Saturday, 10 October 2026
2000. Feindflug einer Fernaufklärerstaffel - Werner Breese 5.(F)/AufklGr. 122
Sunday, 20 September 2026
The court martial of Hptm. Willi Elstermann - I./JG 6 in Schroda, 21-22 January 1945
In July 1944 two Gruppen of Oblt. Johann Kogler's ZG 26 converted from the Me 410 to the Fw 190 and a new Jagdgeschwader 6 was established. Kogler retained his position as Kommodore. Hptm. Willi Elstermann was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 6. Elstermann was a pre-war pilot, born in December 1917, and a decorated career officer -awarded the EK I and the combat clasp in Gold - and rated as 'above average'. Having flown in ZG 52 - and been shot down by French H-75 Hawks during September 1939 - he flew combat in NJG 3 prior to being appointed Kdr. of II./ZG 26. His 'Einsatzfreudigkeit' was especially noted - his 'enthusiasm and commitment to combat'. By mid-January 1945 he had flown some 150 combat sorties and returned seven victories. Although he had been 'sanctioned' after the disastrous performance of his Gruppe in France during late August 1944 (some 50 machines lost in around two weeks combat) he had been re-appointed to command later in the year, taking over as Kommandeur of I./JG 6.
On Monday 22 January takeoffs were impossible at Schroda Ost due to weather conditions. I./JG 6 had twelve operational and four non-operational Focke-Wulf aircraft at Schroda; also present were elements of I./JG 301—with two operational and two non-operational Fw 190s each—and III./SG 77 with eight aircraft. Other units had parked their aircraft at the airfield and handed them over to the airfield commandant. All told, the Schroda-Ost airfield held approximately 65 aircraft. Over the course of the day and the following night, the situation there became critical, as the capture of the airfield by Soviet troops became ever more likely. In light of this, the Kommandeur I./JG 6 was placed in command of I./JG 301 and III./SG 77 present on site, by order of the 3. FL. Div. (3rd Air Division). Furthermore, it was ordered that only the minimum number of aircrew and technical personnel required to ready the aircraft for takeoff and ferry them away were to remain at the airfield. All other personnel were to withdraw immediately to Posen, travelling by road as a unified group. The mission assigned to the Gruppenkommandeur I./JG 6 was to order and oversee the transfer of the aircraft to Posen, subject to weather conditions. As a precaution, the aircraft were to be concentrated together in a tight formation and at the same time prepared for demolition—an action the Gruppenkommandeur was to order should the airfield come under direct fire and takeoffs become impossible. Subsequently, the detachment remaining at the airfield was to be deployed for the airfield's continued defense or begin the march back to Posen, in accordance with the instructions of the Horstkommandant (Airfield Commander). As the situation grew increasingly critical and repeated telephone appeals to the 3rd Air Division failed to yield an evacuation order, the Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 6—acting in concert with the commanders of I./JG 301 and III./SG 77—decided to load the available vehicles and ready all personnel (with the exception of the I./JG 6 Gruppenkommandeur himself and a small demolition squad) for departure outside the airfield perimeter. That evening, when the column could see from a distance that the Schroda-West airfield was being destroyed and demolitions were also taking place at Schroda Ost, it began its withdrawal. In reality, however, only the permanent structures at the East airfield were demolished at that stage, while the remaining detachment continued to hold its position. It was not until 05:30 on the morning of January 23—prompted by the approach of enemy forces—that the aircraft assembled at the airfield were actually destroyed - some 60-odd aircraft. As a result of these events, court-martial proceedings were initiated against the three Kommandeure involved; following an oral hearing on January 27, all three were sentenced to several weeks of aggravated barracks arrest ( geschärfter Stubenarrest) for negligent breach of duty..
The events at Schroda-Ost as recounted above are based on the field court-martial verdict issued by the Special Court of the Commander-in-Chief of *Luftflotte* 6 on 27 January 1945 (BA/MA RL 7/529).
