"... und wird nach Luftkampf vermißt!.." JG 77 Bf 109 K-4s lost on 23 December 1944

 

"...and is missing following aerial combat!" by Werner Girbig in Jägerblatt, March 1972

"... Hundreds of reports issued by military units after costly missions ended with this very sentence. One such was Hptm. Armin Köhler’s III./JG 77 which suffered losses on December 23, 1944: two pilots killed or missing and five wounded. When Günter Schmitz drew my attention to the grave of an unknown German fighter pilot in Altenahr in the summer of 1970, neither of us knew that the man resting there belonged to that very same III. Gruppe of JG 77, or that a combination of unfortunate circumstances would delay the resolution of his fate for another 18 months. Above all, I had no idea at the time how much effort it would take to gather the material needed to prove that the fallen airman in the Altenahr cemetery grave could only be one specific individual.

 But it is best to tell the story in order. At least the date and approximate time of the unknown fighter pilot’s crash near Altenahr were known: December 23, 1944, around 3:30 p.m. This information came from the Altenahr gravedigger; long after the war ended, scrap collectors alerted him to wreckage and skeletal remains, prompting him to retrieve the pilot’s body from the woods and bury it in the municipal cemetery. According to his own account, he found and broke the Erkennungsmarke ID tag also found at the crash site, intending to place one half in the grave and hand the other over to the police for forwarding. Furthermore, the incident was officially recorded, and the identification tag number was noted down. Another resident of Altenahr reported finding a data plate inscribed "Messerschmitt AG" near the crash site, though he had subsequently discarded it carelessly. Alongside the pilot's shattered body, a Polish coin and a St. Christopher amulet were found at the time—items that would prove invaluable for further research. Twenty-six years after the tragic events over the "Western Combat Zone," I began tracing the unknown pilot's path using the scant information available. Günter Schmitz had meanwhile secured permission from the municipal authorities to open the grave, allowing us to search for the identification tag half—which we hoped to find there—using a detector on December 1, 1970.

 Yet, we had no luck that day. Although even the tiniest screws from the aircraft were present and detectable in the grave—the pilot had been recovered from the crash site along with many small fragments of his machine and buried in Altenahr—not the slightest trace of an identification tag could be found. The specific file folder containing the records was also missing. Shortly after the war ended, officials from some military authority had appeared to confiscate specific documents, and since that time, the file folder had vanished. The fate of the fallen airman could now only be determined through indirect means, so I immediately set to work reconstructing the combat events of December 23, 1944. 

 With the help of the WASt in Berlin, I eventually had a good dozen pilots on my list who had been missing since December 23. Naturally, a bit of luck is required in such matters, and Günter Schmitz managed to find several rounds of 30mm ammunition as well as a fragment of an aileron 'horn' —a part specific to the Bf 109. The ammunition and various other distinctive aircraft components confirmed to us that the plane must have been a Bf 109 K-4. Returning to the pilots missing from December 23: some could be ruled out immediately because they had flown Focke-Wulf aircraft that day; of the remaining six Messerschmitt pilots, three flew the G-14 model and the others the K-4. One of these K-4 pilots—a member of III./JG 77—hailed from Teschen in Upper Silesia, and I immediately thought of the Polish coin, given Teschen’s location in the German-Polish border region. Both in terms of time and location, the evidence now pointed strongly toward the JG 77 non-commissioned officer, as the other pilots belonged to units deployed elsewhere on the morning of December 23. The unidentified fallen pilot, however, had crashed around 3:30 p.m.—precisely the time when the III. Gruppe of JG 77 was engaged in aerial combat over the Ahr Valley in their Bf 109 K-4s. Hptm. Köhler himself landed in Cologne at 3:15 p.m. following the mission. Uffz. Silwester was the only member of this unit still missing as of December 23, 1944. I was able to compile enough information to hand it over to the WASt (German Federal Archives). It took weeks before I could submit all the documents. For me, it was already clear that the dead fighter pilot in Altenahr could only be Uffz. Walter Silwester of 12 Staffel of JG 77. All the information converged at one point. Would the WASt also be able to close the case based on my "circumstantial evidence"? As the months passed, I learned from Josef Kleber, former Adjutant of III./JG 77, how the Gruppe was unexpectedly attacked by Allied fighters (P-47s) over the Ahr Mountains on December 23rd during their outbound flight and suffered the well-known losses. Since December 1944, losses among the German fighter forces had been rising rapidly. Leadership errors and inadequate training could not be compensated for by the self-sacrifice of the fighter pilots alone. During the fierce and dramatic air battles in the West in the final days of 1944 (December 23-31), hundreds of aircraft were shot down. Even today, 83 German fighter pilots are considered effectively missing in action there, and the fact that the entire fighter force still lists well over 2,000 missing pilots can easily be seen, in part, from the existing loss lists. The area of the so-called "Western Combat Zone" will be the immediate focus of my next investigations. Uffz. Silwester was one of those missing from the Ardennes Offensive, and the clarification of his fate, in which Günter Schmitz also played a significant role, will hopefully not be the last success..."

 To conclude, here again is the loss report of III./JG 77 from December 23, 1944 including details of 11. and 12. Staffel Bf 109 K-4s..

Uffz. Hasso Fröhlich 11. Staffel verw.

'yellow 16' WNr. 330200

Lt. Martin Ludwig 12. Staffel verw.

'blue 8' WNr. 330205

 Uffz. Willi Meyer 12. Staffel verw.

'blue 6' WNr. 330217

 Uffz. Karl Reinberg 12. Staffel verw.

'blue 13' WNr. 330197

 Fw. Hans Rössner 12. Staffel, gefallen (zunächst vermißt)

'blue 3' WNr. 330177

 Uffz. Walter Silwester 12. Staffel,  gefallen (zunächst vermißt) 

'blue 11' WNr. 330164

 Lt. W. Wildenauer 11. Staffel verw.

'yellow 13' WNr. 330144

Below; previously unpublished image of Lt. Martin Ludwig seated on his 8./JG 77 G-2 'black 9' in the late spring of 1944. Note the Gustav in the background with underwing 'Werfer' rocket launcher. Born 13 July 1923 in Mellenbach. Coming from EJG Süd, he was posted to 8./JG 77 in October 1943. In June 1944 he transferred to 7./JG 77 and in October 1944 joined 12./JG 77. WIA 23 Dec 1944 in combat with P-47s. After recovering from his injuries he did not return to JG 77 joining a ground unit. 3 claims. (via Brouez)

8 May 1945 - my last combat flight, Courland evacuation, Hans Freiherr von Zedlitz

 

