Dewoitine D.520 in the air war over France May-June 1940.

 

By the end of WWI the French were the largest producers of combat aircraft and their air force one of the biggest in the world. But during the interwar years, French aviation suffered under systemic political instability, and catastrophic nationalisation policies - the Front Populaire government nationalized the aircraft industry into regional conglomerates, the so-called Sociétés Nationales de Constructions Aéronautiques or SNCAs. This forced factories to merge based on geography rather than economic logic -aircraft procurement was based on a policy of 'prototypes'- small numbers of individual types being financed per factory to keep them in production. Émile Dewoitine had been named 'directeur délégué' of the SNCA du 'Midi' (SNCAM) but it was the State who decided which aircraft were to be developed. Work on what would become the D.520 was more or less shelved for a year as the Air Ministry placed large orders for the fighter that had won the 1934 C1 fighter competition, the MS 405 (which evolved into the MS 406) - the MS 405 C1 first flew a couple of months after the Me 109 and three months before the Hawker Hurricane. The SNCAM spent most of 1937 supplying spares to keep France's fleet of ancient D.510s in the air. 

By the time of the German invasion, these factors—combined with outdated tactical doctrines and a lack of integrated strategic command—left the Armée de l'Air struggling against the highly coordinated Luftwaffe which had spent its brief existence flying (highly coordinated) 'manoeuvres' with the army. As James S. Corum points out in his recent title 'France, 1940' the Allies were perfectly capable in May 1940 of deploying large numbers of bombers and fighters in support of Allied counter-attacks and armoured thrusts ...but failed to do so.  Similarly the French never developed a 'workable' strategic air power doctrine - at no time was there any attempt to deploy French bombers aggressively against German strategic targets even once war had been declared! This reluctance to 'offend' the Germans did not extend to the Italians -  port installations in Venice were bombed with ancient Blochs during June 1940...

 The French (and others..) continue to argue about the effectiveness of the Armée de l'Air.  The 'reputation' of the Air Force was deliberately 'undermined' by the Vichy government who sought scapegoats after the armistice. Some French authors maintain that in May 1940 the Armée de l'Air had the most modern types, the best aircraft armament etc anywhere...although most of it was obviously too little and too late. The four leading French fighter 'Groupes de Chasse' flew American H-75 Hawks - huge orders had been placed with the Americans in 1937-38 when the French realised that they could not actually mass-manufacture fighter aircraft. French pilots however were well-trained and experienced. French fighter pilots flew lots of aerobatics and although they did not practise gunnery there were already a number of French fighter aces by May 1940. From September 1939 they had deployed to satellite fields near the German borders - although infrastructure and communications were rudimentary. In one notable Phoney War battle during November 1939 nine Hawks from II/GC 5 took on 27 Bf 109s and shot down 12 of them including the leading German ace at the time. Unfortunately for the French the Germans were flying the older 'D' model and not the newer Emil. According to James Slaughter in his 'Air Power over the Rhine' ;

" The Bf 109, which entered the conflict dominant, gained speed and firepower as a direct result of action in Spain as the war continued. Compare this with the French who worried that making the M.S.406 faster would unnecessarily increase tensions with Germany and lead to an arms race they apparently did not know they were already in. By 1940, the latest Bf 109s were far superior to virtually any fighter the French had, again largely due to the “Spanish laboratory.”

The Hawks were pretty capable machines if poorly armed. Leading Hawk unit I/GC 5 under Jean-Mary Accart achieved around 125 victories in the French campaign - the highest scoring French fighter unit. The Dewoitine D.520 struggled into service principally with GC I/3 during May 1940 - although this Groupe had been flying the new fighter since January 1940 serviceability as with any 'new' aircraft was pretty poor and teething issues were notable. Communist trade unions in 'red' Toulouse did much to hamper production and even in the spring of 1940 aircraft factories were still only working a five-day week -  French communists took their orders from Moscow and the Soviets had a non-aggression pact with the Germans until Barbarossa. 

Groupe de Chasse I/3 was only the third highest scoring Armée de l'Air fighter unit during the Battle of France with 75 victories. Some French authors like to stress that the Armée de l'Air had more than just a handful of modern fighters - other types such as the LeO 451, Amiot 351-354, Br 693, the Bloch 174 were all state-of-the-art aircraft, often the best in the world in their category.. and although the Me 109 E was obviously better than the MS 406 which constituted around 45% of French front-line fighter strength the Ms 406 was a more maneuverable fighter and it carried heavier armament - only around eighty of these were actually shot down by 109s in combat.  In reality the Ms 406 was slow and 'difficult' to mass produce - it taking twice as long to build an Ms 406 as it did an Me 109. Despite this some 600 Ms 406s had been delivered within 18 months of the type's first flight in 1935. On the German side somewhere between 150-160 Me 109s were lost in France at a time when monthly production of the Luftwaffe fighter was comparatively very low - around 25 machines. Ultimately the French 'problem' was not the Air Force nor their fighters. You could argue of course that France had not managed by May 1940 to effectively re-equip itself with a substantial force of its best fighters, nor had France developed the integrated command, radar and reporting networks that might have contributed to a much more effective air defence organisation. An effective force for the tactical support of French armies in the field was also lacking. 

Some of the points above are made by David Méchin in the latest 'Le Fana de l'Aviation' 'Hors Serie' (No. 77) currently on French news stands. Entitled " D.520 - les batailles d'un redoutable chasseur" ('D.520, the battles of a formidable fighter') Méchin's 'book-a-zine' is available from publisher Larivière's site here  (10€ euros for 130 pages).  Just getting built and into service was  one of the machine's 'battles' - see the image on pages 18-19 which according to the caption shows ".. the SNCAM Toulouse factory at maximum output in early 1940 "  - four 'workers' standing around, hands on hips or in pockets, staring at three partially completed D.520s!