. To quote from JfV 16/I (Prien/Balke)
".. The verdict leaves a decidedly ambivalent impression; while formally correct, the presiding judge appears to have been torn between the higher command's implicit demand for harsh penalties and a discernible desire to ensure justice for the highly decorated officers on trial—particularly given that they were neither responsible for the desperate situation that arose at Schroda nor had their actions resulted in damage that could have been avoided through proper conduct... "
".. The accused are convicted of negligent breach of duty— Hptm. Wodtke also of negligent disobedience—as follows:
Sunday, 23 August 2026
De-mining the Danube - Minensuchgruppe 1 (MSGr 1) by Peter Kassak
The Luftwaffe's Minensuchgruppe 1 (MSGr 1)—widely known as Sonderkommando "Mausi"—was a specialized airborne mine-sweeping unit formed in late 1940 to trigger and detonate British magnetic sea mines using modified Junkers Ju 52/3m aircraft fitted with massive electrical energizing rings. "Mausi" was short for Magnetspule or magnetic coil. Peter Kassak provides some details of mine-clearing operations flown by the Luftwaffe's specialist Ju 52 mine-sweepers along the Danube as the Allies sought to interdict German oil supplies ..
The recent hot weather throughout Europe (summer 2026) has caused a significant drop in river water levels - even in one of the largest rivers in Europe, the Danube. And the low water levels have exposed some long-hidden WW II relics. Aside from the wrecks of ships in Serbia, or Hungary, there was also ammunition of various types located on the banks of the river. In the southern Slovakian part of the river (the river is a border between the Slovak republic and Hungary) two RAF mines were located and detonated on 3 August causing the suspension of river traffic on the Danube for several hours. Given the location near the village of Virt, the British sea mines most probably originated from the “gardening” mission flown on 29 May 1944 by the RAF's 205 Group and its 178 Squadron Liberator crews. The Wellington and Liberator crews had to sow their mines (hence the slang term 'gardening') at low level on moonlit nights, running the gauntlet of night fighters, flak and balloon barrages.
During WWII, the smooth functioning of the Danube river transport system was crucial for Germany, and its disruption was highly desirable. Two main options presented themselves to Allied planners in Italy. One involved the destruction of the oil refineries, port facilities and other infrastructure. The other required the interdiction of Danube river traffic by mining. Both options would be resorted to as the USAAF and RAF sought to cut Germany off from its much-needed Romanian oil.
The first attempt to disrupt Danube shipping was undertaken by the Russians in September 1941, when Soviet commandos penetrated the German lines from Bessarabia and dropped drifting contact mines in the river. These were however ineffective, damaging no ships although several were struck by them. Traffic was halted for 12 hours only. The first attempt by the Western allies to hinder the supply of Romanian oil to Germany was undertaken on 12 June 1942, when B-24 Liberators of the USAAF’s HALPRO detachment attacked the oilfields at Ploesti. However, the main “gardening” campaign was performed by RAF 205 Group between April to October 1944 and had the most impact. It is estimated that between April and October Allied mines caused a reduction of at least 60% in Danube priority traffic, while ordinary commercial traffic suffered still more seriously to the extent of complete interdiction in certain categories.
German counter measures involving the Luftwaffe were essentially two-fold - night-fighters were scrambled almost nightly with some noticeable results during late summer 1944 (also described in the latest book from AWP, "Nachtjagd over the Eastern Front"). The second counter measure involving the Luftwaffe was the deployment of mine-sweeping aircraft. MSGr 1 Ju 52s swept the river about four hours daily, usually in the early morning and again in the evening. These times were chosen because experience had shown that Allied fighter planes were least likely to appear then. It is believed that 165 mines were detonated by the aircraft.
