soon as we landed, we were told what had happened the day before during our absence and how Le Gloan and Assollant had been able to shoot down 5 Italian machines in less than 45 minutes... " 

For the Luftwaffe the campaign in the West was of course far from the 'walk-over' perhaps imagined. Every Gruppe regularly lost men and machines and certainly not the most inexperienced. On May 21, the Gruppenkommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Erich Mix was shot down by Sous-Lieutenant Hubert de Salaberry in his GC I/3 Dewoitine D.520. Mix had just downed the D.520 flown by Sous-Lieutenant Jean Parisse (although he identified it as an Ms 406). De Salaberry wrote the following account in his unpublished memoir (via Persyn) ;

“ ..up ahead of me I caught sight of a D.520 on its back with its gear extended, a rather unusual sight at this altitude. It was wreathed in a huge sheet of bright orange flame, blazing from the engine cowl to the tail fin like a huge torch. The cockpit seemed to have disappeared. It was a haunting sight in the bright blue sky. Less than one hundred metres behind it a Bf 109 continued to squirt out burst after burst of fire as if at a fairground shooting range, sporadic flashes of flame dancing along its wing leading edges. I was filled with an overwhelming desire to deal this 109 some of its own medicine. After a quick glance behind to check my rear, I dropped down in behind the ‘Fritz’. He had seen me and understood straight away that the hunter was now the prey. He did what all German fighters do when they are caught napping – he rolled onto his back and dropped like a stone, counting on being able to build up enough speed to put some distance between us. I was not about to let him go. I rolled with him and headed down vertically, my engine screaming with the throttle against the stop. I had full confidence in my aircraft, the Dewoitine was very stable and the engine & prop behaved themselves impeccably... Reeling the 109 slowly in during our headlong dive I unleashed several brief bursts from directly astern. The German pilot did not react and continued on down. Suddenly I noticed the sky becoming darker, realised that the ground was rushing up toward us. Crushed by the deceleration as I eased out the dive I lost sight of the German. I orbited the area but could see nothing. Below me the countryside was peaceful and unremarkable...”

Below; Kommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Mix at the controls of his Emil, May 1940. On May 21, he nursed down his shot-up machine for a belly-landing near Roye after combat with GC I/3 D.520s. Sustaining only minor injuries he was able to depart the scene, before being recovered two days later by German troops. He was awarded the EK I (Iron Cross First Class).

Below; GC I/3 D.520 of the unit's 2e escadrille probably assigned to S/Lt Parisse, shot down on 21 May 1940 in the vicinity of Fonches-Fonchette (Somme) after combat with Bf 109s. The pilot was seriously wounded, taking a round in the chest and although he managed to carry out a successful belly-landing in a field and climb out of the cockpit he collapsed and died a short while later. As the local villagers had all fled his body was not properly buried until after they returned in late June ....note the SPA 69 emblem has been cut out of the fuselage side by 'souvenir' hunters...(source "GC I/3 Les rois du Dewoitine 520" published by Lela Presse Avions). 



G.C I/3 D.520s flew their last sorties in the battle for France on the afternoon of June 16, 1940 - ordered to strafe German motorised columns en-route for Nevers. Sous-lieutenant  Pierre Salva recalled;

" ..suddenly they appeared ahead of us - some thirty motorcycle outriders and an unending column of vehicles displaying black crosses. They had not heard us arrive such was the noise of their tracks and engines which covered the roar of ours. I doubt very much that they thought there were any French fighters left in the skies to interrupt their 'marche triomphale' . Their anti-aircraft batteries did not react at all. The first tank in the column was neatly centred in my sight - a miss was impossible. I was about to fire - and then, there in the gun-sight, women and children, and a horse pulling a cart loaded with more refugees. If I unleashed a burst now I might damage the tank but I would inflict carnage on women and children. Despite my orders I did not open fire. Nor did Salaberry...."


Below; Dewoitine D 520 prototype no. 3 seen after capture by the Germans, probably Cazaux. This aircraft was written off in a takeoff accident on March 11, 1940. The hard-edged camouflage distinguishes this from D.520 no. 2.

Below; an early series aircraft as indicated by the location of the radio access hatch. Only 54 D.520s were lost as a direct result of enemy action during May-June 1940. A further 22 were abandoned/lost/destroyed by the French themselves.

Below; Dewoitines stocked at Francazal, post armistice, 28 June 1940.  The D.520 production line was located at Saint-Martin-du-Touch, production site of more recent ATR turboprop aircraft.