By mid-June 1940 there were nearly 2000 D.520s on the SNCAM's order books. Some 467 D.520s were constructed - less than half this number saw any service. Only 34 D.520s took part in the fighting from May 14 onwards (GC I/3), 68 from May 15 on (GC I/3 and II/3), about 102 on June 1 (add GC II/7) and so forth.

An account from générale de brigade aérienne Duval ;

 ".. The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

( **see Danel/Cuny P.66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520s produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre' (not serviceable). By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..)

A young GC III/6 pilot officer Jean Menneglier recounted his first contact with the D.520;

 "... In mid-June GC III/6, which had been at Le Luc since the beginning of the month, finally exchanged its Morane Saulnier MS 406 for the long-awaited Dewoitine D.520. As soon as the first detachment, including Jacobi, chef d'escadrille (squadron leader) of the 5th, and Le Gloan, had returned, we left for Toulouse. We landed on June 15 at Francazal where we abandoned our old Moranes without regret. We were taken by bus to Blagnac where we made contact with the Dewoitine 520. The one they gave me was number 358. It was a splendid machine, entirely of metal, equipped with a Hispano-Suiza 12-cylinder V engine with a power rating greater than that of the Morane, of the order of 920 HP. To compensate for the torque the engine was offset by 1°30' and the vertical stabilizer had a wing profile providing some compensation according to the speed. It was armed with a 20 mm Hispano gun firing through the prop axis, like the 406, but with a magazine of 80 explosive shells instead of 60, and 4 machine guns, 2 in each wing, with a belt magazine of 700 cartridges per gun instead of 350. These were heated. This gave 6 seconds of continuous fire with the gun (800 rounds/min) and 35 seconds with the machine guns, which was much better than the 406. The landing gear was mechanically locked in the "retracted" position, so there was no problem in case of a bullet lodged in the hydraulic system. It was a fast plane, credited with a speed of 550 km/h at the recovery altitude, very fine to fly, which started quite easily, which turned well and which had very sound reactions. It was almost the equivalent of the Me 109. If we had had it at the beginning of the war, things would certainly have been different. There was one amusing detail about the machine. The D.520 was equipped with a 'trunk' (baggage compartment) that sat in the fuselage behind the pilot. It was of decent size and it proved to be very handy when we were on the move, allowing us to take a lot of personal belongings with us. When I took control of my new aircraft, I was surprised by the sensitivity of the rudder and I was snaking a little at takeoff, but I got used to it very quickly. After a few minutes of flight I returned to land at Francazal which we left on patrol the next day to join Le Luc. As soon as we landed, we were told what had happened the day before during our absence and how Le Gloan and Assollant had been able to shoot down 5 Italian machines in less than 45 minutes... " 

For the Luftwaffe the campaign in the West was of course far from the 'walk-over' perhaps imagined. Every Gruppe regularly lost men and machines and certainly not the most inexperienced. On May 21, the Gruppenkommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Erich Mix was shot down by Sous-Lieutenant Hubert de Salaberry in his GC I/3 Dewoitine D.520. Mix had just downed the D.520 flown by Sous-Lieutenant Jean Parisse (although he identified it as an Ms 406). De Salaberry wrote the following account in his unpublished memoir (via Persyn) ;

“ ..up ahead of me I caught sight of a D.520 on its back with its gear extended, a rather unusual sight at this altitude. It was wreathed in a huge sheet of bright orange flame, blazing from the engine cowl to the tail fin like a huge torch. The cockpit seemed to have disappeared. It was a haunting sight in the bright blue sky. Less than one hundred metres behind it a Bf 109 continued to squirt out burst after burst of fire as if at a fairground shooting range, sporadic flashes of flame dancing along its wing leading edges. I was filled with an overwhelming desire to deal this 109 some of its own medicine. After a quick glance behind to check my rear, I dropped down in behind the ‘Fritz’. He had seen me and understood straight away that the hunter was now the prey. He did what all German fighters do when they are caught napping – he rolled onto his back and dropped like a stone, counting on being able to build up enough speed to put some distance between us. I was not about to let him go. I rolled with him and headed down vertically, my engine screaming with the throttle against the stop. I had full confidence in my aircraft, the Dewoitine was very stable and the engine & prop behaved themselves impeccably... Reeling the 109 slowly in during our headlong dive I unleashed several brief bursts from directly astern. The German pilot did not react and continued on down. Suddenly I noticed the sky becoming darker, realised that the ground was rushing up toward us. Crushed by the deceleration as I eased out the dive I lost sight of the German. I orbited the area but could see nothing. Below me the countryside was peaceful and unremarkable...”

Below; Kommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Mix at the controls of his Emil, May 1940. On May 21, he nursed down his shot-up machine for a belly-landing near Roye after combat with GC I/3 D.520s. Sustaining only minor injuries he was able to depart the scene, before being recovered two days later by German troops. He was awarded the EK I (Iron Cross First Class).

Below; GC I/3 D.520 of the unit's 2e escadrille probably assigned to S/Lt Parisse, shot down on 21 May 1940 in the vicinity of Fonches-Fonchette (Somme) after combat with Bf 109s. The pilot was seriously wounded, taking a round in the chest and although he managed to carry out a successful belly-landing in a field and climb out of the cockpit he collapsed and died a short while later. As the local villagers had all fled his body was not properly buried until after they returned in late June ....note the SPA 69 emblem has been cut out of the fuselage side by 'souvenir' hunters...(source "GC I/3 Les rois du Dewoitine 520" published by Lela Presse Avions). 