Below; Ju 52 MS version flying over the bridge in Bratislava in summer 1944, source Dusan Bublik
DW 1 (Directional Wireless 1) was the RAF codename for a magnetically energized (degaussing) ring some 50 feet in diameter, fitted to some Mark I Wellington bombers and used to sweep magnetic sea mines by detonation. The aircraft flew low over the sea; the mines were detecting the magnetic field of the DW 1 and exploded accordingly. The crew of the Wellington were successful in destroying a magnetic mine on their very first sortie on the 8 January 1940 (aircraft was P2518 piloted by test pilot ‘Bruin’ Purvis, navigator Lt.Cdr. ‘Ben’ Bolt with Sq/Ldr. John Chaplin operating the gear in the fuselage). The Germans adopted the idea and fitted similar degaussing devices and rings to a number of Ju 52s. The Ju 52/3m g4e MS (Minen Sucher = mine finder) was fitted with a large Dural hoop braced beneath the wing and fuselage. This hoop was energized by an additional motor installed in the fuselage. The magnetic field generated thus triggered magnetically fused mines.
The advantage of the Ju 52/3m for mine-sweeping operations was that it was easy to bring into action at various locations, and over remote areas. It could search for mines that were undetected by conventional water-borne mine sweepers. But there were also disadvantages. The radius of effectiveness of each aircraft was only about 50 metres. Operations could not be undertaken in bad weather and low visibility because the strong magnetic field produced by the mine degaussing equipment caused on-board compasses to malfunction. And the aircraft’s armament was weak, and insufficient to defend the crew if attacked. However, the machine had an endurance of around four hours at an average speed of 180 km/h.
The M-devices featuring the huge MS ring (MS-Magnetspule) mounted under each aircraft were of course used for exploding magnetic mines. Other types of mines were acoustic. For sweeping , the so-called A-device (A for Acoustic) was used. Once installed in the Ju 52/3m, the acoustic device continuously changed channels and radioed various wavelengths, which triggered mines to explode. ELM/A mines were sensitive within 2200- 2600 meters and detonated at 600-800 meters from the source of the signal. ELM/A-St mines were sensitive within 600-800 meters and detonated at 200- 300 meters from the source. The signal wavelength was changed every 30 seconds, and was organized in 10 channels. In some cases, both magnetic and acoustic mines were dropped by RAF crews. Therefore combined formations of Ju-52/3m mine sweepers could be flown - aircraft carrying the M-device flew ahead, one aircraft carrying an A-device following. The distance between the planes varied according to flight speed and height, to prevent damage to following aircraft by the delayed detonation of a mine.
The unit tasked with minesweeping was Minensuchgruppe 1 (MSGr. 1) formed in October 1942. The task of the Minensuchverbände (mine searching units) was to clear sea and river water routes of mines. MSGr.1 comprised six independent Staffeln, which were active in various theatres of operations. To operate over the Black Sea and later the Danube, a 3. Staffel was established in Varna. From February to October 1944 it was registered as an independent 3. Minensuchstaffel, using Junkers Ju-52/3m MS aircraft. For the last two months of its existence, it moved to Neusatz. Each Minensuchstaffel consisted of 18 Ju 52/3m MS aircraft, of which 14 were so-called M-planes and 4 were A-planes. But between June and September 3. Staffel MSGr.1 had 24 aircraft on charge, due to losses and also greater operational demands. At that time, according to some sources, six planes were stationed at Budapest (Budaőrs airport), eleven in Belgrade and seven in Craiova/Walachei. The aircraft carried the code 3K+.