".. III. Gruppe of the torpedo-bomber wing KG 26 (*Vestigium Leonis*, also known as the "Lion Wing") was stationed at Værnes near Trondheim, Norway, at the end of the war. It was there, on May 7, 1945, that we received news of the war's end. For me—serving as an *Oberleutnant* and pilot—this period had been preceded by 14 combat missions against Allied convoys in the Mediterranean between August 1943 and early 1944. In 1944, I underwent conversion training from the He 111 to the Ju 188, followed by the reformation of III. Gruppe  and our transfer to Norway. Our mission objective was to attack convoys in the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean. On the morning of May 8, all remaining serviceable aircraft were transferred to Oslo. Shortly before we took off from Værnes, we witnessed the crash of a Ju 88; for reasons that could not be determined, the aircraft performed a 180-degree roll along its longitudinal axis after takeoff and struck the ground in a ball of fire from an altitude of approximately 150 meters.. In Oslo, the combat-ready crews received orders to fly to Courland without their flight engineers—meaning with a crew of three. The objective was to airlift as many soldiers as possible out of the Courland Army. While flying south, passing east of Denmark, we spotted a naval formation out at sea to the west that appeared to be heading for Copenhagen. Before taking off from Oslo, we had been told that the planned mission to the east had been coordinated with the Allied forces. The only threat of attack came from the Russian side. Our flight across the Baltic Sea to Courland proceeded without incident. En route, we flew over the island of Bornholm, which we knew to be occupied by German forces. It was fortunate that we did not fly back along the same route; the Russians had taken over the island during the day. We reached our destination, the Grobin 2 airfield near Libau in Latvia, sometime after midday. On our approach to Libau, we spotted several aircraft wrecks off the coast—apparently shot down by the Russians. After landing, it was confirmed to us that Russian fighter planes were constantly patrolling the coast and attempting to shoot down departing aircraft. For this reason, I decided to begin the return flight as late as possible. Unfortunately, we encountered significant difficulties before takeoff. I had managed to barter for 200 litres of aviation fuel in exchange for two bottles of cognac. When the fuel truck arrived from the nearby Grobin 1 airfield, the radio operator had to take on the task of refueling, as the mechanic had remained in Oslo. During the refueling process, the radio operator suddenly shouted, "Stop! The tank is overflowing." A check revealed that he had poured the fuel into the oil filler neck of the right engine. Thanks to the assistance of an airfield inspector, we found an engine specialist who drained the fuel-contaminated oil, allowing fresh oil to be added. We were also able to salvage a small amount of the fuel. The airfield itself was largely filled with airworthy aircraft, yet there were no pilots left. The last pilots had reportedly flown off that morning in the fighters and a few other machines. Only a single Ju 52—already occupied by soldiers—stood a few meters away from us, but without a pilot. My aircraft had meanwhile taken five soldiers on board; a sixth was to be squeezed into the fuselage between the reserve fuel tanks just before takeoff. According to ground crew, about 200 soldiers from the Courland Army were still waiting at the edge of the airfield for transport out at that time. The crew of a Ju 88 that had taken off that afternoon returned about an hour later in a cross-country vehicle; the pilot reported that they had been attacked by Russian fighters and he had made an emergency landing on the coast. He then volunteered to take over the Ju 52 that was still waiting. Sometime that afternoon—we were standing in front of the aircraft—an infantry officer accompanied by two soldiers approached me across the airfield and asked if we still had room in the plane. We were able to accommodate his two soldiers in the Ju 52. The officer—who secured the very last available spot in the aircraft, located in the cockpit facing the rear—was Leutnant Hubert Leufgen. That marked the beginning of a friendship that has now lasted fifty years. Shortly before takeoff, an agitated sergeant arrived and tried to board the aircraft by force. This was prevented by the crew and airfield personnel. Takeoff finally took place in the late afternoon, made more difficult by the fact that the normal runway was too short. We had to take off diagonally across the airfield, aiming for a radio station located at the edge of the airfield, and were glad we didn't clip it. Immediately transitioning to low-level flight, we flew over the port of Liepāja on a northerly course towards the Baltic Sea. After a short time, four Russian fighters approached us at high altitude in formation. We saw them bank to attack, but their unfavorable angle of attack helped to repel the attacks. Three more fighters joined them, but we were able to fend off the uncoordinated attacks, regardless of which direction they came from, with full engine power and a daring low-level flight over the sea. I decided against following my observer's advice to fly towards high clouds on the horizon. My experience as a pilot told me that when attacking at low altitude, the best way to outmaneuver fighters is not to fly normal turns, but to use the rudder to create a sideslip effect, presenting the attacker with a constantly shifting target. To make matters worse, the radio operator behind me kept jamming the only available machine gun. The fighters had turned away (likely because they lacked sufficient fuel for a prolonged flight over the sea) when the right engine began to run roughly—presumably a consequence of the strain. We had originally intended to fly west, passing over Bornholm. Instead, I decided to gain altitude and head toward the Swedish coast. At an altitude of three thousand meters, I shut down the right engine and did not use it again until landing in Copenhagen. By then, it had grown dark; some Swedish airfields had switched on their landing lights, but we continued flying toward Copenhagen. In Copenhagen, they were kind enough to turn on the runway lights. Four jeeps carrying British paratroopers met our aircraft as it rolled to a stop. Armed soldiers escorted us as we disembarked, and I had great difficulty extracting the soldier who had been wedged in between the reserve fuel tanks. Officers and enlisted men were separated and quartered within the Citadel in Copenhagen. That shared return flight from Courland—bringing me face-to-face with Hubert Leufgen—blossomed into a friendship that has endured to this day... "

 Photos: v. Zedlitz

Using AI to write Luftwaffe books? new Gerhard Barkhorn 'biography'

 

A new 'book' on the 'extraordinary life' of a Luftwaffe fighter ace. Of course the typical Al-generated cover is horrible (especially if you happen to know what Barkhorn or a Starfighter look like - and look at that canopy. Is he flying a Spitfire there ?!). I asked chatgpt to examine one lengthy (and typical) passage and provide a stylistic analysis of the text..

 Here's the passage (p87) from Witt's text ;

  "... What set Barkhorn apart from the majority of pilots who suffered comparable numbers of shoot downs was not any special immunity to danger but a combination of skill in managing the aftermath of these incidents and, in no small measure, simple fortune. Being shot down did not automatically mean death or capture. It meant, depending on circumstances, a crash landing behind friendly lines that might leave a pilot shaken but unharmed, a forced descent into territory that required a difficult and dangerous return to friendly forces on foot, or, in the more severe cases, injuries requiring extended medical treatment before any return to flying duty became possible. Barkhorn's survival through nine such incidents, walking or being carried away from wreckage that might easily have killed him, reflects an accumulation of narrow escapes that no amount of tactical patience or calculated engagement could fully explain on its own. The two occasions on which he suffered serious wounds carried a different weight than the more numerous shoot downs that left him physically unharmed. Injury of this severity did more than remove a pilot temporarily from active duty....it introduced a psychological dimension to his continuing service that the simple fact of returning to the cockpit tends to obscure in retrospective accounts of his career... " 

There are several clues that may indicate AI 'assistance' here: 

Highly polished analytical phrasing — e.g. “a combination of skill in managing the aftermath of these incidents and, in no small measure, simple fortune.”

Repetitive qualification — the passage explains and re-explains that being shot down did not necessarily mean death or capture. 

 

Abstract language — “an accumulation of narrow escapes that no amount of tactical patience or calculated engagement could fully explain on its own” sounds more like AI-generated historical analysis than a conventional biographical narrative.

Lack of specific evidence — despite discussing nine shoot-downs and two serious wounds, the text provides few details and does not identify the incidents, dates, locations or sources. However this passage does lead into an 'account' of the events of 31 May 1944 when Barkhorn was downed and seriously injured by a P-39 - although again no other details are provided.  " AI historical prose often has this characteristic: confident interpretation without enough documentary detail... "

The Barkhorn 'crash-landing' discussion repeatedly makes a point, qualifies it, and then restates it in slightly different language: “not any special immunity to danger but a combination of skill…” followed by: “no amount of tactical patience or calculated engagement could fully explain…” and then: “no amount of accumulated skill could entirely erase…” The concepts of skill, calculated judgment, tactical patience, survival and fortune are repeatedly recycled. According to AI, ' a human historian would normally introduce specific incidents to demonstrate these qualities rather than repeatedly explaining the concept abstractly...' 

 

The writing reads authoritatively without supplying evidence.  The passage above makes substantial claims about Barkhorn's psychology: “A pilot who had experienced the genuine physical trauma of serious combat injury carried that knowledge forward into every subsequent mission…” That's a plausible interpretation, but it is speculation presented as narrative fact. We aren't given a Barkhorn quotation, memoir reference, fellow pilot's testimony, medical record, or other evidence showing that this was actually his psychological experience. According to AI itself, "..this is one aspect of AI-generated military history that is particularly recognisable: convincing psychological interpretation is substituted for documentary evidence..."

The historical writing is strangely generic. Following on from the passage quoted above, the chapter header " Shot Down Over Romania "  opens with: “The thirty first of May, 1944, began for Barkhorn as an unremarkable day…” and then launches into a very general description of the tempo of operations. But what actually happened to Barkhorn on 31 May 1944? Any 'normal' writer would normally move fairly quickly into the operational circumstances: unit, location, mission, opposing aircraft, circumstances of the shooting down, where Barkhorn came down, what happened afterwards, and documentary evidence. Instead, the passage spends considerable space telling us that the day was part of a repetitive operational rhythm...