How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose in May-June 1940? French claims for May-June can range from 300-1000  victories. Mombeek in his history of JG 2 quoted the following figures for Luftwaffe losses for this period; 460 fighters, 635 twin engine bombers and 150 Stukas for total losses amounting to 25% of Luftwaffe front-line strength. The current 'official' score for the French fighter squadrons as quoted by the SHD (Service Historique de la Défense) is 650-675 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. According to Peter Cornwell (page 529  'The Battle of France' ) the Luftwaffe lost no less than 3,278 aircrew killed (!) from Sept. ’39 through to the end of June 1940, as compared to the RAF’s 1,127 and the Armée de l’Air’s 923. Taking the period of the invasion on its own gives the German's a loss-rate during the campaign in France that was twice that of its BoB loss rate. Whatever the exact German losses for the French campaign they were pretty heavy. This obviously had an impact on the conduct of operations over England subsequently. In fact the 'myth' of French AF ineptitude during the Battle of France is probably closely related to the 'myth' of 'The Few' during the BoB.

D. 520 on display at the Le Bourget Air and Space museum. One of the last production examples, no. 862 was constructed for the Luftwaffe but is here repainted in the colours of GC III/6 ace Pierre Le Gloan..

Also on this blog;

Dewoitine D.520 in JG 105  -  archive photo scans

Me 163 developmental issues (1) - June 1942

 

The development and rigorous flight testing of the Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet are documented extensively in the Luftwaffe test centre Arbeitsberichte works reports originating from the central testing ground (Erprobungsstelle) at Rechlin. These primary documents trace the developmental history of the aircraft from its early glider tests to its operational deployment as the world's first combat rocket-propelled interceptor. The Bundesarchiv manages the original military records for the Technical Air Armament directorate via their online Invenio Database. Using the archival signature RL 3 specific technical reports and test records related to the Komet can be retrieved while the Rechlin test and work reports are also available for download. While specific Rechlin test logs and technical handbooks are officially catalogued, direct digital downloads require navigating specific archival databases. If you find Invenio a little tricky, then the Archivportal-D is recommended for ease of use - it offers integrated access to various German state archives such as the deutsche digitale bibliothek from one search function, where you can locate specific entries (such as the Me 163 B-Flugzeug-Handbuch). For independent archival research, expert resources like Rob de Bie's Me 163 Archives provide detailed inventories and breakdowns of where specific Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) documents are held; eg the Me 163 B handbook manual is available in translation as a pdf download at the NASM link on Rob's pages.

as highlighted by General der Jagdflieger Galland to the head of the Erprobungsstelle Rechlin test centre in a 'top secret' memo concerning 'Development of the Me 163 b' received on 22 June 1942...

" The General of Fighters requests....."

"...er bittet der Entwickung der Me 163 mehr als bisher geschehen vorwärts zu treiben. Als wesentliche Verzögerung haben sich die Triebswerkschwierigkeiten herausgestellt. Daneben erscheint die Lösung der Fahrwerksfrage vordringlich. Die Entwicklung einer Startshilfe ist unerlässlich. Die Frage der Luftverlegungen bedarf der Erklärung .."

..that the development of the Me 163 be pursued more vigorously than has been the case to date. The difficulties with the power plant have proved to be a major cause of delay. In addition, resolving the issue of the landing gear appears to be a matter of urgency. For increased endurance and improving takeoff characteristics the development and testing of takeoff assistance aids is essential. The questions of road transport (ie salvage) following off-airfield landings and a towing aircraft for repositioning by air (air transfers) require clarification.

Also on this blog;

Messerschmitt Me 163 V18 speed record, July 1944

Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring visits I./NJG 2 at Gilze-Rijen, late 1940 - archive photo scan #54

 

Two photographs taken during one of Kesselring's visits to I./NJG 2 (Nachtjagdgeschwader 2) at Gilze-Rijen in late 1940. Kesselring was Commander-in-Chief of Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2), a command he held from January 1940 until June 1943. At that time he held the rank of Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshall), having been promoted after the campaigns of 1940. As commander of Luftflotte 2, he was one of the most senior operational commanders in the Luftwaffe and was responsible for air operations in the sectors assigned to his air fleet. During late 1940, Luftflotte 2 was heavily involved in the latter stages of the Battle of Britain, prior to launching night-time raids over England and the so-called Fernnachtjagd or long-range intruder missions. Major Karl-Heinrich Heyse, a Spanish veteran with 1.K/88 and first Kommandeur of II./NJG 1 and then I./NJG 2, was killed in action on 23 November 1940, his Ju 88 C shot down over the North Sea by an RAF Hampden returning from a mission. He was replaced by Hptm. Karl Hülshoff, formerly Staffelkapitän of 3./NJG 2. Ironically Kesselring had flown into Gilze-Rijen the previous day - 22 November 1940 - to review I./NJG 2 and, according to H. Rökker, ‘congratulate the unit on its successes’. Kesselring returned to Gilze-Rijen in his Siebel Fh 104 about one month later with 'presents' for the Gruppe (according to Möhlenbeck) and is seen (bottom) in conversation with Kommandeur Hülshoff and his Adjutant Oblt. Gerhard Böhme.

