At the end of WWI the French were the largest producers of combat aircraft and their air force one of the biggest in the world. But during the interwar years, French aviation suffered under systemic political instability, and catastrophic nationalisation policies - the Front Populaire government nationalized the aircraft industry into regional conglomerates, the so-called Sociétés Nationales de Constructions Aéronautiques or SNCAs. This forced factories to merge based on geography rather than economic logic -aircraft procurement was based on a policy of 'prototypes'- small numbers of individual types being financed per factory to keep them in production. Émile Dewoitine had been named 'directeur délégué' of the SNCA du 'Midi' (SNCAM) but it was the State who decided which aircraft were to be developed. Work on what would become the D.520 was more or less shelved for a year as the Air Ministry placed large orders for the fighter that had won the 1934 competition, the MS 405. The SNCAM spent most of 1937 supplying spares to keep France's fleet of ancient D.510s in the air.
By the time of the German invasion, these factors—combined with outdated tactical doctrines and a lack of integrated strategic command—left the Armée de l'Air struggling against the highly coordinated Luftwaffe which had spent its brief existence flying (highly coordinated) 'manoeuvres' with the army. As James S. Corum points out in his recent title 'France, 1940' the Allies were perfectly capable in May 1940 of deploying large numbers of bombers and fighters in support of Allied counter-attacks and armoured thrusts ...but failed to do so. Similarly the French never developed a 'workable' strategic air power doctrine - at no time was there any attempt to deploy French bombers aggressively against German strategic targets even once war had been declared!
An account from générale de brigade aérienne Duval ;
".. The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."
( **see Danel/Cuny P.66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520s produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre' (not serviceable). By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..)
A young GC III/6 pilot officer Jean Menneglier recounted his first contact with the D.520;
The French (and others..) continue to argue about the effectiveness of the Armée de l'Air. The 'reputation' of the Air Force was deliberately 'undermined' by the Vichy government who sought scapegoats after the armistice. Some French authors maintain that in May 1940 the Armée de l'Air had the most modern types, the best aircraft armament etc anywhere...although most of it was obviously too little and too late. The four leading French fighter 'Groupes de Chasse' flew American H-75 Hawks - huge orders had been placed with the Americans in 1937-38 when the French realised that they could not actually mass-manufacture fighter aircraft. French pilots however were well-trained and experienced. French fighter pilots flew lots of aerobatics and although they did not practise gunnery there were already a number of French fighter aces by May 1940. From September 1939 they had deployed to satellite fields near the German borders - although infrastructure and communications were rudimentary. In one notable Phoney War battle during November 1939 nine Hawks from II/GC 5 took on 27 Bf 109s and shot down 12 of them including the leading German ace at the time. Unfortunately for the French the Germans were flying the older 'D' model and not the newer Emil. According to James Slaughter in his 'Air Power over the Rhine' ;
" The Bf 109, which entered the conflict dominant, gained speed and firepower as a direct result of action in Spain as the war continued. Compare this with the French who worried that making the M.S.406 faster would unnecessarily increase tensions with Germany and lead to an arms race they apparently did not know they were already in. By 1940, the latest Bf 109s were far superior to virtually any fighter the French had, again largely due to the “Spanish laboratory.”
The Hawks were pretty capable machines if poorly armed. Leading Hawk unit I/GC 5 under Jean-Mary Accart achieved around 125 victories in the French campaign - the highest scoring French fighter unit. The Dewoitine D.520 struggled into service principally with GC I/3 during May 1940 - although this Groupe had been flying the new fighter since January 1940 serviceability as with any 'new' aircraft was pretty poor and teething issues were notable. Communist trade unions in 'red' Toulouse did much to hamper production and even in the spring of 1940 aircraft factories were still only working a five-day week - French communists took their orders from Moscow and the Soviets had a non-aggression pact with the Germans until Barbarossa.
Groupe de Chasse I/3 was only the third highest scoring Armée de l'Air fighter unit during the Battle of France with 75 victories.