In conclusion;

 as provided by AI  -   "..very likely AI-assisted —  and subsequently AI-edited, rather than wholly human-written. I wouldn't say that because the prose is simply “too good” or because AI has a particular style. The stronger evidence is the combination of duplicated material, repetitive conceptual language, unsupported psychological assertions and generic historical exposition. There is another interesting possibility: the text may have been generated in several AI passes, with one version of a paragraph subsequently pasted into another version. "

As a 'human' reader I would have been perfectly happy with this book had it featured more 'facts'  - there was far too much 'psycho-analysis'. But overall I doubt the text was AI-generated - at least not in one 'pass'. Comparing Witt's book with Don Hollway's 2012 "Aviation History" biography and Christophe Cony's lengthy bio in "Avions" (issue 176) it is far superior 'stylistically' but shows no obvious evidence of  any of this more 'nuts-and-bolts' 'source' material being deployed. It would maybe have been a better book had it done so! The book is 175 pages (the chapter 'Starting Over' is p124) and has no images or bibliography - but there are six blank empty pages at the back!

Below; there are no images in Witt's book. The two Bundesarchiv images of Barkhorn taxying in after a sortie show his G-6, WNr. 15909 during September 1943. During 1943 Barkhorn took his 'score' from 105 to 227 (Prien, JfV 12/II). As Kapitän of 4. Staffel he was awarded the Eichenlaub as the 175th soldier of the Wehrmacht. In August 1943 Barkhorn was tasked with the interim command of I./JG 52 while simultaneously commanding the II./JG 52 Verstärkungskommando or 'reinforcement detachment'. He flew his 1000th combat sortie on Sunday 23 January 1944.

Barkhorn's last victory in the East was returned on 5 January 1945. On the 16th he assumed command of JG 6 two weeks after the disappearance of this unit's first Kommodore, Johann Kogler. He was still hampered by the injuries sustained in May 1944 - at least one photo shows him climbing out of his Dora-9 only with difficulty. He departed JG 6 in March 1945 - commanding a Geschwader in the final chaotic months of the war evidently represented a leadership challenge of a different order - and underwent another operation. While convalescing, Galland convinced him to join Jagdverband 44. Having spent his entire career flying the Bf 109 —with a strong preference for the "Friedrich," which he considered the most maneuverable and effective— Barkhorn presumably had little time to adapt to the jet aircraft. On 21 April, during his second combat mission in the Me 262, while preparing to attack a group of American bombers, one of his engines suddenly caught fire. The ace broke away, but was pursued by P-51s. The Major was forced to make an emergency landing, during which he was injured by the canopy of his aircraft, resulting in him spending the rest of the war in a hospital bed. Arrested by the Americans, he was released in September 1945. He had flown some 1,104 combat missions. In 1956, he joined the Bundesluftwaffe and commanded the Jagdbombergeschwader 31 "Boelcke" (JaboG 31), initially equipped with the Republic F-84F Thunderstreak - see Jägerblatt issues 4 and 5/1987. In 1962, JaboG 31, under Barkhorn's command, was the first unit to complete transition to the fighter bomber F-104 G. This event was to be celebrated at the Nörvenich Air Base on 20 June 1962- just the previous day the aerobatics Schwarm (an 'unofficial' Starfighter display team) crashed. In 1964, Barkhorn was posted to the staff of Luftwaffen-Erprobungskommando (Air Force Test Command). From October 1964 until November 1965, Barkhorn headed the six-man Bundesluftwaffe contingent of the Tripartite Kestrel Evaluation Squadron at RAF West Raynham, Norfolk, England. evaluating the military capabilities of the V/STOL Kestrel FGA.1, the development version of the Hawker Siddeley P.1127 and forerunner of the Harrier V/STOL aircraft.

For more on the Nörvenich crash see 'Der Tod war schneller' here 

Remembering Wilhelm Balthasar by Dr. Gerhard Lohmann

Following the death in combat of Helmut Wick in late 1940, his replacement as Kommodore JG 2 was one of the leading Jagdwaffe aces of the campaign in the West, Hptm. Wilhelm Balthasar. He is seen here (left below) with his usual wingman, Oblt. Erich Leie from his Stabsschwarm, in early 1941 in front of his Bf 109 E-7/N. This was just a short time prior to the arrival of the first Friedrichs in JG 2. Note the open refill hatches for the GM-1 power boost tanks. Balthasar’s Friedrich would display very similar markings - see below.

by Dr. Gerhard Lohmann in Jägerblatt (May 1962 issue) 

"..The most successful fighter pilot of the French campaign was Wilhelm Balthasar. The tall Kapitän of 7./JG 27 had managed to achieve 23 victories during the weeks of May and June—a feat for which, alongside Mölders, he became one of the first fighter pilots to receive the Knight's Cross. He had also destroyed 13 additional aircraft on the ground. Günther Lützow then recruited him to command III./JG 3.

When he took over command of JG 2 on February 16, 1941, with 29 victories to his name, he was evidently still suffering from the after-effects of the severe wound he had received in the autumn of 1940, which had not yet fully healed and from which he suffered until his death. Perhaps this is why he appeared serious throughout his life, although his cheerful nature always broke through at the opportunity. He was simple, modest, and straightforward, embodying the best Prussian spirit. This "more than you seem!" as an expression of a moral character trait was, incidentally, possessed by many non-Prussians! He demanded much of his men, but even more of himself! He took his task very seriously, tirelessly visiting the geographically dispersed units of his Geschwader and imparting to them his combat experience, which stretched back to the Spanish Civil War, where he had achieved seven victories.

Here's a little anecdote. One evening, there was a particularly cheerful atmosphere in the officers' mess. When I entered, Balthasar, with a twinkle in his eye, asked me why I had ordered our Ju 52 to Königsberg. As he did so, he waved a telegram that read: "Ju just landed safely." Astonished, I replied: "Impossible! ..the Ju is right there on the field!" Roars of laughter! Finally, the penny dropped! Balthasar had arranged with his wife that she should refer to the expected addition to their family as either a Ju or a Me in the telegram. Soon after, he flew home to hold his son in his arms for the first (and last) time.

After the quiet winter weeks, during which he managed to shoot down two enemy aircraft, the situation in the air began to change significantly in the spring of 1941. Aerial combat no longer took place on the other side of the Channel, but rather over the Channel itself and over friendly territory. The bulk of the Geschwader redeployed north to French Flanders and the Pas de Calais. The headquarters Stab was stationed at St.-Pol-Brias, alongside Assi Hahn’s III. Gruppe and his "young bears." The British launched their air offensive against the Belgian-French industrial region. Balthasar always flew at the head of the formations; how often one heard his clear voice and his battle cry—"Hinein! (Dive in!) "—over the radio. Within a week, he achieved nine victories, bringing his total to forty. He used a lull in operations caused by the weather to visit the grave of his father—a Hauptmann killed near La Bassée in October 1914—with myself at the cemetery in Illies, southwest of Lille. Was it a premonition of death when he said, "If I should fall fighting against England, I want to be laid to rest beside my father"?

On July 3, 1941, the Geschwader took off following the report: "Inbound raid by many 'Indians' [enemy fighters]!" I was in charge of the operations center. Over the radio, I heard Leie shout: "Watch out, Balthasar—two Spitfires behind you!" "Yeah, yeah!" came his somewhat impatient-sounding reply. The fighters of J.G. 2 engaged the enemy. The only aircraft missing was the Kommodore’s. At first, no one was worried; during such wild dogfights, it was common for aircraft to land elsewhere. Later, a call came in from the Jafü (Fighter Leader) reporting that an Me 109 had crashed into the ground not far from Hazebrouck. It was Wilhelm Balthasar's. Neither he nor the aircraft had sustained any hits; the wing lay a considerable distance away. Balthasar was known for pushing his machines to the absolute limit. A wing had evidently been torn off during a dive. Deep sorrow settled in our hearts. Wilhelm Balthasar was laid to rest beside his father... The graves of Balthasar (father and son)—which are difficult to locate today, as the large iron crosses we originally erected were destroyed—are being selflessly tended by Monsieur Jacques Raille (of 49 Rue Grande Chaussée, Lille), as is the grave of Rudi Pflanz south of Abbeville. Our thanks go to this French comrade!.. "

Here a rare view taken at Kommodore Balthasar's funeral ceremony..