G.C I/3 D.520s flew their last sorties in the battle for France on the afternoon of June 16, 1940 - ordered to strafe German motorised columns en-route for Nevers. Sous-lieutenant  Pierre Salva recalled;

" ..suddenly they appeared ahead of us - some thirty motorcycle outriders and an unending column of vehicles displaying black crosses. They had not heard us arrive such was the noise of their tracks and engines which covered the roar of ours. I doubt very much that they thought there were any French fighters left in the skies to interrupt their 'marche triomphale' . Their anti-aircraft batteries did not react at all. The first tank in the column was neatly centred in my sight - a miss was impossible. I was about to fire - and then, there in the gun-sight, women and children, and a horse pulling a cart loaded with more refugees. If I unleashed a burst now I might damage the tank but I would inflict carnage on women and children. Despite my orders I did not open fire. Nor did Salaberry...."


Below; Dewoitine D 520 prototype no. 3 seen after capture by the Germans, probably Cazaux. This aircraft was written off in a takeoff accident on March 11, 1940. The hard-edged camouflage distinguishes this from D.520 no. 2.

Below; an early series aircraft as indicated by the location of the radio access hatch. Only 54 D.520s were lost as a direct result of enemy action during May-June 1940. A further 22 were abandoned/lost/destroyed by the French themselves.

Below; Dewoitines stocked at Francazal, post armistice, 28 June 1940.  The D.520 production line was located at Saint-Martin-du-Touch, production site of more recent ATR turboprop aircraft.

How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose in May-June 1940? French claims for May-June can range from 300-1000  victories. Mombeek in his history of JG 2 quoted the following figures for Luftwaffe losses for this period; 460 fighters, 635 twin engine bombers and 150 Stukas for total losses amounting to 25% of Luftwaffe front-line strength. The current 'official' score for the French fighter squadrons as quoted by the SHD (Service Historique de la Défense) is 650-675 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. According to Peter Cornwell (page 529  'The Battle of France' ) the Luftwaffe lost no less than 3,278 aircrew killed (!) from Sept. ’39 through to the end of June 1940, as compared to the RAF’s 1,127 and the Armée de l’Air’s 923. Taking the period of the invasion on its own gives the German's a loss-rate during the campaign in France that was twice that of its BoB loss rate. Whatever the exact German losses for the French campaign they were pretty heavy. This obviously had an impact on the conduct of operations over England subsequently. In fact the 'myth' of French AF ineptitude during the Battle of France is probably closely related to the 'myth' of 'The Few' during the BoB.

D. 520 on display at the Le Bourget Air and Space museum. One of the last production examples, no. 862 was constructed for the Luftwaffe but is here repainted in the colours of GC III/6 ace Pierre Le Gloan..

Also on this blog;

Dewoitine D.520 in JG 105  -  archive photo scans

Me 163 developmental issues (1) - June 1942

 

The development and rigorous flight testing of the Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet are documented extensively in the Luftwaffe test centre Arbeitsberichte works reports originating from the central testing ground (Erprobungsstelle) at Rechlin. These primary documents trace the developmental history of the aircraft from its early glider tests to its operational deployment as the world's first combat rocket-propelled interceptor. The Bundesarchiv manages the original military records for the Technical Air Armament directorate via their online Invenio Database. Using the archival signature RL 3 specific technical reports and test records related to the Komet can be retrieved while the Rechlin test and work reports are also available for download. While specific Rechlin test logs and technical handbooks are officially catalogued, direct digital downloads require navigating specific archival databases. If you find Invenio a little tricky, then the Archivportal-D is recommended for ease of use - it offers integrated access to various German state archives such as the deutsche digitale bibliothek from one search function, where you can locate specific entries (such as the Me 163 B-Flugzeug-Handbuch). For independent archival research, expert resources like Rob de Bie's Me 163 Archives provide detailed inventories and breakdowns of where specific Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) documents are held; eg the Me 163 B handbook manual is available in translation as a pdf download at the NASM link on Rob's pages.

as highlighted by General der Jagdflieger Galland to the head of the Erprobungsstelle Rechlin test centre in a 'top secret' memo concerning 'Development of the Me 163 b' received on 22 June 1942...

" The General of Fighters requests....."

"...er bittet der Entwickung der Me 163 mehr als bisher geschehen vorwärts zu treiben. Als wesentliche Verzögerung haben sich die Triebswerkschwierigkeiten herausgestellt. Daneben erscheint die Lösung der Fahrwerksfrage vordringlich. Die Entwicklung einer Startshilfe ist unerlässlich. Die Frage der Luftverlegungen bedarf der Erklärung .."

..that the development of the Me 163 be pursued more vigorously than has been the case to date. The difficulties with the power plant have proved to be a major cause of delay. In addition, resolving the issue of the landing gear appears to be a matter of urgency. For increased endurance and improving takeoff characteristics the development and testing of takeoff assistance aids is essential. The questions of road transport (ie salvage) following off-airfield landings and a towing aircraft for repositioning by air (air transfers) require clarification.

Also on this blog;

Messerschmitt Me 163 V18 speed record, July 1944

Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring visits I./NJG 2 at Gilze-Rijen, late 1940 - archive photo scan #54

 

Two photographs taken during one of Kesselring's visits to I./NJG 2 (Nachtjagdgeschwader 2) at Gilze-Rijen in late 1940. Kesselring was Commander-in-Chief of Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2), a command he held from January 1940 until June 1943. At that time he held the rank of Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshall), having been promoted after the campaigns of 1940. As commander of Luftflotte 2, he was one of the most senior operational commanders in the Luftwaffe and was responsible for air operations in the sectors assigned to his air fleet. During late 1940, Luftflotte 2 was heavily involved in the latter stages of the Battle of Britain, prior to launching night-time raids over England and the so-called Fernnachtjagd or long-range intruder missions. Major Karl-Heinrich Heyse, a Spanish veteran with 1.K/88 and first Kommandeur of II./NJG 1 and then I./NJG 2, was killed in action on 23 November 1940, his Ju 88 C shot down over the North Sea by an RAF Hampden returning from a mission. He was replaced by Hptm. Karl Hülshoff, formerly Staffelkapitän of 3./NJG 2. Ironically Kesselring had flown into Gilze-Rijen the previous day - 22 November 1940 - to review I./NJG 2 and, according to H. Rökker, ‘congratulate the unit on its successes’. Kesselring returned to Gilze-Rijen in his Siebel Fh 104 about one month later with 'presents' for the Gruppe (according to Möhlenbeck) and is seen (bottom) in conversation with Kommandeur Hülshoff and his Adjutant Oblt. Gerhard Böhme.