Some French authors like to stress that the Armée de l'Air had more than just a handful of modern fighters - other types such as the LeO 451, Amiot 351-354, Br 693, the Bloch 174 were all state-of-the-art aircraft, often the best in the world in their category.. and although the Me 109 E was obviously better than the MS 406 which constituted around 45% of French front-line fighter strength the Ms 406 was a more maneuverable fighter and it carried heavier armament - only around eighty of these were actually shot down by 109s in combat. In reality the Ms 406 was slow and 'difficult' to mass produce - it taking twice as long to build an Ms 406 as it did an Me 109. Despite this some 600 Ms 406s had been delivered within 18 months of the type's first flight in 1935. On the German side somewhere between 150-160 Me 109s were lost in France at a time when monthly production of the Luftwaffe fighter was comparatively very low - around 25 machines. Ultimately the French 'problem' was not the Air Force nor their fighters. You could argue of course that France had not managed by May 1940 to effectively re-equip itself with a substantial force of its best fighters, nor had France developed the integrated command, radar and reporting networks that might have contributed to a much more effective air defence organisation. An effective force for the tactical support of French armies in the field was also lacking.
Some of the points above are made by David Méchin in the latest 'Le Fana de l'Aviation' 'Hors Serie' (No. 77) currently on French news stands, " D.520 - les batailles d'un redoutable chasseur". Available from publisher Larivière's site here (10€ euros for 130 pages). Just getting built and into service was one of the machine's 'battles' - see the image on pages 18-19 which according to the caption shows ".. the SNCAM Toulouse factory at maximum output in early 1940 " - four 'workers' standing around, hands on hips or in pockets, staring at three partially completed D.520s!
By mid-June 1940 there were nearly 2000 D.520s on the SNCAM's order books. Some 467 D.520s were constructed - less than half this number saw any service. Only 34 D.520s took part in the fighting from May 14 onwards (GC I/3), 68 from May 15 on (GC I/3 and II/3), about 102 on June 1 (add GC II/7) and so forth.
An account from générale de brigade aérienne Duval ;
".. The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."
( **see Danel/Cuny P.66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520s produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre' (not serviceable). By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..)
A young GC III/6 pilot officer Jean Menneglier recounted his first contact with the D.520;
"... In mid-June GC III/6, which had been at Le Luc since the beginning of the month, finally exchanged its Morane Saulnier MS 406 for the long-awaited Dewoitine D.520. As soon as the first detachment, including Jacobi, chef d'escadrille (squadron leader) of the 5th, and Le Gloan, had returned, we left for Toulouse. We landed on June 15 at Francazal where we abandoned our old Moranes without regret. We were taken by bus to Blagnac where we made contact with the Dewoitine 520. The one they gave me was number 358. It was a splendid machine, entirely of metal, equipped with a Hispano-Suiza 12-cylinder V engine with a power rating greater than that of the Morane, of the order of 920 HP. To compensate for the torque the engine was offset by 1°30' and the vertical stabilizer had a wing profile providing some compensation according to the speed. It was armed with a 20 mm Hispano gun firing through the prop axis, like the 406, but with a magazine of 80 explosive shells instead of 60, and 4 machine guns, 2 in each wing, with a belt magazine of 700 cartridges per gun instead of 350. These were heated. This gave 6 seconds of continuous fire with the gun (800 rounds/min) and 35 seconds with the machine guns, which was much better than the 406. The landing gear was mechanically locked in the "retracted" position, so there was no problem in case of a bullet lodged in the hydraulic system. It was a fast plane, credited with a speed of 550 km/h at the recovery altitude, very fine to fly, which started quite easily, which turned well and which had very sound reactions. It was almost the equivalent of the Me 109. If we had had it at the beginning of the war, things would certainly have been different. There was one amusing detail about the machine. The D.520 was equipped with a 'trunk' (baggage compartment) that sat in the fuselage behind the pilot. It was of decent size and it proved to be very handy when we were on the move, allowing us to take a lot of personal belongings with us. When I took control of my new aircraft, I was surprised by the sensitivity of the rudder and I was snaking a little at takeoff, but I got used to it very quickly. After a few minutes of flight I returned to land at Francazal which we left on patrol the next day to join Le Luc. As soon as we landed, we were told what had happened the day before during our absence and how Le Gloan and Assollant had been able to shoot down 5 Italian machines in less than 45 minutes... "
For the Luftwaffe the campaign in the West was of course far from the 'walk-over' perhaps imagined. Every Gruppe regularly lost men and machines and certainly not the most inexperienced. On May 21, the Gruppenkommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Erich Mix was shot down by Sous-Lieutenant Hubert de Salaberry in his GC I/3 Dewoitine D.520. Mix had just downed the D.520 flown by Sous-Lieutenant Jean Parisse (although he identified it as an Ms 406). De Salaberry wrote the following account in his unpublished memoir (via Persyn) ;
“ ..up ahead of me I caught sight of a D.520 on its back with its gear extended, a rather unusual sight at this altitude. It was wreathed in a huge sheet of bright orange flame, blazing from the engine cowl to the tail fin like a huge torch. The cockpit seemed to have disappeared. It was a haunting sight in the bright blue sky. Less than one hundred metres behind it a Bf 109 continued to squirt out burst after burst of fire as if at a fairground shooting range, sporadic flashes of flame dancing along its wing leading edges. I was filled with an overwhelming desire to deal this 109 some of its own medicine. After a quick glance behind to check my rear, I dropped down in behind the ‘Fritz’. He had seen me and understood straight away that the hunter was now the prey. He did what all German fighters do when they are caught napping – he rolled onto his back and dropped like a stone, counting on being able to build up enough speed to put some distance between us. I was not about to let him go. I rolled with him and headed down vertically, my engine screaming with the throttle against the stop. I had full confidence in my aircraft, the Dewoitine was very stable and the engine & prop behaved themselves impeccably... Reeling the 109 slowly in during our headlong dive I unleashed several brief bursts from directly astern. The German pilot did not react and continued on down. Suddenly I noticed the sky becoming darker, realised that the ground was rushing up toward us. Crushed by the deceleration as I eased out the dive I lost sight of the German. I orbited the area but could see nothing. Below me the countryside was peaceful and unremarkable...”
