A summary of the activities of NSGr.8 for the month of March 1945, dated 31.03.45, and written up by Major and Gruppenkommandeur Johann Trnka for his 'parent-command' 4 Fliegerdivision (BA RL 7-6/21)
1) During operations on moonlit nights, sightings of individual enemy night-fighters were reported. However, these reports could not be confirmed with certainty. Recently, enemy anti-aircraft artillery has frequently appeared to use tracer ammunition at night. No enemy searchlight activity was observed in the front-line area.
2.) Own operational activity:
Over the course of the month, 178 Ju 87s, 6 Ju 188s, 4 Ju 88s, and 2 Go 145s were deployed across 7 operational days. The following ordnance was dropped: 61 AB 500s, 143 AB 250 SD 16s, 262 AB 250 SD 16s, 1 "Mark-rot 500," 5 "Mark-grün 500s," 4 "Mark-grün 250s," (target markers), 250 SD 70s, 19 SD 250s, 6 SC 500s, and 37 LC 50s.
The attacks targeted troop concentrations, artillery positions, and vehicle concentrations in the areas of Gorgast, Manschnow, Neu-Manschnow, Reithwein, Göritz, and Lebus, as well as routes leading up to the Oder crossings near Rathstock and Göritz.
Given the favorable weather conditions, the operations were carried out with the targets illuminated and marked by Ju 88 aircraft. As the targets were clearly identified by the aircrews and subsequent bombing patterns were observed, it can be assumed with certainty that the enemy suffered significant losses in both personnel and materiel.
3.) Notable successes
Following the attack on Lebus on 25 March 1945 (blog note : a small town in eastern Germany located approximately 80 to 90 kilometres east of Berlin, sitting on the west bank of the Oder River) the 712th Infantry [Division] reported:
"Enemy staging areas disrupted by bombs and artillery fire. Caused by bombs: Large fires in the centre of Lebus—likely fuel—and an ammunition depot destroyed. Casualties not yet determined.
The intended attack (detected via radio intelligence at 06:15) was thwarted. The bombs landed accurately— primarily on the eastern and northern parts of Lebus, but also across the rest of the area. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was minimal. Furthermore, it was reported via radio transmission: Enemy staging areas were shattered by bombs and artillery, preventing them from launching their attack. Fires and explosions—flames visible in Lebus.
The enemy is constructing trenches and field fortifications opposite our own main battle line (HKL). Enemy troops are regrouping throughout the entire sector. There is renewed artillery activity in and around Lebus.
Enemy artillery is ranging in on the main battle line and the area near the front. Constant enemy aerial reconnaissance. On 27 March, 1945, the Küstrin Fortress command reported: Our own ground-attack aircraft sorties were on target and provided significant relief.
4.) Specific operational findings:
a)
Coordinated attacks in Staffel strength (approximately 15 aircraft), led by a Ju 88 acting as a pathfinder (Beleuchter) have proven highly effective. By illuminating the target and marking it with target-marker bombs, crews can orient themselves precisely within the operational area, allowing them to execute attacks under optimal conditions. The accuracy of these strikes was excellent in every instance. Because the crews attack in rapid succession, the formations are generally able to verify their own strike results.
b)
With visibility less than 5 km/cloud base below 500 m, operations are rarely worthwhile, as the resulting flight difficulties and poor target-identification capabilities preclude effective dive-bombing attacks.
c)
During attacks in the immediate vicinity of the front line, it is crucial for our own troops to signal their positions—for instance, by using white flares —to indicate their location relative to the enemy.
2.) Own operational activity:
Over the course of the month, 178 Ju 87s, 6 Ju 188s, 4 Ju 88s, and 2 Go 145s were deployed across 7 operational days. The following ordnance was dropped: 61 AB 500s, 143 AB 250 SD 16s, 262 AB 250 SD 16s, 1 "Mark-rot 500," 5 "Mark-grün 500s," 4 "Mark-grün 250s," (target markers), 250 SD 70s, 19 SD 250s, 6 SC 500s, and 37 LC 50s.
The attacks targeted troop concentrations, artillery positions, and vehicle concentrations in the areas of Gorgast, Manschnow, Neu-Manschnow, Reithwein, Göritz, and Lebus, as well as routes leading up to the Oder crossings near Rathstock and Göritz.
Given the favorable weather conditions, the operations were carried out with the targets illuminated and marked by Ju 88 aircraft. As the targets were clearly identified by the aircrews and subsequent bombing patterns were observed, it can be assumed with certainty that the enemy suffered significant losses in both personnel and materiel.
3.) Notable successes
Following the attack on Lebus on 25 March 1945 (blog note : a small town in eastern Germany located approximately 80 to 90 kilometres east of Berlin, sitting on the west bank of the Oder River) the 712th Infantry [Division] reported:
"Enemy staging areas disrupted by bombs and artillery fire. Caused by bombs: Large fires in the centre of Lebus—likely fuel—and an ammunition depot destroyed. Casualties not yet determined.
The intended attack (detected via radio intelligence at 06:15) was thwarted. The bombs landed accurately— primarily on the eastern and northern parts of Lebus, but also across the rest of the area. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was minimal. Furthermore, it was reported via radio transmission: Enemy staging areas were shattered by bombs and artillery, preventing them from launching their attack. Fires and explosions—flames visible in Lebus.
The enemy is constructing trenches and field fortifications opposite our own main battle line (HKL). Enemy troops are regrouping throughout the entire sector. There is renewed artillery activity in and around Lebus.
Enemy artillery is ranging in on the main battle line and the area near the front. Constant enemy aerial reconnaissance. On 27 March, 1945, the Küstrin Fortress command reported: Our own ground-attack aircraft sorties were on target and provided significant relief.
4.) Specific operational findings:
a)
Coordinated attacks in Staffel strength (approximately 15 aircraft), led by a Ju 88 acting as a pathfinder (Beleuchter) have proven highly effective. By illuminating the target and marking it with target-marker bombs, crews can orient themselves precisely within the operational area, allowing them to execute attacks under optimal conditions. The accuracy of these strikes was excellent in every instance. Because the crews attack in rapid succession, the formations are generally able to verify their own strike results.
b)
With visibility less than 5 km/cloud base below 500 m, operations are rarely worthwhile, as the resulting flight difficulties and poor target-identification capabilities preclude effective dive-bombing attacks.
c)
During attacks in the immediate vicinity of the front line, it is crucial for our own troops to signal their positions—for instance, by using white flares —to indicate their location relative to the enemy.