At the beginning of April 1944, the unit had only one aircraft, but received 17 more during the month. In June one aircraft was lost to US fighters. This happened on June 6 north-west of Turnu Severin, Romania, where 1st Lt. James W. Stegman of the 82nd FG/96th FS claimed a Ju 52 with a strange ring device under the fuselage. This correlates with the loss of Ju 52/3m MS W.Nr. 501313 at location 44°46’ N, 21°32’ E. Its crew consisted of pilot Lt. Oskar Fuhrmann, observer Flg. Heinz Rietzsch, Onboard mechanic Ofw. Franz Bußkamp and gunner Fw. Max Muchowski. All four were KIA. 3./MSGr.1 ended the month of June with 24 aircraft. Four more Ju 52s were lost through enemy action in July. Three losses occurred on July 4th, when three pilots, 1st Lt. Walther J. Carroll Jr., Capt. Richard M. Gangel and 1st Lt. Arthur W. Kidder Jr., all of the 96th FS, 82nd FG each claimed a Ju 52 with a ring device shot down north west of Craiova, Romania. The losses were however made up and the strength of the unit remained 24 aircraft. August brought one loss due to enemy fighters, which was replaced. The only recorded loss of this unit for August, however, was due to a mine explosion. It occurred on 4 August and three men on board the aircraft died. On 25 August 3. Staffel of MSGr. 1 moved to Belgrade from Rumania. September 1944 was a disaster for the unit as 10 Ju 52/3ms were lost due to enemy action, with three more in October. The only loss we could identify occurred on 5 October, when a Ju-52/3m MS was lost at Dunaremete at km 1826 at 16:04 hours. Again, the cause was a mine explosion. The four crew were killed (pilot Ofhr. Karl Matula, radio operator Uffz. Willi Hendler, mechanic Fw. Hermann Fritsch and gunner Uffz. Franz Dreßler).
Above; Karl Matula, pilot in a Minensuchverband, killed during a Danube mine-sweeping sortie with his crew at the controls of his Ju 52 on 5 October 1944. Sterbebild, source eBay.com
Tuesday, 28 April 2026
Fw. Albert Ullrich - an ace in 6./JG 77 - archive photo scan #51
Albert Ullrich was born 24 April 1920 in Sandweier (Baden-Württemberg). He enlisted in the Luftwaffe in 1941 and was in various flying schools (Marienbad, Karlsbad, Danzig and Magdeburg) before joining the EJG Süd (Orange). In August 1943 he was posted to 6./JG 77 then based in Italy. The Italian 'change-of-sides' took place shortly thereafter and II./JG 77 took on charge a full complement of Macchi Mc 205 fighters to make up the slow deliveries of Bf 109s that had been briefly interrupted. The Macchi 205 Veltro (or 'Maggie' as Ullrich referred to it in his correspondence..) was a 'more difficult' machine to fly ('schwieriger zu fliegen') and there were several losses - certain manoeuvres had to be flown with more speed and altitude than was usual in the Bf 109. The 'narrow' cockpit meant that pilots could not fly with German parachute packs and had to use Italian chutes - after one bad incident it was discovered that these had been 'sabotaged' after being 'treated' with acid...
Fw. Albert Ullrich (6./JG 77) in the cockpit of a Macchi 205. Ullrich achieved his first victory on 11 November 1943 - a B-24.
In his correspondence (dated 1991, letter #7) he described his first victory, achieved at the controls of a Macchi 205, a B-24 downed in PQ 75673 (south of Turin) on 11 November 1943;
"..a Schwarm was scrambled ('Alarmstart') under Lt. Ahlers. We were not in radio contact ('Funkverbindung') as the German sets could not be fitted in the Macchis. When I spotted the enemy aircraft I signalled this to Ahlers with hand gestures - which he appeared not to have understood. I dropped out of our formation and closed on the Viermot alone, setting one engine on fire with my bursts. On my second - and final - pass, the crew bailed out of their machine. Some six or seven men hanging under their chutes. Their Viermot went down in the vicinity of Cuneo. I do not know if the other Staffeln achieved any victories with the "Maggie" but this was the only enemy machine shot down by my 6. Staffel in the 205 .."