Below; Kommandeur III./JG 2 Maj. Mix at the controls of his Emil, May 1940. On May 21, he nursed down his shot-up machine for a belly-landing near Roye after combat with GC I/3 D.520s. Sustaining only minor injuries he was able to depart the scene, before being recovered two days later by German troops. He was awarded the EK I (Iron Cross First Class).
Below; GC I/3 D.520 of the unit's 2e escadrille probably assigned to S/Lt Parisse, shot down on 21 May 1940 in the vicinity of Fonches-Fonchette (Somme) after combat with Bf 109s. The pilot was seriously wounded, taking a round in the chest and although he managed to carry out a successful belly-landing in a field and climb out of the cockpit he collapsed and died a short while later. As the local villagers had all fled his body was not properly buried until after they returned in late June ....note the SPA 69 emblem has been cut out of the fuselage side by 'souvenir' hunters...(source "GC I/3 Les rois du Dewoitine 520" published by Lela Presse Avions).
G.C I/3 D.520s flew their last sorties in the battle for France on the afternoon of June 16, 1940 - ordered to strafe German motorised columns en-route for Nevers. Sous-lieutenant Pierre Salva recalled;
" ..suddenly they appeared ahead of us - some thirty motorcycle outriders and an unending column of vehicles displaying black crosses. They had not heard us arrive such was the noise of their tracks and engines which covered the roar of ours. I doubt very much that they thought there were any French fighters left in the skies to interrupt their 'marche triomphale' . Their anti-aircraft batteries did not react at all. The first tank in the column was neatly centred in my sight - a miss was impossible. I was about to fire - and then, there in the gun-sight, women and children, and a horse pulling a cart loaded with more refugees. If I unleashed a burst now I might damage the tank but I would inflict carnage on women and children. Despite my orders I did not open fire. Nor did Salaberry...."
Below; Dewoitine D 520 prototype no. 3 seen after capture by the Germans, probably Cazaux. This aircraft was written off in a takeoff accident on March 11, 1940. The hard-edged camouflage distinguishes this from D.520 no. 2.
How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose in May-June 1940? French claims for May-June can range from 300-1000 victories. Mombeek in his history of JG 2 quoted the following figures for Luftwaffe losses for this period; 460 fighters, 635 twin engine bombers and 150 Stukas for total losses amounting to 25% of Luftwaffe front-line strength. The current 'official' score for the French fighter squadrons as quoted by the SHD (Service Historique de la Défense) is 650-675 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down.
According to Peter Cornwell (page 529 'The Battle of France' ) the Luftwaffe lost no less than 3,278 aircrew killed (!) from Sept. ’39 through to the end of June 1940, as compared to the RAF’s 1,127 and the Armée de l’Air’s 923. Taking the period of the invasion on its own gives the German's a loss-rate during the campaign in France that was twice that of its BoB loss rate. Whatever the exact German losses for the French campaign they were pretty heavy. This obviously had an impact on the conduct of operations over England subsequently. In fact the 'myth' of French AF ineptitude during the Battle of France is probably closely related to the 'myth' of 'The Few' during the BoB.
D. 520 on display at the Le Bourget Air and Space museum. One of the last production examples, no. 862 was constructed for the Luftwaffe but is here repainted in the colours of GC III/6 ace Pierre Le Gloan..
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