'Red 12' back in England for the Duxford/Shuttleworth airshows

'Red 12' spent the night at Headcorn before departing this morning in humungous temperatures for the weekend's flying displays. Photos courtesy Dale and Jonty... 

Storming the bombers - Egon Mayer's first 'frontal' attack, 23 November 1942

 

The air war in the West and over the Reich determined the fate of the Luftwaffe - with a higher percentage of casualties to participants than in the East, it was by far the most costly theatre for the Luftwaffe. And the Allies for that matter. The USAAF lost over 79,000 airmen between 1942-1945 and the RAF lost over 8,000 aircraft in the period 1939-1945 resulting in similar numbers of air crew killed. Over 60% of these losses were attributed to enemy fighters, both day and night respectively. The USAF lost over 8,000 bombers from November 1942 to May 1945 with German fighter pilots shooting down over 6,000 American and 7,000 RAF bombers, at a cost of 150,000 Allied airmen combined. The Germans themselves lost almost 20,000 fighter and 'destroyer' crews men and pilots, more than half killed fighting against the heavy bombers and their fighter escorts on the Western Front. Attacking a bomber formation was dangerous. Initial encounters with US bombers flying by day during mid-late 1942 were inconclusive, but the Germans quickly grew to realise that the American four-engine bombers with their heavy defensive armament - well able to absorb punishment especially when flying in their mutually protective ‘combat boxes’ - were tough opponents.  

Egon Mayer scored his first heavy bomber kills as Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 2 on 23 November  1942 - this may well have been his first such encounter with the '4-mot. Kampfflugzeuge' or “Viermots.” Having been appointed Gkr. at the start of that month, Mayer - known as a conscientious, studious and pragmatic fighter pilot and leader - had studied tactics and angles of attack to develop procedures against the 'Viermots' - most notably the B-17.  Other pilots in his unit had been doing likewise - Jules Meimberg recalled in his memoir;

“ we sought out as much information on these machines as we could find..first flight in 1935, steadily upgraded and improved..three revolving turrets, eight heavy machine guns for defence..and only one point of weakness – the cockpit. Whereas Mayer wanted to launch attacks from all directions simultaneously to disperse the defensive fire, I argued that head-on – hitting the B-17s where their defensive fire was at its weakest - was the only certain way to bring a Fortress down..”  

US bombers were increasingly penetrating the airspace of western and northern France. Mayer's Gruppe was specifically tasked with defending the U-boat bases in Brittany.  While JG 2 was not scrambled on the 9 October 1942 attack on the 'Lille industrial area', this was the first raid for which the US VIII BC managed to assemble over 100 bombers. However events elsewhere (North Africa) meant that it would be another six months before such a large force could be put together again over Western Europe. 

On 7 November, some 34 B-17s and B-24s raided Brest. Oblt. Bruno Stolle claimed one B-24, the first of this type shot down by the Richthofen Geschwader. St. Nazaire was the target of 36 bombers on 23 November 1942. Mayer led off 7. and 9./ JG 2 from Vannes at around 12:00 mid-day. 

As the Fw 190s sighted the bomber formation, Mayer made a rapid assessment of the situation and elected to attack the bomber formation 'head-on'. Climbing almost a mile above and three miles ahead of the formation, he turned and started  a shallow diving attack from the front. Receiving light defensive fire he held his approach for several seconds, focusing his aim on the port engines.  Perhaps less than thirty feet above the bomber 'box' he veered away as the target headed to earth. He repeated this pass on a second B-17. Fifty calibre rounds pounded his armor plate around his cockpit and according to one account, damaged two cylinders in his engine. Pulling up and gaining altitude, he then closed on a box of B-24s, an attack timed at  14:00.  By this stage he was probably almost out of ammunition and running low on fuel. Mayer decided to return to base. While he claimed two B-17s and a B-24 on 23 November 1942 (his victories 52-55) and brought back a relatively unscathed aircraft, no B-24s were lost. Four B-17s in total did fail to return - two credited to Mayer, one for Uffz. Friedrich May of 8./JG 2 and the fourth was credited to Oblt. Siegfried Schnell, StaKa of 9./JG 2, his 72nd victory. Mayer's 7. Staffel wingman Uffz. Theo Angele was the only loss suffered by III./JG 2- Angele's Fw 190 A-4 was hit by the bombers' defensive fire and went down into the sea. Angele's body was later washed up on the coast.

General der Jagdflieger Galland was quick to praise Mayer's initiative against the Viermots on 23 November 1942. In a message sent to all units  (below, dated 14 December and received at I./JG 54 on 13 January 1943) he urged all formation leaders to adopt this frontal attack method where possible in order to increase the 'lethality' of the German fighters and overwhelm the bomber formations. 

RL 10/291 contains a combat report 'Erfahrungsbericht' (a  'retour d'experience' written for the JG 54 pilots shifting  to the Western Front) which indicates that Mayer almost certainly employed the new frontal attack method for the first time during this raid. The traditional attack from the rear had proved risky, with attacking fighters likely sustaining many hits from the defensive fire of a typical staggered trail formation. 