American troops entered the Italian capital on 4 June 1944. The next afternoon six 'waves' of B-24s and medium bombers attacked Ferrara, Forlì, and Rimini. The Bf 109s of II./JG 77 engaged them in combat from their airfield in Ferrara and claimed victories. Ullrich was airborne from Poggio-Renatico with his 6./JG 77. He encountered Liberators with fighter escort and downed his third B-24. He landed at 13:40. On 13 June 6./JG 77 was up from Poggio at around 08:20 to intercept more formations of escorted B-24s. Fw. Ullrich claimed his fourth victory against a B-24. His Staffel landed at Lavariano. By evening, the repaired runway at Ferrara allowed the two Staffeln - grounded since the bombing of 5 June - to rejoin 6. Staffel at Poggio Renatico. However, as early as the 16th, fearing a partisan attack, the Bf 109s temporarily left Poggio for Lavariano. This field was better situated for intercepting raids toward Austria. According to his own Flugbuch Ullrich downed his 5th B-24 on 22 June.
Ullrich shifted to the Eastern Front with his Staffel early in 1945. By now Staffelkapitän Deicke had been appointed Kommandeur of I./JG 77 and Ullrich was a seasoned ace whose experience was indispensable in 6./JG 77. He shot down his first Soviet fighter, an La-5, on 23 March 1945. He downed two Il-2s on 29 March. Ullrich left 6./JG 77 in April 1945 to be trained on the Me 262 at Lechfeld. He survived a transfer flight to Prague Rusin at the controls of a Me 262 and with a group of comrades 'absconded' in a truck as the Russians approached the city. He surrendered to American forces and was released by the French in 1947. J. Matthews credits him with 11 'claims', six of these over Italy and five in the 'East' during the last two months of the war.
Sunday, 22 February 2026
" I could not love the 109 the way I loved my friend Brewster.." - F2A Buffalo - Brewster Model 239
Lentolaivue 24 Brewster being refueled in Tiiksjärvi. The Model 239 had two 300 ltr integral wing tanks
I guess most aviation enthusiasts know something about the F2A Buffalo - typically that the USMC, the RAF and other air forces suffered at the hands of the Japanese while north of the Arctic Circle the Finns achieved some success with the type against the Soviets during the Continuation war.
" The Marines on Midway had no combat experience and were fighting IJN pilots with extensive combat experience. The Dutch and British faced similarly experienced IJAAF pilots over the DEI and Malaysia, with limited time in the Buffaloes and experience in high altitude fighting over Europe. Fighting in the Pacific was at lower altitudes and required different tactics. The Finns were all combat veterans of the Winter War and when the later Continuation War began they were also quite familiar with their Buffaloes. They knew their aircraft and their enemy..."
The F2A was of course probably not as bad as it is often portrayed. Usually decried as being 'heavy and under-powered', on both counts the F2A-3 (Wright R-1820 Cyclone) came out with better numbers than the F4F Wildcat (Twin Wasp R-1830). The Finnish B-239s were modified from US Navy F2A-1s, featuring a more powerful engine, no armour, integral wing tanks, and extra machine guns. The elite Finnish Lelv 24 claimed 477 victories for the loss of 19 in combat and six more in accidents or destroyed on the ground during the period 1941-44 in their Brewsters. This blog is not about to suggest that the Buffalo - or Brewster Model 239 as the export 'version' was designated - was superior to the Bf 109 G. But by certain criteria it actually was.
The Buffalo performed well in Finland. Firstly, it was probably the easiest of the Finnish fighters to handle all round. In the summer of 1941 there were fighter pilots flying it with fewer than 150 total hours. Second, it was quite reliable. It was a sound design, no major faults and it was also "erk friendly". Third, for a significant period of time its performance was adequate (up to late 1942). The Soviets still used lots of I-153 and I-16. Fourth, the enemy pilots in general were not particularly good and especially their aggressiveness left much to be desired.
Pure comparison accounts are surprisingly few even if most Buffalo pilots continued on to the 109. In the 1990s the-then director of the FAF museum published his 109 book which had a chapter with personal reports. The author had requested accounts from pilots and mechanics for their opinions on the 109. Basically very few were by "the aces" (most had died by then) and most were from pilots who flew it only post-war. There is quite a lot of variance. For example, Eino Luukkanen considered the 109 easier to handle than the Fokker D. 21. But he was one of the most experienced of them all.