The court martial of Hptm. Willi Elstermann - I./JG 6 in Schroda, 21-22 January 1945

In July 1944 two Gruppen of Oblt. Johann Kogler's ZG 26 converted from the Me 410 to the Fw 190 and a new Jagdgeschwader 6 was established. Kogler retained his position as Kommodore. Hptm. Willi Elstermann was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 6. Elstermann was a pre-war pilot, born in December 1917, and a decorated career officer -awarded the EK I and the combat clasp in Gold - and rated as 'above average'. Having flown in ZG 52 - and been shot down by French H-75 Hawks during September 1939 - he flew combat in NJG 3 prior to being appointed Kdr. of II./ZG 26. His 'Einsatzfreudigkeit' was especially noted - his 'enthusiasm and commitment to combat'. By mid-January 1945 he had flown some 150 combat sorties and returned seven victories. Although he had been 'sanctioned' after the disastrous performance of his Gruppe in France during late August 1944 (some 50 machines lost in around two weeks combat) he had been re-appointed to command later in the year, taking over as Kommandeur of I./JG 6.

In late January 1945 Elstermann and elements of his Gruppe had the misfortune to find themselves directly in the advance of the so-called Soviet 'Vistula-Oder' operation - the 'steamroller' that brought the Red Army in a matter of weeks to within striking distance of Berlin. I./JG 6 was on the airfield of Schroda-Ost.  Schroda (now Środa Wielkopolska) was a German town and administrative district (Kreis) within the Prussian province of Posen (Poznań region), located some 30 km south-east of the city of Posen (Poznań). Posen lies on the river Warta (Werte in German or Werthe in English), one of Poland's longest rivers. It meets the Oder at Kostrzyn on the Polish-German border - the then German 'fortress' of Küstrin. Alongside Elstermann and I./JG 6 in Schroda were elements of I./JG 301 under Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Friedrich-Karl Wodtke and III./SG 77 under the Staffelkapitän of 7./SG 77 Hptm Günther Ludigkeit. Wodtke was another pre-war pilot (born 1916 in Ansbach) transferring from the Aufkl.Kette AS/88 to 3./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406, prior to retraining as a bomber pilot. As Stafü in III./KG 1 he attended the Verbandsführerschule/KG 101 and during September 1943 held the rank of Hptm. and was StaKa in 3./KG 30. Ludigkeit was a decorated Stuka pilot in St.G 77 with the DKiG. He had subsequently been awarded the Ritterkreuz in March 1944 having then flown some 765 combat sorties.  All three of the Gruppen led by these officers were assigned to 3. Flieger-Division. 

I./JG 301 had barely arrived  in Schroda, transferring on 21 January 1945 as part of the wholesale shift of Western fighter Gruppen to the Eastern Front. Unfortunately for the hapless fighter pilots Schroda was so close to the front lines that pilots were among some of the men immediately deployed to the ground forces attempting to hold up the Russians. At least two pilots were killed in theses clashes.

But crucially for what happened next, all three Gruppen were then 'socked-in' by bad weather with little chance of getting airborne...

On Monday 22 January takeoffs were impossible at Schroda Ost due to weather conditions. I./JG 6 had twelve operational and four non-operational Focke-Wulf aircraft at Schroda; also present were elements of I./JG 301—with two operational and two non-operational Fw 190s each—and III./SG 77 with eight aircraft. Other units had parked their aircraft at the airfield and handed them over to the airfield commandant. All told, the Schroda-Ost airfield held approximately 65 aircraft. Over the course of the day and the following night, the situation there became critical, as the capture of the airfield by Soviet troops became ever more likely. In light of this, the Kommandeur I./JG 6 was placed in command of I./JG 301 and III./SG 77 present on site, by order of the 3. FL. Div. (3rd Air Division). Furthermore, it was ordered that only the minimum number of aircrew and technical personnel required to ready the aircraft for takeoff and ferry them away were to remain at the airfield. All other personnel were to withdraw immediately to Posen, travelling by road as a unified group. The mission assigned to the Gruppenkommandeur I./JG 6 was to order and oversee the transfer of the aircraft to Posen, subject to weather conditions. As a precaution, the aircraft were to be concentrated together in a tight formation and at the same time prepared for demolition—an action the Gruppenkommandeur was to order should the airfield come under direct fire and takeoffs become impossible. Subsequently, the detachment remaining at the airfield was to be deployed for the airfield's continued defense or begin the march back to Posen, in accordance with the instructions of the Horstkommandant (Airfield Commander). As the situation grew increasingly critical and repeated telephone appeals to the 3rd Air Division failed to yield an evacuation order, the Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 6—acting in concert with the commanders of I./JG 301 and III./SG 77—decided to load the available vehicles and ready all personnel (with the exception of the I./JG 6 Gruppenkommandeur himself and a small demolition squad) for departure outside the airfield perimeter. That evening, when the column could see from a distance that the Schroda-West airfield was being destroyed and demolitions were also taking place at Schroda Ost, it began its withdrawal. In reality, however, only the permanent structures at the East airfield were demolished at that stage, while the remaining detachment continued to hold its position. It was not until 05:30 on the morning of January 23—prompted by the approach of enemy forces—that the aircraft assembled at the airfield were actually destroyed - some 60-odd aircraft. As a result of these events, court-martial proceedings were initiated against the three Kommandeure involved; following an oral hearing on January 27, all three were sentenced to several weeks of aggravated barracks arrest ( geschärfter Stubenarrest) for negligent breach of duty..

The events at Schroda-Ost as recounted above are based on the field court-martial verdict issued by the Special Court of the Commander-in-Chief of *Luftflotte* 6 on 27 January 1945 (BA/MA RL 7/529).

. To quote from JfV 16/I (Prien/Balke) 

".. The verdict leaves a decidedly ambivalent impression; while formally correct, the presiding judge appears to have been torn between the higher command's implicit demand for harsh penalties and a discernible desire to ensure justice for the highly decorated officers on trial—particularly given that they were neither responsible for the desperate situation that arose at Schroda nor had their actions resulted in damage that could have been avoided through proper conduct... " 

In other words - and as understood by this blog - Elstermann would likely have been court-martialed and punished regardless of whether he had blown up 60 perfectly good aircraft or let them fall into Russian hands - all of this through no fault of his own....

".. The accused are convicted of negligent breach of duty— Hptm. Wodtke also of negligent disobedience—as follows: 

Hptm. Elstermann is sentenced to 6 (six) weeks of strict room arrest, 

Hptm. Wodtke to (four) weeks of strict room arrest, 

Hptm. Ludigkeit to 3 (three) weeks of strict room arrest. 

Hptm. Ludigkeit is acquitted of the charge of cowardice on the grounds of lack of culpability.."

" erster Abschuss mit 19 Jahren.." - first victory aged 19

 

.. from the 'Adler im Süden' dated Tuesday 24 March 1942 (nummer 24)

"...Just a few days ago, the Staffelkapitän (squadron leader) introduced him to us as our "chick". ('unser Küken') He took him under his arm with fatherly kindness and hugged him close, as if the lad still needed special protection and tender care.

The "chick" has since taken wing—in more ways than one. Now, on his twenty-first combat sortie, he has shot down a Hurricane off the coast of Malta, just like the veterans do. A single pass was enough; the Englishman tumbled, crashed onto the chalk cliffs of Malta, and burned. There stood the Gefreiter Beitz in the circle of old hands—men who had already added a zero to their tally of victories - and was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class. A spark of daring spirit shone in his bright eyes; he grinned broadly, accepting their congratulations—still a youngster, yet already a true fighter pilot.