'Red 12' back in England for the Duxford/Shuttleworth airshows

'Red 12' spent the night at Headcorn before departing this morning in humungous temperatures for the weekend's flying displays. Photos courtesy Dale and Jonty... 

Storming the bombers - Egon Mayer's first 'frontal' attack, 23 November 1942

 

The air war in the West and over the Reich determined the fate of the Luftwaffe - with a higher percentage of casualties to participants than in the East, it was by far the most costly theatre for the Luftwaffe. And the Allies for that matter. The USAAF lost over 79,000 airmen between 1942-1945 and the RAF lost over 8,000 aircraft in the period 1939-1945 resulting in similar numbers of air crew killed. Over 60% of these losses were attributed to enemy fighters, both day and night respectively. The USAF lost over 8,000 bombers from November 1942 to May 1945 with German fighter pilots shooting down over 6,000 American and 7,000 RAF bombers, at a cost of 150,000 Allied airmen combined. The Germans themselves lost almost 20,000 fighter and 'destroyer' crews men and pilots, more than half killed fighting against the heavy bombers and their fighter escorts on the Western Front. Attacking a bomber formation was dangerous. Initial encounters with US bombers flying by day during mid-late 1942 were inconclusive, but the Germans quickly grew to realise that the American four-engine bombers with their heavy defensive armament - well able to absorb punishment especially when flying in their mutually protective ‘combat boxes’ - were tough opponents.  

Egon Mayer scored his first heavy bomber kills as Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 2 on 23 November  1942 - this may well have been his first such encounter with the '4-mot. Kampfflugzeuge' or “Viermots.” Having been appointed Gkr. at the start of that month, Mayer - known as a conscientious, studious and pragmatic fighter pilot and leader - had studied tactics and angles of attack to develop procedures against the 'Viermots' - most notably the B-17.  Other pilots in his unit had been doing likewise - Jules Meimberg recalled in his memoir;

“ we sought out as much information on these machines as we could find..first flight in 1935, steadily upgraded and improved..three revolving turrets, eight heavy machine guns for defence..and only one point of weakness – the cockpit. Whereas Mayer wanted to launch attacks from all directions simultaneously to disperse the defensive fire, I argued that head-on – hitting the B-17s where their defensive fire was at its weakest - was the only certain way to bring a Fortress down..”  

US bombers were increasingly penetrating the airspace of western and northern France. Mayer's Gruppe was specifically tasked with defending the U-boat bases in Brittany.  While JG 2 was not scrambled on the 9 October 1942 attack on the 'Lille industrial area', this was the first raid for which the US VIII BC managed to assemble over 100 bombers. However events elsewhere (North Africa) meant that it would be another six months before such a large force could be put together again over Western Europe. 

On 7 November, some 34 B-17s and B-24s raided Brest. Oblt. Bruno Stolle claimed one B-24, the first of this type shot down by the Richthofen Geschwader. St. Nazaire was the target of 36 bombers on 23 November 1942. Mayer led off 7. and 9./ JG 2 from Vannes at around 12:00 mid-day. 

As the Fw 190s sighted the bomber formation, Mayer made a rapid assessment of the situation and elected to attack the bomber formation 'head-on'. Climbing almost a mile above and three miles ahead of the formation, he turned and started  a shallow diving attack from the front. Receiving light defensive fire he held his approach for several seconds, focusing his aim on the port engines.  Perhaps less than thirty feet above the bomber 'box' he veered away as the target headed to earth. He repeated this pass on a second B-17. Fifty calibre rounds pounded his armor plate around his cockpit and according to one account, damaged two cylinders in his engine. Pulling up and gaining altitude, he then closed on a box of B-24s, an attack timed at  14:00.  By this stage he was probably almost out of ammunition and running low on fuel. Mayer decided to return to base. While he claimed two B-17s and a B-24 on 23 November 1942 (his victories 52-55) and brought back a relatively unscathed aircraft, no B-24s were lost. Four B-17s in total did fail to return - two credited to Mayer, one for Uffz. Friedrich May of 8./JG 2 and the fourth was credited to Oblt. Siegfried Schnell, StaKa of 9./JG 2, his 72nd victory. Mayer's 7. Staffel wingman Uffz. Theo Angele was the only loss suffered by III./JG 2- Angele's Fw 190 A-4 was hit by the bombers' defensive fire and went down into the sea. Angele's body was later washed up on the coast.