SSgt Heimo 'Hemmi' Lampi recounted his attachment to the Brewster to historian Dan Ford;
“The old friend Messerschmitt, who was a real hard fighter, was my next plane after the Brewster, but it totally lacked in humaneness.. [..]..I could not love it the way I loved my friend Brewster. Nor any other plane for that matter.”
The men of Llv 24's 4th Flight putting CO Llv 24' Major 'Eka' Magnusson's aircraft BW-380 in the firing butts, Rantasalmi, July 10, 1941. The fuel drum on which the machine is about to be balanced is just visible. Note tactical number 'black 1'
Many have claimed that at 25-to-1 Finnish Brewsters recorded the highest victory-loss ratio of the war. Juutilainen described his combat experiences in the memoir Double Fighter Knight, referring to his two Mannerheim Crosses. He pressed attacks to minimum range to ensure lethal accuracy. Juutilainen recalled one particularly close-in dogfight with a Soviet Hurricane:
" I came in at high speed from above and behind and pulled the throttle back to idle. The target grew in my gunsight. It was a very clean airplane and looked brand new. Now I was approaching the perfect firing range and looked around me one more time. No other enemies were in sight. The pipper on my sight was just slightly in front of the nose of the Hurricane, and my glide angle was about 10 degrees. Now I could count rivets on the target..."
The Buffalo is often thought of as being obsolete by 1941. It could not survive in Western Europe and did not survive in the Pacific. Ultimately the Finns were successful with the type because they stripped out as much weight as possible, leading to even better performance. It was piloted by combat veterans who knew the tactics of their enemy and in an environment that better suited the aircraft. And for the first year or so of the Continuation War they were also up against ancient I-16s and other obsolescent Soviet types flown by poorly trained pilots.
Tuesday, 9 December 2025
Werftzug. mot 3/20 Ju 88s of KG 76 - archive image scan #50
#50 in our ongoing series of rare images scanned for this blog from various 'professional' and 'personal' collections. A selection of these KG 76 Ju 88s recently appeared for sale on ebay.de but obviously the seller didn't post them in this quality. Professionally photographed, they depict the activities of a motorised Werftzug on an Eastern Front airfield (Kursk) during the summer of 1942. The Werftzug was an organizational unit, specifically a technical or maintenance platoon/section, typically attached at the Gruppe level. Its primary function was to provide essential maintenance, technical support, and repair services for the aircraft within its assigned Gruppe, which usually consisted of approximately 30-40 aircraft. The personnel in the Werftzug included ground crew, mechanics, and other technical specialists responsible for keeping the aircraft operational. The Werftzug was an integral part of the operational structure of a flying unit, ensuring that the aircraft were maintained and ready for combat missions. The term Zug translates to "platoon," indicating a relatively small but vital body of specialist personnel and equipment. Note the 'F1' code on the Ju 88 (KG 76) and the 'C' heavy fighter with the 'fake' over-painted nose intended to 'disguise' the heavy forward firing armament.
Wednesday, 5 November 2025
1/72 - I.A.R. 80/81 family by IBG Models - I.A.R.80 A & 81C released - new I.A.R.80 B over Stalingrad due this month!