When the war broke out, he was an eighteen-year-old office worker; he volunteered, determined to become a fighter pilot. It took time, but he eventually found the finest role imaginable: flying fighter missions with the legendary "Ace of Spades" Geschwader. He knows what is expected of him, and he has proven himself. He aims to build upon the trust placed in him and to live up to the example set by his role models..."

**War Correspondent Helmut Heidelauf**

Gert Beitz of 9./JG 53 achieved a second victory on 18 May 1942 but in the course of the dogfight in which he shot down a Spitfire, Beitz’s own Messerschmitt Bf 109 F-4 (WNr. 8670,  "Yellow 2 + I") was struck and heavily damaged during aerial combat. Beitz successfully bailed out of his crippled fighter and parachuted safely into the Mediterranean. He was quickly rescued from the water by a Royal Air Force (RAF) High-Speed Launch and spent the remainder of the war as a POW. 

Below; Friedrichs of III./JG 53 in February 1942 heading for Malta ..

From the original PK caption - "..Combat in the Mediterranean: escorted by our agile fighters, our combat aircraft thunder toward their target (Malta) carrying their destructive payloads..."

PK (Propaganda Company) photo: War correspondent Linden. 

Below Kommandeur and Ritterkreuzträger Kaminski with one of his pilots describing a combat...

.. and from Jochen Prien..

".. Just stumbled over your article on Beitz – the last photo shows Hptm. Herbert Kaminski, who was Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 53, not III./JG 53. The officer-pilot he is listening to could be Lt. Joachim Louis, then in the Stabsschwarm of I./JG 53.."

new Luftwaffe books - 'Nachtjagd over the Eastern Front' (by Sven Carlsen, Morten Jessen and Adam Thompson, Air War Publications )

 

After a lengthy gestation a superb new volume is just published by the Luftwaffe 'specialists' at Air War Publications. Covering a little-known area of Luftwaffe operations during WWII in unprecedented detail - Eastern Front night-fighting - this is a stunning large-format 316-page volume with artwork by Claes Sundin and many rare photos from the collections of numerous Luftwaffe 'luminaries' (Boiten, Davis, Meyer and Stipdonk to name a few!) with text and research contributions from Andrew Arthy and Nigel Moore...

On the launch of Barbarossa in June 1941 the Luftwaffe hierarchy could hardly have imagined that their planned rapid campaign of conquest would require a night-fighting arm. But, six months later they had already lost all momentum. And as in the West, the defenders quickly learnt that night-time operations could be conducted in relative safety. By early 1942 ad-hoc measures were being implemented on both sides - Bf 109s from JG 54 were some of the first Eastern Front 'night fighters' as the Luftwaffe sought to interdict Soviet night-time resupply sorties into Leningrad. It goes without saying therefore that Luftwaffe night fighting in the East developed somewhat differently from the much more 'sophisticated' defensive 'lines' established along virtually the entire length of Germany's western borders. Soviet night-time air operations were initially countered by whatever aircraft and crews were available - including He 111s - organised into small night-fighting Schwärme ('flights') assembled from the bomber and reconnaissance units under the auspices of the various Luftflotten (air fleets); for example the Nachtjagdschwarm of Luftflotte 4 comprised several pilots from 9./KG 27 including Engelbert Heiner who scored some 11 night victories in the He 111, a performance that led to his award of the Ritterkreuz on 9 December 1942.

The Germans faced both conventional -albeit antiquated- Soviet bombers and transports and more especially the small 'sowing machine' biplanes (also known as 'crabs') that were used extensively for harassment and resupply missions for partisan groupings operating behind German front lines. These proved surprisingly difficult targets because they operated at low speed and extremely low-level - they may have been 'lame ducks' but interception by fast fighters was particularly challenging. The solution was the deployment of much  'slower' German machines such as the Fw 189 and the Fw 58 as night fighters. Several aces achieved victories with what Oblt. Josef Pützkuhl called the “slowest night fighter in the world" - the Fw 189 was fitted with search radar 'antlers' and Schräge Musik as MG 151s became available and hunted these R-5 and U-2 'crabs' when there were no bombing raids.

As Soviet night activity increased, the Luftwaffe established more specialised units, notably Nachtjagdgeschwader 100 (NJG 100) and NJG 200 in 1943. Their Ju 88s, Do 217s and Bf 110s were supported by mobile radar and ground-control stations on 'nightfighting trains', which could be moved as the front shifted. This was the so-called Eisenbahnnachtjagd ('railway night-fighting') in which NJG 100 'specialised', flying in the 'dark' Nachtjagd' role. This allowed German crews to be directed towards approaching Soviet aircraft rather than simply searching for them independently. Nevertheless, the enormous distances involved, rapidly changing front lines, limited communications and the almost total absence of infrastructure made night interceptions particularly challenging. The fighters of NJG 200 on the other hand were generally not even fitted with radar, flying 'helle' Nachtjagd, targets illuminated from the ground either by searchlights or flak fire. The organisation of NJG 200 formed in late August 1943 attests to the ad-hoc nature of the Luftwaffe's embryonic night fighter force in the East - the unit never had a Stab, far less a full complement. 1./NJG 200 was the redesignation of the Nachtjagdschwarm of Luftflotte 1 at Dno; 4./NJG 200 was formed at Orscha from the remnants of 10./ZG 1; 5./NJG 200 at Nikolajew was the former NJ Schwarm of Luftflotte 4, while 7./NJG 200 came from the NJ Schwarm of Luftflotte 6 at Smolensk. 7./NJG 200 was eventually absorbed into NJG 100, being disbanded in December 1943 while an 8./NJG 200 established at Stalino with a mix of He 111s and Ju 88As never completed operational training (see Table 43 on page 220). Only 5. Staffel of NJG 200 ever managed to field a full complement of aircraft (12 machines). In total NJG 200 had barely  more than 50 aircraft on strength of which only a certain percentage would likely be serviceable.

Nonetheless experienced crews could achieve impressive results - especially during early 1944. Lt. Klaus Scheer of 4./NJG 100 downed five Soviet PS-84s in the Narva area (Estonia) at the controls of his Ju 88 C-6 coded “W7+BM” before landing back at Reval on the night of 6-7 March 1944. He accounted for four DB3-Fs on the night of 9-10 March during a raid by over 500 Soviet bombers on the Estonian capital of Tallinn, all later confirmed by Luftflotte 1. He ended the war with 24 night victories. That same night his comrade Uffz. Otto Holler achieved four Abschüsse during the raid on Tallinn, achieving ace status. He was shot down and killed by return fire from his last victim—his kills were all later confirmed by Luftflotte 6. Hptm. Theodor Bellinghausen (4./NJG 100) also achieved ace status during the Tallinn raid, while Ofw. Karl Strohecker of 3./NJG 100 claimed a DB-6 and a “Martin” SB-2 for his fourth and fifth Luftsiege. Men such as Heinrich Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, Günther Bertram, Josef Kociok, Alois Lechner, and Gustav Francsi became notable Eastern Front night-fighter aces and their comprehensive biographies feature throughout this magnificent volume in extensive 'side-bars'. Lechner was awarded the Ritterkreuz on February 5, 1944 after 42 victories, Francsi survived the war as the highest-scorer in the East with some 59 confirmed 'kills'. As the Russians moved ever westwards, some of these aces found themselves flying against the Western Allies - most notably following the uprising in Warsaw in the late summer of 1944. The Poles began their uprising without any significant logistic reserves, assuming that the fighting would last only three days. The Red Army failed to intervene and the fighting lasted 63 days. The RAF and the USAAF attempted to mount hazardous and ultimately unsuccessful resupply operations. Gustav Francsi claimed eight RAF bombers attempting to drop supplies over the Polish capital—including three “Lancasters” on the night of August 14/15 (all three were 178 Sqn B-24s from 205 Group). Another 1./NJG 100 ace, Ofw. Helmut Dahms, claimed two more 'Viermots' on the night of 16-17 August 1944 and finished the war with 28 Abschüsse..