General der Jagdflieger Galland was quick to praise Mayer's initiative against the Viermots on 23 November 1942. In a message sent to all units  (below, dated 14 December and received at I./JG 54 on 13 January 1943) he urged all formation leaders to adopt this frontal attack method where possible in order to increase the 'lethality' of the German fighters and overwhelm the bomber formations. 

RL 10/291 contains a combat report 'Erfahrungsbericht' (a  'retour d'experience' written for the JG 54 pilots shifting  to the Western Front) which indicates that Mayer almost certainly employed the new frontal attack method for the first time during this raid. The traditional attack from the rear had proved risky, with attacking fighters likely sustaining many hits from the defensive fire of a typical staggered trail formation. 

 There were of course several 'negatives' to the frontal pass - attacking from head-on gave the German fighter pilot only a few seconds to line up, aim, fire and either pull up or dive away after a closing speed of 500 mph or more. Few German pilots could do this, which was considered an acquired skill and required steely nerves. Those who did master this method risked collision and damage or destruction once they pulled up, or in most cases rolled into a 'split-S' manoeuvre and dove away following the attack. On the other hand, only the top turret twin fifties on the B-17 F models could engage the incoming aircraft, reducing exposure to the numbers of guns in a formation until the fighter passed underneath or overhead. But by then the German was too fast for the ball turret to track and engage. Waist gunners had to be cautious in firing for fear of hitting the bomber on their flank. But the frontal pass directly concentrated fire on the most vulnerable part of the bomber - the cockpit. In response to this new method of German attack, the Americans introduced new models - the B-17 G and B-24 H both incorporated the forward firing “chin” mounted twin fifty calibre machine guns to defend against the head-on attack. This soon led to the exclusive use of the more heavily armed Fw 190s to attack the bombers, leaving the Messerschmitts to engage the American escort fighters.

Below; Oblt. Egon Mayer (fifth left) with his 7. Staffel seen in Poix during October 1942. Uffz. Theo Angele KIA on the 23 November raid is fourth right.

These developments deterred all but the most dedicated and efficient bomber 'killers'. Those aces who 'specialised' in the frontal attack simply changed their angle of attack, above the chin turret guns’ elevation, rolling over exposing the undersides of their Fw-190s, where the armor plating absorbed the impact of the enemy rounds. Most of the German fighter pilots who amassed many bomber kills paid a heavy price and fought a long war. For example, Georg-Peter Eder was shot down on multiple occasions and wounded numerous times. He had three kills confirmed after colliding with his targets, surviving the crash and being thrown from the wreckage, the last being in a Me-262 jet, breaking both legs in January 1945, ending his war. Anton Hackl was shot down eight times and also wounded on four occasions, including a collision. Eder was not that an unusual case. Most of Germany’s pilots were shot down and often wounded several times. Returning to combat was expected unless the loss of sight, a limb or other crippling injury was the result. The fortunate few became instructors until they healed, passing on their knowledge to the next group of future fighter pilots. This protection was far less available in the front of a formation, and an attack described by Heinz Knoke shows how on the job training often developed a better result, but was a much more difficult and dangerous proposition: 

“We draw closer to the bomber formation…I can distinguish the individual enemy aircraft now. Most of them are Liberators….They look as if their fat bellies are pregnant with bombs. I pick one of them as my target…I shall make a frontal attack. The Yank is focused in my sights. He grows rapidly larger. I reach the firing buttons on the stick. Tracers come whizzing past my head. They have opened up on me! Fire! I press both buttons, but my aim is poor. I can see only a few hits register in the right wing. I almost scrape the fat belly as I dive past. Then I am caught in the slipstream, buffeted so violently that for a moment I wonder if my tail plane has been shot away. I climb up steeply and break away to the left. Tracers pursue me, unpleasantly close. “Damn all this metal in the air! Three hundred heavy bombers carry a total of 4,800 super heavy machine guns. Even is only one in ten has a chance to fire that still means we run into quite a barrage. I come in for a second frontal attack, this time from a little below. As I swing round I turn my head. Flames are spreading along the bottom of the fuselage of my Liberator. It sheers away from the formation in a wide sweep to the right. “Twice more I come in to attack, this time diving from above the tail. I am met by heavy defensive fire. My plane shudders under the recoil from the cannon and two 13 mm guns. I watch my cannon shell bursts rake along the top of the fuselage and right wing, and then I hang on to the stick with both hands. Fire spreads along the right wing. The inside engine stops. Suddenly the wing breaks off altogether. The body of the stricken monster plunges vertically, spinning into the depths. A long black trail of smoke marks its descent. “One of the crew attempts to bail out. But his parachute is in flames. Poor devil! The body somersaults and falls to the ground like a stone. At an altitude of 3,000 feet there is a tremendous explosion, which causes the spinning fuselage to disintegrate. Fragments of blazing wreckage land on a farm 200 or 300 yards from the Zwischenahn Airfield, and the exploding fuel tank sets the farm buildings on fire.”