 There were of course several 'negatives' to the frontal pass - attacking from head-on gave the German fighter pilot only a few seconds to line up, aim, fire and either pull up or dive away after a closing speed of 500 mph or more. Few German pilots could do this, which was considered an acquired skill and required steely nerves. Those who did master this method risked collision and damage or destruction once they pulled up, or in most cases rolled into a 'split-S' manoeuvre and dove away following the attack. On the other hand, only the top turret twin fifties on the B-17 F models could engage the incoming aircraft, reducing exposure to the numbers of guns in a formation until the fighter passed underneath or overhead. But by then the German was too fast for the ball turret to track and engage. Waist gunners had to be cautious in firing for fear of hitting the bomber on their flank. But the frontal pass directly concentrated fire on the most vulnerable part of the bomber - the cockpit. In response to this new method of German attack, the Americans introduced new models - the B-17 G and B-24 H both incorporated the forward firing “chin” mounted twin fifty calibre machine guns to defend against the head-on attack. This soon led to the exclusive use of the more heavily armed Fw 190s to attack the bombers, leaving the Messerschmitts to engage the American escort fighters.

Below; Oblt. Egon Mayer (fifth left) with his 7. Staffel seen in Poix during October 1942. Uffz. Theo Angele KIA on the 23 November raid is fourth right.

These developments deterred all but the most dedicated and efficient bomber 'killers'. Those aces who 'specialised' in the frontal attack simply changed their angle of attack, above the chin turret guns’ elevation, rolling over exposing the undersides of their Fw-190s, where the armor plating absorbed the impact of the enemy rounds. Most of the German fighter pilots who amassed many bomber kills paid a heavy price and fought a long war. For example, Georg-Peter Eder was shot down on multiple occasions and wounded numerous times. He had three kills confirmed after colliding with his targets, surviving the crash and being thrown from the wreckage, the last being in a Me-262 jet, breaking both legs in January 1945, ending his war. Anton Hackl was shot down eight times and also wounded on four occasions, including a collision. Eder was not that an unusual case. Most of Germany’s pilots were shot down and often wounded several times. Returning to combat was expected unless the loss of sight, a limb or other crippling injury was the result. The fortunate few became instructors until they healed, passing on their knowledge to the next group of future fighter pilots. This protection was far less available in the front of a formation, and an attack described by Heinz Knoke shows how on the job training often developed a better result, but was a much more difficult and dangerous proposition: 

“We draw closer to the bomber formation…I can distinguish the individual enemy aircraft now. Most of them are Liberators….They look as if their fat bellies are pregnant with bombs. I pick one of them as my target…I shall make a frontal attack. The Yank is focused in my sights. He grows rapidly larger. I reach the firing buttons on the stick. Tracers come whizzing past my head. They have opened up on me! Fire! I press both buttons, but my aim is poor. I can see only a few hits register in the right wing. I almost scrape the fat belly as I dive past. Then I am caught in the slipstream, buffeted so violently that for a moment I wonder if my tail plane has been shot away. I climb up steeply and break away to the left. Tracers pursue me, unpleasantly close. “Damn all this metal in the air! Three hundred heavy bombers carry a total of 4,800 super heavy machine guns. Even is only one in ten has a chance to fire that still means we run into quite a barrage. I come in for a second frontal attack, this time from a little below. As I swing round I turn my head. Flames are spreading along the bottom of the fuselage of my Liberator. It sheers away from the formation in a wide sweep to the right. “Twice more I come in to attack, this time diving from above the tail. I am met by heavy defensive fire. My plane shudders under the recoil from the cannon and two 13 mm guns. I watch my cannon shell bursts rake along the top of the fuselage and right wing, and then I hang on to the stick with both hands. Fire spreads along the right wing. The inside engine stops. Suddenly the wing breaks off altogether. The body of the stricken monster plunges vertically, spinning into the depths. A long black trail of smoke marks its descent. “One of the crew attempts to bail out. But his parachute is in flames. Poor devil! The body somersaults and falls to the ground like a stone. At an altitude of 3,000 feet there is a tremendous explosion, which causes the spinning fuselage to disintegrate. Fragments of blazing wreckage land on a farm 200 or 300 yards from the Zwischenahn Airfield, and the exploding fuel tank sets the farm buildings on fire.”

Also on this blog;

rare images of Georg-Peter Eder JG 2

Storming the bombers ! IL2 movie based on Heinz Knoke's memoir - in two parts

Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey Stuka in colour

 

A Ju 87 D-5 of the Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey seen about to depart on a sortie from Immola during July 1944. Earlier D-series aircraft generally retained the 7.92 mm MG 17 wing machine guns, but the D-5 replaced them with a pair of MG 151/20 cannon to improve the Stuka's ground-attack capability. This may be an SA-Kuva image (see p71 of Falconer's "Haynes Manual") and may be (period) colorised.

On the Ju 87 D-5, the underwing racks were not simply generic ETC racks. The D-5 could carry a variety of underwing stores on specialized wing-mounted bomb carriers or Schlosslafetten (bomb-carriage mountings) as here. The D-5's ground-attack role made extensive use of these wing stations for SC 50s, SC 70s, fragmentation bomb containers and other stores. The underwing ETC 50/VIIIdTp bomb racks allowed bombs and containers weighing up to 300 kg to be suspended... The fuselage racks: 1000/500/IXb — centreline rack for the heaviest bombs. 500/IXc — centreline rack for lighter bombs. Detachment Kuhlmey (Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey) took 33 Ju 87 D-5 Stukas to Finland as the dive-bomber component of I./SG 3. The complete force that arrived at Immola in June 1944 consisted of approximately 70 combat aircraft, including: 33 Ju 87 D-5 dive bombers (I./SG 3) 29–62 Fw 190 A-6 fighters (II./JG 54) 16 Fw 190 F fighter-bombers (I./SG 5) 1–8 Bf 109 G-8 reconnaissance aircraft (I./NAGr 5)

more KG 100 He 177s - archive photo scan #53

 

Loading a KG 100 He 177 for a raid on England on a French airfield, perhaps Châteaudun just south of Paris - this is most likely an He 177 A-5 which featured the broader wing and heavy under-wing bomb carrying capability. The bomb being manhandled under the wing is likely either an SC 1000 'Hermann' or possibily an SC 1800 'Satan'. The SC 2500 'Max' was the heaviest air-dropped bomb used by the Luftwaffe and could be carried by the He 177. It was also too large for the internal bomb bay of the He 177 which was divided into two longitudinal 'sections'. Given that the ground crew are still able to manipulate the bomb on a wheeled trolley the ordnance being loaded is probably not the 'Max'.. The SC 1000 had a length of 2.5 m and a width of 0.65 m.