By early 1945 as huge Soviet columns moved through Poland and massed on the eastern approaches to Berlin the Eastern Front nightfighters flew what were primarily night ground-attack missions, so-called Straßenjagd sorties - once again new tactics had to be adopted and improvised even as the war neared its end. Gliding down silently from altitude -engines cut - to launch firing passes against motorised columns advancing deep into the Reich, all headlights blazing, must have been extremely risky. But even sorties like this had little impact on the Russian advance. By now units such as NJG 100 could not even operate from their remaining operational aerodromes without Mosquito intruders appearing over the field. Bertram's last victory - his 35th - was an RAF Lancaster on the evening of 10 April 1945.

The full story of the Luftwaffe's Eastern Front night fighters is told in this remarkable volume - from its ad-hoc beginnings to its 'radar trains', its aces, its 'chaotic' deployments and constantly improvised tactics. Comprehensive appendices include personnel and aircraft loss lists, camouflage and markings, tactics, victory claims and airfields and commanders. Maps and data tables make it easy to follow the  dense text. Full-page 'side-bars' look at the night fighters opponents - the RAF over the Balkans (p227)  - and even some non-Eastern Front ops, eg II./NJG 100 in Operation 'Bodenplatte (page 253)  Unlike other World War II air forces and contrary to the accepted view, 'Nachtjagd over the Eastern Front' highlights the constant shortage of personnel and aircraft endured by the Luftwaffe. There were major difficulties in raising new units - the Zerstörer, bomber, transport and reconnaissance pilots could not make up the shortfall. The deployment of innovations such as night-fighting 'radar trains' resulted in important successes, but as in the West, the sheer numerical supremacy of the enemy led to an inexorable decline..

Ewald Janssen, Stab I./SG 4 - 300th combat sortie - Bundesarchiv photo report #15

 

 

..somewhere on the northern sector of the Eastern Front, early summer 1944 – a PK reporter captures some shots marking the 300th combat sortie flown by pilot Maj. Ewald Janssen, seen here climbing down from his (presumably) 'green 2',  a Focke-Wulf Fw 190 F-8 of the Stab I./SG 4, Luftflotte 1.

Janssen was an original member of JG Herrmann, joining the 'experimental' wilde Sau  night fighters (Nachtjagdversuchskommando) from the Stuka arm. He went on to briefly command I./JG 300 during the summer of 1943 before being appointed to head up JG 302 until early 1944. He had been awarded the DKiG with St.G 2 and received the RK in October 1944 as Kommodore of SG 4.  According to De Zeng/Stankey he was later relieved of his command due to the poor performance of his Geschwader during the Ardennes Offensive/Battle of the Bulge. He does not get a mention in Robert Forsyth's latest title 'Fw 190 Schlacht units'. He survived the war and died in Brazil in 1985.

 

Breguet Bizerte in the Luftwaffe

 

The Breguet 521 Bizerte was descended directly from the British Shorts Calcutta ( the military version was named 'Rangoon') after Breguet purchased one example and built four more under licence, after Louis Breguet acquired a factory in Le Havre in 1929 (nationalised in 1936). The aircraft were delivered in 1932-33 and  assigned to escadrille 3E1.The French Marine Nationale had previously bought a Calcutta directly from Shorts in Rochester, Kent. The Bizerte was the 'francisation' of the Calcutta and first flew in September 1933. Around 37 examples were constructed, the last three - still incomplete in June 1940- delivered directly to the Luftwaffe during 1941. The ungainly "nose" was designed for observation tasks while the aircraft was in flight. Note the defensive position to the right of the cockpit. The machine above is still displaying its French tail livery and has yet to receive Luftwaffe markings, a task that was hurriedly accomplished as the Germans had an urgent requirement for air-sea rescue seaplanes along the French Atlantic and Channel coastlines.

The first loss of a Bizerte was SG+FM (N° 11), launched on 16 November 1940 to look for the crew of a KG 100 He 111 and intercepted and shot down by a N° 236 (Coastal Command) Squadron Blenheim. As of April 1944 the Luftwaffe Seenot Staffeln had just five Bizertes on strength, two with 3. Seenot at Berre (N° 20 and ??) and three with 1. Seenotstaffel (N° 3, 4 and 36) at Biscarosse. With the Allied landings in Provence during August 1944, both Staffeln were ordered back to Germany. At least one of these machines (N° 4) remained in France to be incorporated back into the French naval air arm with 30S post-war. 

Bizerte flying boats were based in Hourtin (Atlantic coast, north of Bordeaux) and Brest among others. It was in Hourtin that Leutnante Klingspor and Unterhorst first arrived on 30 July 1940 with two crews to take possession of Bizertes N° 11 and 34 abandoned on 18 June. Both machines were repainted in German colours and flew into Lanvéoc-Poulmic (Brest, southern Brittany) on 7 August 1940

The Fighter Pilot from Ratibor - Herbert Kutscha

 

" The Fighter Pilot from Ratibor Herbert Kutscha Turns 70 "     from Jägerblatt (May 1987)

 "Der Ratiborer"—the official hometown publication for the city and district of Ratibor** (Upper Silesia) and an independent periodical dedicated to preserving and deepening ties to the homeland—published an extensive tribute in its latest issue to famous aviation pioneers and pilots from the Upper Silesian city of Ratibor. Alongside the former balloonist and airship pilot Dr. Hugo von Abercron and the leader of *Jagdstaffel* Boelcke (and *Pour le Mérite* recipient) Otto Bernert, the article honored an active member of our community: the fighter pilot and Knight's Cross recipient Herbert Kutscha. We share the pride felt by his fellow natives of Ratibor for a man who distinguished himself in both war and peace; after losing his Upper Silesian homeland, he overcame great difficulties to build a new career in Northern Württemberg, all while remaining steadfastly loyal to our community. 

** Now Racibórz in southern Poland, close to the Czech border) the town maintains active ties with Germany today through municipal partnerships, cultural exchanges, and European cooperation, even though its local ethnic German population was largely expelled after World War II

Herbert Kutscha was born on April 24, 1917, in Ratibor. He joined the commercial pilot training school (Verkehrsfliegerschule) as early as 1934 and transferred to the Luftwaffe shortly thereafter. During the Second World War, while serving as a Unteroffizier with II./JG 77, he achieved his first victory on December 14, 1939, over the German Bight. In February 1940, he was transferred to II./ZG 1. After achieving ten victories with II./SKG 210, he was deployed to Russia, where he enjoyed great success in low-level ground-attack missions. From June 1943, he served as *Staffelkapitän* of 15./JG 3 in Italy, flying missions in 'Ofenrohr' (stove pipe) equipped Gustavs against four-engine bombers. In August 1944 he became Kommandeur of II./JG 3 and in December 1944 was appointed Kommandeur of II./JG 27, a post that he held until February 1945 when he was posted to command III./JG 11. Herbert Kutscha was the recipient of numerous decorations; as a pilot, he was awarded the Knight's Cross on September 24, 1942, while serving on the Eastern Front with 5./ZG 1. With 47 aerial victories—including 22 four-engine bombers—and numerous ground-attack missions against tanks, locomotives, flak positions etc in some 900 sorties Kutscha settled in West Germany post-war after release from captivity. 

As a Staffelkapitän in IV./JG 3, he briefly led the Gruppe in the air during early 1944 after 83-victory ace and Kommandeur Franz Beyer was shot down and killed on 11 February 1944. Kutscha himself was downed barely ten days later on 24 February 1944 in combat with P-47s. Although wounded he baled out of his Bf 109 G-6, WNr. 411048, "yellow 13" (below) over Quakenbrück and was out of action for several months. 

 1939: Küstenjagdstaffel of II./JG 136 at Jever, equipped with Bf 109 Bs (from left): Merker, Kutscha, Pohl, Heilmayer, Babucke.