Also on this blog;

rare images of Georg-Peter Eder JG 2

Storming the bombers ! IL2 movie based on Heinz Knoke's memoir - in two parts

Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey Stuka in colour

 

A Ju 87 D-5 of the Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey seen about to depart on a sortie from Immola during July 1944. Earlier D-series aircraft generally retained the 7.92 mm MG 17 wing machine guns, but the D-5 replaced them with a pair of MG 151/20 cannon to improve the Stuka's ground-attack capability. This may be an SA-Kuva image (see p71 of Falconer's "Haynes Manual") and may be (period) colorised.

On the Ju 87 D-5, the underwing racks were not simply generic ETC racks. The D-5 could carry a variety of underwing stores on specialized wing-mounted bomb carriers or Schlosslafetten (bomb-carriage mountings) as here. The D-5's ground-attack role made extensive use of these wing stations for SC 50s, SC 70s, fragmentation bomb containers and other stores. The underwing ETC 50/VIIIdTp bomb racks allowed bombs and containers weighing up to 300 kg to be suspended... The fuselage racks: 1000/500/IXb — centreline rack for the heaviest bombs. 500/IXc — centreline rack for lighter bombs. Detachment Kuhlmey (Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey) took 33 Ju 87 D-5 Stukas to Finland as the dive-bomber component of I./SG 3. The complete force that arrived at Immola in June 1944 consisted of approximately 70 combat aircraft, including: 33 Ju 87 D-5 dive bombers (I./SG 3) 29–62 Fw 190 A-6 fighters (II./JG 54) 16 Fw 190 F fighter-bombers (I./SG 5) 1–8 Bf 109 G-8 reconnaissance aircraft (I./NAGr 5)

more KG 100 He 177s - archive photo scan #53

 

Loading a KG 100 He 177 for a raid on England on a French airfield, perhaps Châteaudun just south of Paris - this is most likely an He 177 A-5 which featured the broader wing and heavy under-wing bomb carrying capability. The bomb being manhandled under the wing is likely either an SC 1000 'Hermann' or possibily an SC 1800 'Satan'. The SC 2500 'Max' was the heaviest air-dropped bomb used by the Luftwaffe and could be carried by the He 177. It was also too large for the internal bomb bay of the He 177 which was divided into two longitudinal 'sections'. Given that the ground crew are still able to manipulate the bomb on a wheeled trolley the ordnance being loaded is probably not the 'Max'.. The SC 1000 had a length of 2.5 m and a width of 0.65 m.

Kurfürst K-4 cockpit revisions

 

The cockpit of the Bf 109 K-4 was not simply a late-war Gustav cockpit with a few new instruments. One of the most noticeable internal changes was on the starboard sidewall, where Messerschmitt redesigned the layout as part of the K-series standardization program.

On the Bf 109 G-series, including the G-6, a prominent fuel line associated with the external drop tank system ran along the upper part of the starboard cockpit sidewall. It featured a 'clear' window cut-out to enable the pilot to detect the first air bubbles indicating that the tank was approaching empty. All Friedrichs and Gustavs had the fuel line for the drop tank running on the upper right hand side of the cockpit. On the K-4 the fuel system routing was revised. The conspicuous starboard-side fuel feed pipe was eliminated from the cockpit sidewall, reducing exposed 'plumbing' within the cockpit. As a result;

- the K-4's right sidewall appeared cleaner and less cluttered than that of a G-6.

- the large exposed fuel feed pipe characteristic of the Gustav cockpit was absent

- equipment and controls on the right side were rearranged around the new sidewall structure.

- the Kurfürst starboard cockpit wall features a circuit breaker box. (below) Note the FuG 16 and FuG 25 to the bottom right. 

K-4 instrument panel showing the Revi 16 sight which could be folded aside when not in use. In this view the Revi has been re-positioned out of the pilot's line of sight to improve visibility (eg, when taxiing). Below this the classic six instruments of the blind flying panel. Note too just under the coaming three ammo indicators for the K-4; one for the 30 mm MK 108 cannon firing through the propeller hub and two for the engine cowl 13 mm MG 131 machine guns. (thank you Charlie!)