Kurfürst K-4 cockpit revisions

 

The cockpit of the Bf 109 K-4 was not simply a late-war Gustav cockpit with a few new instruments. One of the most noticeable internal changes was on the starboard sidewall, where Messerschmitt redesigned the layout as part of the K-series standardization program.

On the Bf 109 G-series, including the G-6, a prominent fuel line associated with the external drop tank system ran along the upper part of the starboard cockpit sidewall. It featured a 'clear' window cut-out to enable the pilot to detect the first air bubbles indicating that the tank was approaching empty. All Friedrichs and Gustavs had the fuel line for the drop tank running on the upper right hand side of the cockpit. On the K-4 the fuel system routing was revised. The conspicuous starboard-side fuel feed pipe was eliminated from the cockpit sidewall, reducing exposed 'plumbing' within the cockpit. As a result;

- the K-4's right sidewall appeared cleaner and less cluttered than that of a G-6.

- the large exposed fuel feed pipe characteristic of the Gustav cockpit was absent

- equipment and controls on the right side were rearranged around the new sidewall structure.

- the Kurfürst starboard cockpit wall features a circuit breaker box. (below) Note the FuG 16 and FuG 25 to the bottom right. 

K-4 instrument panel showing the Revi 16 sight which could be folded aside when not in use. In this view the Revi has been re-positioned out of the pilot's line of sight to improve visibility (eg, when taxiing). Below this the classic six instruments of the blind flying panel. Note too just under the coaming three ammo indicators for the K-4; one for the 30 mm MK 108 cannon firing through the propeller hub and two for the engine cowl 13 mm MG 131 machine guns. (thank you Charlie!) 

Wurmheller receives the DKiG - Bundesarchiv photo find#14

 

This brief report by PK Brütting consists of just three images entitled 'Frankreich.- Feldflugplatz. Auszeichnung eines Piloten'. (A field strip in France - a pilot is presented with an award). These show Oesau pinning a DKiG to the tunic of JG 2 ace Wurmheller who received the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold (German Cross in Gold) on 21 August 1942. He was awarded this 'honour'  - the 'Spiegelei' or 'fried egg'- just days after the actions over Dieppe where he supposedly shot down 7 opponents with a broken leg!  At the time he was an Oberfeldwebel. He would soon be promoted to Leutnant and be nominated for the Eichenlaub. He is seen here in front of 'yellow 3' of III./JG 2.

Also on this blog

Wurmheller at Vannes, August 1943

Wurmheller at Dieppe, August 1942

Maj. Helmut Leicht - St.G 77 - archive photo scan #53

Helmut Leicht enrolled at Luftkriegschule 4 (Air Warfare School No. 4) in Berlin-Gatow on 6 April 1936 and, on 1 July 1937, joined I. Gruppe of Stuka Wing 165 as a Leutnant; this unit became I. /Stukageschwader 77 in May 1939. With 1. Staffel he took part in the campaigns in Poland and the West, flying sorties over both France and England during the summer of 1940. On 6 February 1941, was appointed Staffelkapitän  of the Ergänzungsstaffel des Stuka-Geschwaders 77. On 28 June 1941, he returned to 1. Staffel and was seriously wounded during his first mission over Russia. Following his recovery, he served as Staffelkapitän of 2./ StG 77 from 3 January 1942 to 10 January 1943 and also as acting Kommandeur of I. Gruppe. After around 400 combat sorties, he was awarded the Knight’s Cross with the rank of Hptm. on 3 September 1942. From 11 January to 22 April 1943, he served on the staff of IV Fliegerkorps and took command of II./Stukageschwader 77 in April 1943. Promoted to Major on 1 October 1943, he was seriously wounded on 9 November 1943. After his recovery, on 5 May 1944 he resumed command of II. / Stuka-Geschwader 77, which became III. / Schlachtgeschwader 10 in May 1944. On 26 June 1944 Leicht failed to return from his 600th combat mission. Sellhorn who flew with him in 1./St.G 77 indicated that he was lost on 22/06/44 in his own caption to this image, while 'Kracker' states this occurred on his 900th sortie! Flying Fw 190 F-8 WNr. 930483 "Green 1" he was reportedly last seen attacking enemy columns in the area south-east of Vitebsk. Probably the first Ju 87 Stuka 'ace' to be shot down and killed in a Fw 190, Leicht was awarded a posthumous Eichenlaub. In this rare image Leicht is seen at the controls of a Storch, probably during 1942. Click to view full screen,

Lt. Frommlowitz of the Gruppenstab I./St.G 77 in front of a Ju 87 D, 1943

 

Ju 87 Stukas in the Blitzkrieg

 

On 10 May, 1940, the Wehrmacht launched the Westfeldzug, code-named 'Fall Gelb', the campaign in the West. All Ju 87 units (except I./St.G. 1) were committed over France, Belgium and the Netherlands, i.e. around 350 machines. The Ju 87s were quickly feared by their adversaries as they pursued their Blitzkrieg (lightning war) in close collaboration with German ground and Panzer forces. Flying up to four sorties per day, the Stuka units suffered about 30% losses. With barely any rest period they were then dispatched on missions over England. This dusty, slightly battle-worn Ju 87 of III./St.G. 51 was photographed at the end of the campaign. This Gruppe would soon be incorporated in St.G. 1.