Luftwaffe book review - former Kommandeur of III./JG 7 on Mano Ziegler's book 'Turbinen-Jäger Me 262'

 

  

 Mano Ziegler's books, especially Turbinen-Jäger Me 262 and his Me 163 title 'Rocket Fighter' come in for some hefty criticism in the magazine of the German fighter Pilot's association Jägerblatt. In a piece entitled " A critical note regarding Mano Ziegler’s book *Turbinen-Jäger Me 262* (*Jägerblatt* 6/77, Book Recommendations B. 54) Rudolf Sinner (R.-Wagner-Str. 5, A-4020 Linz)—formerly a Major, Gruppenkommandeur in JG 27, a member of the Lechfeld Jet Testing Command (Turboerprobungskommando), and Kommandeur of III./JG 7 reacts. Sinner had been asked by his former Kommodore, Edu Neumann, to assist Mano Ziegler in his work on the history of the Me 262. Through several meetings and letters, Sinner provided Ziegler with information, documents, photographs, and pointers. However, he had requested the opportunity to review and correct the material before the book went to press.

Sinner raised objections regarding the draft excerpt sent to him, but these were disregarded. Consequently—as he wrote to Ziegler on December 7, 1977—"knowledgeable readers could form completely erroneous impressions regarding the objective (Zielsetzung) and content of my contribution."

"What bothers me most is Chapter 17; I had expressly requested its omission or a proposed revision," Sinner continued. He found the section titled "The Knight's Cross Invention" (page 165 of the aforementioned book) completely baffling; he had specifically pointed out in a conversation that, due to the lack of this decoration—which was practically part of the standard uniform for fighter wing commanders (Jagdflieger Kommandeure) —he was initially denied a command position upon his transfer to JG 7. In his letter to the Jägerblatt editorial staff, Rudolf Sinner offers the following assessment of the book:

"..What is reported here regarding the aircraft's deployment is a patchwork—served up in a superficial and slipshod manner—featuring spurious highlights and absurdly skewed priorities. The descriptions of the operational environment and the commentary on fighter operations in general—and the fight against the four-engine bombers in particular—reveal that Mr. Z. never experienced this crap firsthand (..diese Scheiße..) My point, for instance, that virtually all fighter pilots in Reich Defense units would have gladly switched from their 109s, 190s, and 110s to the 262 - despite certain teething problems - because this aircraft—due to its superior speed and concentrated firepower—offered greater safety and represented a lifeline for many who flew until the very end, remained incomprehensible to him. It was impossible to dissuade him from the exaggerated portrayal, both in terms of length and dramatization, of the dangers that simply flying the 262 supposedly entailed, even though these dangers were hardly worth mentioning compared to the risks (as operations demonstrated) that combat inevitably brought, even with this aircraft—not to mention the old "Otto fighters."

Also on this blog;

Hans Ring review of Walther Dahl's memoir 'Rammjäger', April 1962

Bf 108s in England, May 1937 - the Isle of Man air races

 

This Eduard Bf 108 finished as D-IHDD race number '22' in racing blue was seen on the competition tables at the recent US Fort Wayne IPMS Nationals. According to some, Messerschmitt Bf 108 B Taifun with registration code D-IHDD is 'famous' for participating in the 1937 Manx Air Derby (Isle of Man Air Race) in May 1937. (The Isle of Man is strictly speaking not part of the UK or England, but a British 'Crown dependency') Due to its unique historical racing livery, D-IHDD is a popular subject for modellers and it featured as a primary markings option in the Eduard Bf 108 Weekend Edition (1:48 scale). But was race number '22' really D-IHDD?  Unfortunately not.....

Above;  Bf 108 D-INKY and enthusiastic British (Isle of Man) supporters, May 1937..

Modellers are STILL building the blue Bf 108 in its Manx  air racing scheme as D-IHDD race number 22. This all started years ago with the release of a Techmod decal sheet depicting D-IHDD (race number 22).  It is impossible to know  how and why this error made it into print but Techmod's 'research' was then repeated by Eduard.  

Two Bf 108s took part in the 1937 Isle of Man air rally (Manx Air Races) entered by the Aero Club of Germany - these were D-IOSA (race number 21) and D-INKY. D-INKY was in fact the 'real' race number '22'. The aircraft were flown by (Major) Hans Seidemann and Ernst Gerbrecht. Seidemann was declared winner (after a delay and in somewhat controversial circumstances) of the London to Isle of Man race that took place on 16 May 1937; according to the Ronaldsway airport (Douglas) Isle of Man web page;

"...The crowds at Douglas, waiting for the first arrivals timed for 3 p.m., were to be disappointed and they only saw five machines across the finishing line.. A. M. Henderson (Monospar) was in front closely followed by Captain Higgins, A. V. Harvey (Comper Swift), H. J. Wilson (BA Eagle) and R. C. Hockley (Aeronca). But, amazingly, Major Seidemann was the first to arrive at Ronaldsway, landing at 3.22 p.m. As he had missed the finish line in Douglas Bay he was excluded. He immediately took off again and flew to Douglas. This resulted in a protest being lodged with the Stewards who held three meetings over the weekend to sort things out. It was not until Monday morning that they announced the final placings, declaring Major Seidemann the winner as he had been the only competitor to be recorded at Maughold Head. He was of course delighted to be taking the Challenge Cup back to Germany, claiming it was ‘better to race in peace than in war’.."

Three Bf 108s returned for the 1938 races - again no D-IHDD. The machines were D-IDNT (race number 26), D-IOSS ('27') and D-ICIS ('28') . The three Bf 108s were accompanied over England by the AGO Ao 192 Kurier, registration D-OCTB. Photographs of these machines in the UK are extremely rare and usually of poor quality. The images shown here are reproduced from the Manx Aviation museum archive. 

Details of rear fuselage stencils on D-IOSA

Above; this view taken at the 1937 rally in the UK indicates that there was no 'Messerschmitt Taifun' lettering under the cabin door, although the stylised 'bird' marking appears just ahead of the cockpit. D-INKY taxies in.

Below; Bf 108 '22' registration D-INKY with the pilot Ernst Gerbrecht settling into the cockpit. Note the different finish on the propeller blades, almost certainly not the usual dark green (see model photo above) 

Eduard Bf 109 K-4 in 1:72nd from Michel Wilhelme

.. latest Eduard 1:72nd Bf 109s from French master 72nd scale modeller Michel Wilhelme. Two Kurfürst from the K-4 'limited edition' box, finished as a III./JG 4 machine and Alfred Nitsch's K-4 from JG 77 

De-mining the Danube - Minensuchgruppe 1 (MSGr 1) by Peter Kassak

 

The Luftwaffe's Minensuchgruppe 1 (MSGr 1)—widely known as Sonderkommando "Mausi"—was a specialized airborne mine-sweeping unit formed in late 1940 to trigger and detonate British magnetic sea mines using modified Junkers Ju 52/3m aircraft fitted with massive electrical energizing rings. "Mausi" was short for Magnetspule or magnetic coil. Peter Kassak provides some details of mine-clearing operations flown by the Luftwaffe's specialist Ju 52 mine-sweepers along the Danube as the Allies sought to interdict German oil supplies ..

The recent hot weather throughout Europe (summer 2026) has caused a significant drop in river water levels - even in one of the largest rivers in Europe, the Danube. And the low water levels have exposed some long-hidden WW II relics. Aside from the wrecks of ships in Serbia, or Hungary, there was also ammunition of various types located on the banks of the river. In the southern Slovakian part of the river (the river is a border between the Slovak republic and Hungary) two RAF mines were located and detonated on 3 August causing the suspension of river traffic on the Danube for several hours. Given the location near the village of Virt, the British sea mines most probably originated from the “gardening” mission flown on 29 May 1944 by the RAF's 205 Group and its 178 Squadron Liberator crews. The Wellington and Liberator crews had to sow their mines (hence the slang term 'gardening') at low level on moonlit nights, running the gauntlet of night fighters, flak and balloon barrages.

Below; British 700 kg anti-shipping mines found in the Slovakian section of the Danube river, August 2026, source: Police of the Slovak republic FB page.