Sunday, 12 October 2025
Doras of Jagdgeschwader 6 on the Eastern Front - archive photo scan #43
Brand-new Dora-9s as delivered to JG 6 early in 1945. These machines seen in Welzow are still in their factory finish. Previously published in Rodeike's 'Jagdflugzeug 190'
“ ..Shortly before I take off Fridolin rings up and tells me to fly straight to the Sudetenland; he is just on the point of moving the unit to Kummer am-See near Niemes. In the aircraft at first I feel very strange, but I am soon back in my element. Steering is complicated by the fact that I can use only one foot on the rudder-bar. I can exert no pressure on the right because I have not yet got an artificial limb ..[..], So an hour and a half later I land on my new airfield at Kummer.. our airfield lies amid magnificent scenery between two spurs of the Sudeten mountains surrounded by forest with good-sized lakes near by and at Kummer itself a lovely forest-girt tarn. On the other side of the Sudeten mountains it is still foggy and as we cannot go out on a sortie I take up a FW 190 D 9 and give an exhibition of low and high flying acrobatics. That genius, Lt. Klatzschner, my engineer officer, has already readjusted the foot brakes, which are indispensable for this fast aircraft, so that they can be operated by hand. As I come down to land all the men are gesticulating violently and pointing up into the sky. I look up and through the gaps in the ragged cloud cover I can see American fighters and Jabos, Mustangs and Thunderbolts circling above…..[..] .Fresh weather reports from the Gorlitz-Bautzen area forecast a gradual clearing-up of the weather, so we take off. The Soviets have by-passed Gorlitz and pushed on beyond Bautzen, which is encircled with its German garrison, in the hope of reaching Dresden by way of Bischofswerda to effect the collapse of Field Marshal Schoerner's front..”
Their Doras loaded with AB 250 Abwurfbehälter the pilots of II./JG 6 flew ground-attack and strafing sorties against these Soviet spearheads pressing north along the Bautzen-Königswartha-Hoyerswerda road between Görlitz and Dresden.
According to Rudel’s account, Bautzen was ‘relieved’ and a large number of vehicles and tanks destroyed. The logbooks of two surviving Fw 190 D-9 pilots allow a glimpse at some of the last-ditch sorties flown. Just after mid-day on Tuesday 24 April Tuesday Fw. Karl ‘Charly’ Hoffmann was up from Kummer am See (Niemes-Süd) in his ‘black 4’ and claimed four Soviet trucks destroyed before landing safely at 13:30. His comrade, Ofw. Herrmann ‘Hermy’ Härtel of 7./JG 6, was airborne at 15:20, returning to Kummer at 16:15 having again accounted for four trucks as noted in his Flugbuch. Härtel had flown over one hundred combat sorties since 1940 and had claimed his first victories just days earlier, downing two Yak fighters on April 17.
The following day Soviet forces reached the Elbe at Torgau (Saxony) where they linked up with American forces. The Doras of II./JG 6 continued to fly defensive sorties. Fw. Hoffmann was airborne at the controls of ‘black 2’ in the sector Sagan-Cottbus. Flying Fw 190 D-9 ‘Langnase’ ‘black 8’ Härtel was up from Kummer am See but landed late in the afternoon in Görlitz. Despite adverse weather conditions that hampered flying activity during early May, Ofw. Härtel noted several further sorties in his log book. On May 5 he flew a combat mission from the Feldflugplatz (field strip) of Alt-Chemnitz - some five days after Hitler’s suicide. On May 8 both pilots flew west into Halle-Nietleben and American captivity, probably the last flights undertaken by the Fw 190 D-9.
Tuesday, 7 October 2025
NAG Bf 109 G-4 - archive photo scan #41
Sunday, 7 September 2025
JG 77 Herz As in the 'East', January -February 1945 (Bf 109 K-4)
The last fortnight of 1944 operating over the Ardennes and western Germany were some of the hardest days yet endured by the men of JG 77 - there was hardly a single sortie flown that was not marked by heavy losses. In total that short period saw 26 pilots killed, 13 seriously injured and one taken captive and around 80 Messerschmitts lost! No fewer than 26 of these were III. Gruppe Bf 109 K-4s. Among the losses were the Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 77 Hptm. Lothar Baumann, the Staffelkapitän of 2./JG 77 Oblt. Iring Englisch (replaced by Lt. Ulrich Peiper), and 133-victory ace and Geschwaderkommodore Maj. Johannes Wiese. Ordered up by Galland on the morning of 25 December, and heading north-west over the Ruhr at 8,700m, Wiese and what was left of his Stabsschwarm (Fw. Hansch) failed to rendezvous with I./JG 77 over Duisberg and found themselves caught up with 401 Sqd Spitfires over Euskirchen;
" ...Flying at about 8700 m over Duisberg, I saw the Rhine in front of me and a little behind me - flying from west to east - enemy fighters. After a brief wing waggle, I immediately made a steep turn to the left towards their formation and, as I started the attack, I recognised further aircraft, now clearly identified as Spitfires, above, below and beside me. In the course of the ensuing sharp turn, I had difficulty jettisoning my drop tank. Behind me I saw a machine burning brightly. This was probably Fw. Hansch's aircraft. Despite all my evasive manoeuvres I came under repeated attack from all sides, received hits in the engine, a hit in the cabin and felt several impacts in the fuselage and tail. I had thrown the machine into such wild manoeuvres that it was now out of control. With the cockpit icing up and the engine smoking and losing power, I decided to parachute clear.."