Probably unsurprisingly the Junkers Ju 87, the Luftwaffe’s 'Sturzkampfflugzeug' (dive-bombing aircraft) or 'Stuka' has inspired myth and urban legend.. As Spanish Civil War historian Gerald Howson  described, a veteran of the International Brigades who was at Dunkirk related how the Stukas operating over the Low countries and France during May 1940 had not been a novelty for him since he had already encountered them in Spain... Unlikely since the Germans sent only a handful of Stukas to Spain and, in all probability what had been seen in Spain was another type entirely. Similarly, Italian Ju 87s flew from Belgian bases in May 1940 to bomb columns of refugees in the south of France. The Italians though did not receive Stukas until much later, and the Stuka's endurance hardly allowed it to operate at those sorts of ranges. But then Ju 87s were 'omnipresent' during the Second World War. Popular TV 'historical' documentaries - including episode 1 of a brand-new WW II history series- generally feature footage of panicked columns of refugees fleeing in May/June 1940 interspersed with clips showing the 'shrill screams of the Stuka's sirens' as they dive-bombed these same columns. Horrific stories accompanied by 'blood-curdling' sound effects are related over background scenes of the ever-present Ju 87s swooping down accompanied by film of entire buildings collapsing like a house of cards. Even 'serious' authors are not immune;

"..with its distinctive cranked wing and vulture-like looks, the blood-curdling shriek of a Stuka in a near-vertical power-dive was certain to strike fear and panic into the most battle-hardened soldiers as well as defenceless civilians.." (Falconer, Haynes Workshop Manual, 2018)

Of course, by the time French, Belgian and Dutch refugees had started to flee southwards during May 1940, the 'Jehrico trumpet' sirens had been removed from the aircraft. And Ju 87 pilots had more than enough on their hands than setting out to massacre unfortunate civilians. As for flattening towns and cities, the Stukas' usual payload could at best barely penetrate a single building, far less collapse an entire block of flats/apartments. But worth noting perhaps -  as per Marc Hazard in his 'Stuka in the Blitzkrieg' (Lela Presse, 2023) - that somewhere between 80-100 Stuka pilots who took part in the campaign of May/June 1940 went on to receive the RK, ie some 25% of all Stuka pilots who took part in the Westfeldzug. And that the defeated Allies (Britain and France) did much to 'demonise' the Ju 87 and its crews - the "Teutonic harbinger of destruction [... and] stylised figureheads of the invincible German war machine " (Falconer)  - as part of the explanation for their rapid collapse and defeat in May/June 1940..

Below; a newspaper account published in a March 1942 issue of the NS Leipziger Tageszeitung newspaper written by Schlachtflieger ace Oblt. Dieter Pekrun relating his shooting-down (by Spitfires of course) on his second sortie of the day while piloting a Stab I./StG 2 Stuka on the third day of the Westfeldzug, 12 May 1940 - Pekrun managed to bail out and came down in a field of 'irate' cows at Geetbets, Belgium - behind  the lines. With his BS dead, Pekrun evaded the various search efforts mounted to locate him and returned home some 24 hours after being presumed MIA. Pekrun was awarded the RK in June 1941.

Also on this blog

Stuka crew of LG 1 relaxes ahead of the attack in the West

'Stukas in the Blitzkrieg', Marc Hazard, Stukageschwader 77, summer 1940

German WWII warbirds at La Ferté-Alais 2026

'Red 12' calling in at Headcorn on Sunday evening for a first stop in the UK. Louis Prebble photos.

Displays representing the wartime Luftwaffe featured at Le Temps des Hélices 2026, including the traditional three-ship of Junkers Ju-52/3M, Pilatus P-2* and MS-505 Criquet**, and a solo display by Charlie Brown in Bf 109 E-4 "Red 12". The P-2 is not an authentic German WWII type, but was commonly used to represent the Luftwaffe in war films before genuine Luftwaffe aircraft became available, hence its inclusion here. The MS-505 is the French version of the Fi 156 Storch.

 

Fw 190 A-8, WNr.732197, Fw. Rudolf Artner JG 5

 

Fw 190 A-8 'White 10' WNr.732197, Herdla. Photos dated 8 March 1945, after Fw. Artner (standing on the wing and then seated on the stabiliser with his 'Abschussstock') had scored his 20th victory, a Beaufighter (RD 132) of 455 Sqn.  'White 10' features the JG 5 yellow/black 'Bauchbinde' RVT fuselage bands, the 'new' setting-sun 'Eismeer' cowl emblem and the typical 9. Staffel white-painted armoured ring protecting the oil cooler. Ago-built WNr.732197 was scrapped in Norway at the end of the war. Also in the images are Uffz. Siegfried Ballerstädt and Uffz. Martin Ullman of 9./JG 5. Previously published in Rodeike's 'Jagdflugzeug 190', decals for 'white 10' are available via EagleCals.

Also on this blog;

Hptm. Theo Weißenberger's I./JG 5 on the Invasionsfront

Hptm. Horst Carganico's Bf 109 G-6/AS Kommandeur I./JG 5

Fw 190 Jabos - archive photo scan #52

 

Two armourers preparing to mount an SC 250 bomb on the belly rack of Fw 190 A-2/U1 WNr. 2081, ‘Blue 3’ of 10.(Jabo)/JG 2 at Saint-André-de-l’Eure in the summer of 1942.