During WWII, the smooth functioning of the Danube river transport system was crucial for Germany, and its disruption was highly desirable. Two main options presented themselves to Allied planners in Italy. One involved the destruction of the oil refineries, port facilities and other infrastructure. The other required the interdiction of Danube river traffic by mining. Both options would be resorted to as the USAAF and RAF sought to cut Germany off from its much-needed Romanian oil.

The first attempt to disrupt Danube shipping was undertaken by the Russians in September 1941, when Soviet commandos penetrated the German lines from Bessarabia and dropped drifting contact mines in the river. These were however ineffective, damaging no ships although several were struck by them. Traffic was halted for 12 hours only. The first attempt by the Western allies to hinder the supply of Romanian oil to Germany was undertaken on 12 June 1942, when B-24 Liberators of the USAAF’s HALPRO detachment attacked the oilfields at Ploesti. However, the main “gardening” campaign was performed by RAF 205 Group between April to October 1944 and had the most impact. It is estimated that between April and October Allied mines caused a reduction of at least 60% in Danube priority traffic, while ordinary commercial traffic suffered still more seriously to the extent of complete interdiction in certain categories.

German counter measures involving the Luftwaffe were essentially two-fold - night-fighters were scrambled almost nightly with some noticeable results during late summer 1944 (also described in the latest book from AWP, "Nachtjagd over the Eastern Front"). The second counter measure involving the Luftwaffe was the deployment of mine-sweeping aircraft. MSGr 1 Ju 52s swept the river about four hours daily, usually in the early morning and again in the evening. These times were chosen because experience had shown that Allied fighter planes were least likely to appear then. It is believed that 165 mines were detonated by the aircraft.

Below; Ju 52 MS version flying over the bridge in Bratislava in summer 1944, source Dusan Bublik

 

DW 1 (Directional Wireless 1) was the RAF codename for a magnetically energized (degaussing) ring some 50 feet in diameter, fitted to some Mark I Wellington bombers and used to sweep magnetic sea mines by detonation. The aircraft flew low over the sea; the mines were detecting the magnetic field of the DW 1 and exploded accordingly. The crew of the Wellington were successful in destroying a magnetic mine on their very first sortie on the 8 January 1940 (aircraft was P2518 piloted by test pilot ‘Bruin’ Purvis, navigator Lt.Cdr. ‘Ben’ Bolt with Sq/Ldr. John Chaplin operating the gear in the fuselage). The Germans adopted the idea and fitted similar degaussing devices and rings to a number of  Ju 52s. The Ju 52/3m g4e MS (Minen Sucher = mine finder) was fitted with a large Dural hoop braced beneath the wing and fuselage. This hoop was energized by an additional motor installed in the fuselage. The magnetic field generated thus triggered magnetically fused mines.

The advantage of the Ju 52/3m for mine-sweeping operations was that it was easy to bring into action at various locations, and over remote areas. It could search for mines that were undetected by conventional water-borne mine sweepers. But there were also disadvantages. The radius of effectiveness of each aircraft was only about 50 metres. Operations could not be undertaken in bad weather and low visibility because the strong magnetic field produced by the mine degaussing equipment caused on-board compasses to malfunction. And the aircraft’s armament was weak, and insufficient to defend the crew if attacked. However, the machine had an endurance of around four hours at an average speed of 180 km/h. 

The M-devices featuring the huge MS ring (MS-Magnetspule) mounted under each aircraft were of course used for exploding magnetic mines. Other types of mines were acoustic. For sweeping , the so-called A-device (A for Acoustic) was used. Once installed in the Ju 52/3m, the acoustic device continuously changed channels and radioed various wavelengths, which triggered mines to explode. ELM/A mines were sensitive within 2200- 2600 meters and detonated at 600-800 meters from the source of the signal. ELM/A-St mines were sensitive within 600-800 meters and detonated at 200- 300 meters from the source. The signal wavelength was changed every 30 seconds, and was organized in 10 channels. In some cases, both magnetic and acoustic mines were dropped by RAF crews. Therefore combined formations of Ju-52/3m mine sweepers could be flown - aircraft carrying the M-device flew ahead, one aircraft carrying an A-device following. The distance between the planes varied according to flight speed and height, to prevent damage to following aircraft by the delayed detonation of a mine.  

Below; diagram depicting a mixed formation of M-and A- type mine sweeping Ju 52s  

The unit tasked with minesweeping was Minensuchgruppe 1 (MSGr. 1) formed in October 1942. The task of the Minensuchverbände (mine searching units) was to clear sea and river water routes of mines. MSGr.1 comprised six independent Staffeln, which were active in various theatres of operations. To operate over the Black Sea and later the Danube, a 3. Staffel was established in Varna. From February to October 1944 it was registered as an independent 3. Minensuchstaffel, using Junkers Ju-52/3m MS aircraft. For the last two months of its existence, it moved to Neusatz. Each Minensuchstaffel consisted of 18 Ju 52/3m MS aircraft, of which 14 were so-called M-planes and 4 were A-planes. But between June and September 3. Staffel MSGr.1 had 24 aircraft on charge, due to losses and also greater operational demands. At that time, according to some sources, six planes were stationed at Budapest (Budaőrs airport), eleven in Belgrade and seven in Craiova/Walachei. The aircraft carried the code 3K+.

At the beginning of April 1944, the unit had only one aircraft, but received 17 more during the month. In June one aircraft was lost to US fighters. This happened on June 6 north-west of Turnu Severin, Romania, where 1st Lt. James W. Stegman of the 82nd FG/96th FS claimed a Ju 52 with a strange ring device under the fuselage. This correlates with the loss of Ju 52/3m MS W.Nr. 501313 at location 44°46’ N, 21°32’ E. Its crew consisted of pilot Lt. Oskar Fuhrmann, observer Flg. Heinz Rietzsch, Onboard mechanic Ofw. Franz Bußkamp and gunner Fw. Max Muchowski. All four were KIA. 3./MSGr.1 ended the month of June with 24 aircraft. Four more Ju 52s were lost through enemy action in July. Three losses occurred on July 4th, when three pilots, 1st Lt. Walther J. Carroll Jr., Capt. Richard M. Gangel and 1st Lt. Arthur W. Kidder Jr., all of the 96th FS, 82nd FG each claimed a Ju 52 with a ring device shot down north west of Craiova, Romania. The losses were however made up and the strength of the unit remained 24 aircraft. August brought one loss due to enemy fighters, which was replaced. The only recorded loss of this unit for August, however, was due to a mine explosion. It occurred on 4 August and three men on board the aircraft died. On 25 August 3. Staffel of MSGr. 1 moved to Belgrade from Rumania. September 1944 was a disaster for the unit as 10 Ju 52/3ms were lost due to enemy action, with three more in October. The only loss we could identify occurred on 5 October, when a Ju-52/3m MS was lost at Dunaremete at km 1826 at 16:04 hours. Again, the cause was a mine explosion. The four crew were killed (pilot Ofhr. Karl Matula, radio operator Uffz. Willi Hendler, mechanic Fw. Hermann Fritsch and gunner Uffz. Franz Dreßler).

Above; Karl Matula, pilot in a Minensuchverband, killed during a Danube mine-sweeping sortie with his crew at the controls of his Ju 52 on 5 October 1944. Sterbebild, source eBay.com 

At the end of the month the unit had only eight serviceable Junkers. A Slovakian police report dated 6 October describes one of the last Ju 52 sweeps for Brtish mines in the Danube. Police officer Černý reported that since 14:20 hours every half an hour two German planes were flying low over the river up and downstream, and were fitted with big rings under the fuselage. 

Text and photos based on the book “ Gardening by Moonlight” – 205 Group RAF mining operations over the River Danube in 1944, published in 2016 by Peter Kaššák and David Gunby (David is a son of an airman, who was lost during a 'Gardening' operation over Danube). Click on the link to go to the Lulu.com 'print-on-demand' page

For more Peter Kassak posts on the Luftwaffe blog go here

Slovak Spectator article on British mines in the Danube during the summer of 2026