14 January 1945 saw major battles in the air over the south-eastern corner of Germany. I. and II./JG 77 operated primarily to counter Allied ‘Jabos’ around Bastogne and St. Vith. While I./JG 77 suffered two fatalities over Münster/Düsseldorf, II./JG 77 had six killed and four wounded including Uffz. Fritz Giere who was forced to bail out of his G-10 in the region of Hamm (presumably Hamm am Rhein, a municipality south of Darmstadt). According to the loss listing Giere was shot up under his chute and came down in the Rhine and drowned. A Spitfire and a Beaufighter were claimed by II./JG 77.
On 15 January I./JG 77 received orders to transfer to the East, under new Kommodore Maj. Erich Leie - previously Kommandeur of I./JG 2 and high-scoring ace with JG 51 in the East (117 claims by October 1944). Below; part of a photo-set to mark the award of Leie's RK (21 victories) taken on August 1, 1941.
The situation on the 'Eastern Front' was catastrophic. The pilots of JG 77 flew several sorties per day, with the futile aim of slowing the Soviet advance. Casualties, mainly due to the Red Army's solid anti-aircraft fire, were severe and the incomplete official lists for this period give only a small idea of the scale of the losses. Nevertheless, although the Soviet air force enjoyed numerical superiority equal to that of the Western Allies, a handful of German aces continued to add to their scoreboards - undoubtedly due to the fact that the Soviet Boston and Pe-2 medium bombers were, for example, less ‘sophisticated’ than the B-24s and B-17s of the US bomber formations and the Soviet pilots less well trained (even if they were more of a handful than those encountered during ‘Barbarossa’).
Tuesday, 2 September 2025
1. Flieger Div. activity summary March 1945, Fw. Helmut Mischke III./SG 1
During Feb-March 1945 1. Fliegerdivsion was subordinated to II. Fliegerkorps (previously Luftflotte 6) on the Eastern Front. A Fliegerdivision usually commanded a mixed force of no more than 5 or 6 Gruppen that included reconnaissance, fighter and ground-attack units. By this stage of the war the Russians were barely 100 miles from Berlin.
".. During the first three days of March 1945 units of 1. Fliegerdiv. destroyed at least 74 tanks, damaging a further 39 in continuous attacks..
On 1 March Kommandeur and Ritterkreuz holder III./SG 1 Maj. (Karl) Schrepfer flew his 800th combat sortie. On 11 March our fighter aircraft scored 25 'kills' while our Schlacht ground attack Fw 190s downed 12 enemy aircraft. Of note was the performance of Ofw. (Helmut) Mischke of III./SG 1 who, in two ground-attack sorties, scored 9 victories, 4 of which were returned while his Fw 190 was fully loaded. Eichenlaub holder Maj. Schroer, Kommodore of JG 3, returned victories 104-106 on 11 March and added another three on 15 March..."
( note: Kracker re Mischke "..17 known Western (sic) victories between 20 February and 11 March, 1945 with his bomb attached! (re-sic) Eight of these victories were scored on 20 February, 1945 and nine on 11 March, 1945..." )

















