Below; III./SKG 10 Fw 190 A-4 in Tunisia, La Fauconnerie, March-April 1943. Gruppenkommandeur was Oblt. Fritz Schröter. Schröter departed the front early in April to get married. His A-4 (WNr. 0142327) displaying command chevrons was lost on 8 April, shot down by ground fire with Gruppe Ia (operations officer) Lt. Clemens Graf von und zu Westerholt und Gysenberg at the controls.

An Fw 190 F-8 of III./SG 3 takes off on a mission from Tilsit airfield in July 1944.  The gear retraction sequence is underway. Note the yellow wingtips. The SC 250 bomb is fitted with a steel 'tip' to prevent it from ricocheting on impact. (ECPAD - PK Doege)

Establishment of II./JG 77 - Oberfeldwebel Georg Ries (Stabskompanie JG 77) - archive photo scan #52

 

Ofw. Georg Ries seen in Norway during 1940 with II./JG 77

 In 1934, the Kriegsmarine had formed a Staffel in Kiel to protect the German Bight (Deutsche Bucht) region: 1./JG 136. This naval air unit was subsequently split in two, and the unit became a Gruppe with a third and even a fourth Staffel. The Gruppe, based mainly at Jever, was taken over by the Luftwaffe. Its Kommandeur was Major Carl Schumacher, a former artilleryman from the Great War who had joined the navy and then, in 1934, the Luftwaffe. In 1938, the Gruppe abandoned its He 51s to fly Bf 109 Bs. Leaving Jever for Fürth and Weiden, the unit, now stripped of its fourth Staffel, was renamed II./JG 333. Like the future I./JG 77, II./JG 333 was based for a time in the Sudetenland, being stationed in Pilsen in 1939. In May of that year, II./333 was renamed II./JG 77 and received Bf 109 Es. At the end of August 1939, the Luftwaffe High Command transferred the Gruppe to Nordholz on the Baltic Sea, an area well known to many of its pilots. Its Staffelkapitäne at the time were Oblt. Helmut Henz (4./JG 77), Hptm. Alfred von Loijeswski (5./JG 77), both Legion Condor veterans, and Hptm. Franz-Heinz Lange (6./JG 77). 

Below; II./JG 333 (renamed II./JG 77 in 1939) received its first Bf 109 Es in May 1939. Well camouflaged under netting and foliage, the Gruppe Adjutant’s aircraft is seen with its engine covered with a tarpaulin bearing the aircraft’s WNr. (609). 

Click on the image for a full-screen view.

Georg Ries had joined the Kriegsmarine in 1930 and served on the cruisers Leipzig and Köln before taking a position on Göring's 'yacht' 'Carin I'. For 'personal reasons' he decided to leave the navy and trained as an aircraft mechanic before being posted to Jever as an Unterfeldwebel and joining the Stabskompanie of JG 77 via a spell in Spain with the Legion Condor.  By the time of the invasion of Norway during 1940 Ries was - in his own words - " ..responsible for all of II./JG 77's aircraft." This Gruppe was the only single-engine Luftwaffe fighter unit sent to Norway. Ries served as Werkstattzugführer in Stavanger and Trondheim. 

His Gruppe initially assembled on Norwegian soil at Kristiansand/Kjevik. The first few days were quiet: the outgunned Norwegian fighter forces mainly flew Gladiators, which were vastly outclassed by the Bf 109s. But the RAF soon appeared in Norwegian skies. On 12 April, in poor weather, twelve Hampdens from No. 44 (Rhodesian) and No. 50 Squadrons made an incursion in search of German ships, appearing at around midday over the port of Kristiansand. German anti-aircraft guns opened up and downed two Hampdens. Several II./JG 77 Bf 109s managed to get airborne and caught up with the bombers. A fierce dogfight ensued in which six RAF bombers were claimed by the fighters - among the victorious pilots were Staffelkapitän Lange and Fw. Robert Menge – the latter had recently been transferred to 5./JG 77 from 6./Tr.Gr.186. British records partially confirm these losses: two twin-engine aircraft from No. 50 Sq. were shot down by anti-aircraft fire; three others (one from No. 50 Sq. and two from No. 44 Sq.) were shot down by Bf 109s. Below; wreckage from one of the Hampdens shot down over Kristiansand/Kjevik on 12 April 1940.

Above, a II./JG 77 Emil following a 'Kopfstand'. A good view of the 'classic' 1940 scheme.

Ries departed Norway in late 1940 for Brest, II./JG 77 covering those Channel front fighter units returning to the Reich for rest and refit as the 'Luftschlacht um England' petered out. The advance detachment of II./JG 77 left Norway on 10 November, passing through Kiel, Charleroi-Gosselies and Paris before reaching Brest. Bad luck was to mark the transfer: on the 16th, one of the two Ju 52s carrying ground crew crashed near Brest, killing around ten men. The ground crews were accommodated in buildings on the airfield at Guivapas. 

Ries participated in all of JG 77's early campaigns including the Balkanfeldzug and Barbarossa. He departed the Eastern Front in March 1942 posted to a training school as 'technischer Leiter'. In his correspondence dated 1989 he mentions that much of his documentation was lost at the end of the war, but that he still had a few photos from Norway and the pre-war period.  Some of these show Ries (below, centre) supervising the dismantling and loading of Me 109s onto trucks for recovery back to Germany and/or onward rail transfer to Brest in France.

Ries' 'Bestallung' document appointing him to the rank of 'Feldwebel' (below). Note that 'Unterfeldwebel' was an NCO rank in the Wehrmacht, admittedly not a common one. Many or most in the Luftwaffe - especially flying personnel - went from Unteroffizier directly to Feldwebel, skipping Unterfeldwebel, a rank that seems to have been reserved for 'specialist' technical personnel. (a reviewer on amazon.com mentioned in his 'review' of my 'Day Fighters Aces of the Luftwaffe' (Casemate, 2021) that he had read all of Caldwell's books and had never encountered this rank before, suggesting somehow that this author must have made an error. Well, no.)